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Your educators can be nothing more
than your liberators. And that is
the secret of education; it does not
pixjvide artificial limbs, false noses
or eyeglasses - on the contrary , what
could provide these gifts is merely
pseudo-education. Education is rather
liberation, a rooting out of all weeds,
rubbish and vermin from around the buds
of the plants, a radiation of light and
warmth, a loving, whispering fall of night
It is the imitation and adoration of
nature in her motherly and compassionate
mood; it is the consummation of nature when
it prevents her cruel and pitiless attacks
and turns them to the good, when it draws
a veil over the expression of her
stepmotherly
attitude and sad irrationality.
Schopenhauer as Educator
Chapter One : Introduction
Rationale
This dissertation will be an exegesis of the educational thought
of Friedrich Nietzsche with the central focus on his conception of the
teacher as liberator. This will involve an analysis of his conception of
freedom, an analysis which involves a grasp of his philosophy as a whole.
Nietzsche never wrote a systematic educational philosophy. Yet, in a
certain sense, education is his primary concern. "I teach you the overman.
Man is something that shall be overcome. . .The overman is the meaning of
the earth. Let your will says: the overman shall be the meaning of the
earth. In Nietzsche's view, the conscious production of the overman,
a person who is characterized by a conscious will to power, a conscious
striving for self overcoming and creativity was the primary task of
educators. "To educate educators! But the first ones must educate themselves!
2
And for these I write."
The impending nihilism of Western Europe brought about by the
question of and destruction of the old values and the recognition of the
death of God and the lack of absolutes had convinced Nietzsche that man would
have to create meaning for himself in this world. It was his sincere faith
•that this meaning could be found and loved, that the suffering and tragedy
of human existence could be fo\md meaningful within a joyous Weltanschauung
3 ,
that, on one hand would "remain faithful to the earth" and
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 124-25.
^ Notes. 1875. Portable
.
p. 50.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable , p. 125.
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on the other hand would render dignity and value to human existence.
I teach: that there are higher
and lower men, and that a single
individual can under certain
circumstances justify the existence
of a whole millenia - that is, a full,
rich, great, whole human being in
relation to pointless incomplete frag-
mentary men.
Nietzsche's educational philosophy is primarily concerned with the
production of these whole, free creators who my means of their creativity
would be able to assume the task of leadership in society. Educators
become the means by which these men must be produced; thus, in their
essential role they are liberators.
In Nietzsche's educational thought one finds certain key
conceptions that when comprehended render a total picture of his view of
the role of education in society: will to power, eternal recurrence,
sublimation, eros, creativity, innocence, solitude and the educator as
liberator. These concepts were not developed in his early works, two
of which dealt specifically with educational topics: The Future of
Educatxona^l
2
Institutions ^ and Schopenhauer as Educator. Thus to assume that one
can grasp Nietzsche's educational thought by studying these two
educational
treatises is incorrect. It is true that the germ of his
philosophy is
4
there but it is not until one closes his last work, Ecce
Homo that
one can begin to grasp his educational thought as a whole.
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation, p. 518.
2.PV., of Educational Institutions . The Complete Wqrte.
Votae III.
London and New York: The Macmillan Company, iy09-ll.
Reissued by Russe
Russell Company, New York, 1964.
^hohonenhauer as Eduoator. Hillesheiir, and Simpson Translation.^^
auction by Ellseo Vivas. Chicago, Gateway, Henry
Regnery Company, 1965. Here
in this study cited as Schopenhauer as
Educator.
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It is the pxirpose of this dissertation to exposit Nietzsche ' s
view of education by examining the aforementioned key conceptions and showing how
his educational thought revolves aroimd these conceptions, especially the
conception of teacher as liberator. For Nietzsche, education was a process of the
individual realization of self, a process of becoming free and creative. Its
objective he describes in his later works as the achievement of a certain world
view, what he terms a Dionyian state whih affirms life and existence in all
of its tragedy and actively creates out of love a place more beautiful for
human beings.
While many of his views regarding curricul\jm are outdated, certain
aspects of his thought have considerable relevance for the modem world. Although
Nietzsche comments to some extent on methodology and curriculum in his earlier
works, his comments are irrelevant and will not be discussed in this study. However,
his views on education as breeding and on the necessity of a curriculum which
"demands much at the proper time."^ in collaboration with an educator who out of
2 .
love and hardness calls for a "hard discipline. . .sternly demanded," xs
important for an understanding of Nietzsche’s conception of a sound education.
For Nietzsche, the stress is much more on the educator, his ability to "demand
the good, even the exceptional as the norm," his capacity to love and to
create in his student a sincere love for truth, creativity and freedom.
Nietzsche’s educational theory is post-darwinian. Although he
accepted the general theory of evolution, he felt that "Darwin overrated
the influence
of external circumstances...Essential in the life process is
precisely the tremendous
circumstances. Although his ideal of the educated man is a man
who is constantly
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation. p. 482.
^
Ibid.
^Ibid.
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engaged in the process of becoming, the overman who struggles to overcome
his limitations, he realizes that he is a "bridge that must be overcome" --
a bridge and not an end. Niet zsche was convinced that this superior man
would not come about by a natural process of evolution. On the contrary, for
the overman to become a reality, educators must will their existence consciously
and then set about systematically to bring them into reality. It is educators
who must take it upon themselves to educate these men of courage, independence and
responsibility. The question for educational philosophy is basically:
What type of man shall be bred , shall be
willed, for being higher in value, worthier
of life, more certain of the future? Even
in the past this higher type has appeared
often - but as a fortunate accident, as an
exception, never as something willed . In fact,
this has been the type most dreaded - almost the
most dreadful - and from the dread, the opposite
type was willed, bred and attained: the domestic
animal
,
th^ herd animal , the sick animal , the
Christian.
This overman was not envisioned as some new biological species. Rather
he was for Nietzsche a man who, acknowledging the death of God, would
out
of faith have the courage and strength to affirm life in its tragedy
and use xt
to create new values and a more humane society. He was a
man who had dedicated
himself to the ta'sk, the endless task, of self perfecting and
human fulfilling and
was capable of using his power to discipline himself and
sublimate his passions for
the sake of creation. He has taken upon himself the
responsibility of raising
himself above the animals and overcoming the inertia of
cultural conditioning and
endlessly striving to become mor e whole and more creative.
His creativity is
a product of his inner richness and his self knowledge.
Creativity is also tom
of his suffering.
^The Antichrist. The Portable Nietzsche.
Kaufmann Translation, p. 570 - 71 .
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"The eternal suffering of giving birth must exist together with the eternal
joy of creation and the eternal affirmation of the will to live, "^"Creation -
that is the great redemption. . .But that the creator may be, suffering is needed and
much change. Indeed, there must be much bitter dying in your life, you creators."^
In effect, Niet zsche was calling for a new man, a man who could take
it upon himself, in light of the death of God, to transfigure the human species and
nature itself without seeking comfort or meaning in the supernatural. It was
his deepest belief that man through his creative powers, his will to power, could
move toward perfectibility, never reached but always posited, and that it was
the primary role of education to produce this man. If education was to have
an aim it must be to produce men who have the ability to transfigure nature and
truly humanize it. The essence of this aim is process—an endless creativity
and renewal.
There is much in Nietzsche's educational thought that is relevant for
today's educator. For Nietzsche, the educator is in the foreground.
All the
curriculim and methodology reforms in the world will not replace the
educator,
the person who has the capacity for liberating others. He is the
means by which
the student can become himself. .For N ietzsche, true educators
are indispensable
Educators are needed who themselves have
been educated; superior, noble spirits,
proved at every moment by words and silence,
representing culture which has grown ripe and
sweet, not the learned louts whom secondary
schools and universities toda^ offer our
youth as "higher wet nurses."
^
Twilight of the Idols . The Portable Nietzsche .
Kaufmann translation
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Ibid , p. 199
^Twilight of the Idols. . Itid . p. 510.
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The educator's capacity to liberate is in direct proportion to the care
he has taken in educating himself. To the extent that he is a man of culture,
a man who has not only been exposed to the heritage of the past, but a man
who has become truly cultured and wise and who reflects a unity in his very
way of life, to that extent will he be able to aid others in liberation. He
himself, of necessity, must be a man who is constantly striving for freedom and
self perfection, a man who manifests this striving in his everyday life. Because
he has inculcated the art of self overcoming and self knowing, he is able
through communication and overflowing love to bring the student to the point
where he can begin in all sincerity the quest for self liberation.
The educator is a lover who by means of his will to power can create
Ideas and lead others to a love of beauty. Although he is interested in
"creating the most favorable conditions under which creatures of the highest
•yalue arise^" he is aware that the traits of his ideal—— independence,
2
hardness, coxirage, sincerity, feeling of responsibility" — cannot be taught.
They must be communicated through love to the student who out of a love for
his educator begins to emulate him. Although he is aware that he is
manipulating
the environment for the production of free men, he is also aware
that
his task of liberation requires more. It is only through his
very being, through
his creative love, that he is able to eventually help another
to free himself.
Without these educators "the very first condition of education
is lacking."
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann translation, p. 480.
^
Ibid .
^Ibid. p. 510.
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In leading the student to an awareness of the baseness of the values and
mores of contemporary society and in leading him to an awareness of his
own ignorance, the educator can aid the student in attaing freedom. His
role is achieved, when he is no longer necessary; that is, when the student
is capable of siorpassing his educator in the creation of beautiful ideas and
actions
.
In the end, all our great teachers have
come to a standstill, and it is by no
means in the noblest or most graceful
attitude that their weariness has brought
them to a pause: the same thing will happen
to you and me but what does this matter to^
either of us? OTHER BIRDS WILL FLY HIGHER
L
Although Nietzsche's conception of the teacher as liberator is the most
important conception of his educational thought, other corollary ideas are
also relevant for modem education. In this day of "free schools", and
"integrated day", Nietzsche can serve as a balance for educational philosophers
in their pursuit of meaningful education. His stress on the ultimate impor-
tance of self discipline and the pain involved in the self mastery of
oneself as a prerequisite for freedom is somehow refreshing and yet sobering.
Although no era has been more concerned with freedom than ours, few
educators talk about the pain which is the price of freedom. All too
frequently -modem educators assume that given the correct environment, freedom
will naturally result. The struggle, pain and sxiffaring xnvolved xn
the
endless quest of self mastery is often mitigated or ignored as if
talk of such
things is not in good taste. And to actually say that one of the
educators
„2
task to "to scourage this race of blessed people mercilessly
xnto unhappiness
is truly foreign to our ears. Nietzsche's awareness of the
danger of conformity,
^Dawn of Day . The Complete Works , p. 394-5.
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann translation, p. 482.
elaxation, Epicurean happiness, comfort, peace and his emphasis on pain, suffering
nd travail necessary for the breeding of creators, although upsetting is
insightful when one considers the necessities of a good education.
The breeding of suffering, of great
suffering—do you not know that only this
breeding has created all exaltations of man so
far? The tension of the soul in misfortune
that breeds its strength. .and whatever was
given to it of depth. . .spirit .. .greatness : was
it not given to jt... through the breeding of
great suffering.
Nietzsche also stresses the importance of the cultivation of the
art of solitude if one is to become free. To the extent that solitude is not
cultivated in schools, students are deprived of one of the most important
sources of self knowledge and self mastery. In these days of group activities and
group awareness, his stress on the necessity for solitude, not as an end in itself,
but as a precondition for meaningful action and deep self knowledge gives the
educational philosopher something to ponder. If anything, today in
American schools, the art of solitude is ignored and children never have the
opportunity of being alone.
Nietzsche's emphasis on self overcoming as the intrinsic meaning
and process of life is similar to Dewey's conception of growth.
The process of growth, of improvement, and
progress rather than the static outcome and
result becomes the significant thing. Not
health as an end fixed once and for all, but
the needed improvement in health, a continual
process is the end and good. The end is no
longer the terminus or limit to be reached.
Not perfection as a final goal but the ever
enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining
is the aim of living.
^
Beyond Good and Evil . Kaufmann Translation, p. 154
^John Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: 1962, p. 177
-9-
For Nietzsche, as for Dewey, growth is an endless task on which the futxire
of humanity depends. Rather than viewing life as a preparation for a
world beyond, Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the betterment of mankind here
and now. His main hope is that men will begin to put the effort that in
the past went into a preparation for the beyond into this world in order to make
it a better place in which man can live.
I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful
to the earth, and do not believe those who
speak to you of otherworldly hopes. . .Remain
faithful to the earth...with the power of
your virtue. Let your gift giving love and
your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth . .
.
Alas, there has always been so much virtue that
has flown away. Lead back to the earth the virtue
that flew away... back to the body, back to life, |hat
it may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning.
In order for this to become a reality, educators must begin to seriously
discover the best possible ways of educating men for self mastery, wisdom and courage
The question central to Nietzsche’s educational though t is how we can best
help students to become responsible human beings who out of love for themselves and
others take it upon themselves to transform nature and truly himanize it.
I am much more interested. .. in the question
on which the salvation of humanity depends . .
.
the question of nutrition. For ordinary
purposes, it may be formulated thus: How
precisely must you nourish yourself in order
to attain to your maximum, of power, or vertu
in the Renaissance style of virtue free from
moralism.
Until Educators begin to discover ways of creating superior individuals,
men
of culture who have dedicated themselves to the salvation of humanity,
education
1
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. p. 188
^Ecce Homo. Kaufmann Translation P-X31
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is meaningless. It is only to the extent that education serves the human
race that it has meaning. For Nietzsche, education can serve mankind only
by producing overmen, superior men of genius who have dedicated themselves
to this great task. Nietzsche's educational thought is elitist, of course.
He reproaches his age for impairing and weakening education by lowering its
standards so that everyone may be educated; he advocates the contrary policy
of restricting it to a few people so that it may produce only superior men.
Nietzsche was convinced that the German State was supporting mass
education since it was a means for preserving the status quo and keeping the
reins on the education of men who might threaten the values and mores of the
State itself. By watering down the curriculm and making sure that creative
educators were removed from the scene, German universities served as nothing
but factories for producing technicians. It is for this reason that
Nietzsche, as early as his Future of Educational Institutions advocated
removing educational institutions from state control. Without this separation
Nietzsche believed the change of educating men who would serve as critics
of the society was nearly impossible. Nietzsche was not interested in educating
men who would finally fit into the society but rather challenge and question
the values of the society and lead it to a higher quality of existence.
Convinced of the lack of culture and healthy values in German society, Nietzsche
believed it essential to educate men who would look at alternatives to the
present society.
Another corollary of Nietzsche's educational thought is not only
the recognition but the affirmation of tragedy as an inevitable and
creative
aspect of human life. The concept of tragedy is rarely dealt
with by
educational philosophers, much less recognized as a central constxtuent
of
any meaningful educational philosophy. With the death of
God and rejection of
-11 -
traditional metaphysics, one finds in Nietzsche's philosophy a tragic
optimism which is quite outside the scope of contemporary educational
thought. The existaitial importance of death is continually/stressed.
Each moment of life becomes eternally meaningful and life becomes something
to be lived, here and now, as intensely as possible.
In the end, the emphasis is on the individual in his imiqueness,
finding his own meaning, not in isolation from others, but constantly aware
of what separates him from others in his search for freedom. The educator
is the agent of this liberation, but only the agent. In the end, it is
the student himself who must create his own meaning. The ways to this
meaning are many and different. For Nietzsche, there are certain givens
in education, givens which I will explore later in this study. Ultimately,
however, they are all means which hopefully will be used by the student in
the creation of meaning and in the giving of meaning to hman existence.
He who will one day teach men to fly will have
moved all boundary stones... He has discovered himself
who says "This is good and evil.". . .Verily, I do
not like those who consider everything good and this
world the best... Such men I called omni-satisfied. .
.
This, however, is my doctrine: he who would learn
to fly, one day must learn to stand and walk and run and
climb and dance: one cannot fly into flying... By many
ways I have reached ^ truth... And it was only reluctantly
that I inquired about the way... I preferred to question
and try out the ways themselves. A trying and questioning
was my every move... That however is my taste, not good,
not bad, but m^ taste.
This is my way, where is yours? Thus I answered
those who ^sked me "the way." For the way - that does
not exist.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable, p. 307
-12-
Survey of the Literature
In this section I will survey the literature related to
Nietzsche's conception of freedom and the teacher as liberator. However,
the analysis of what Nietzsche means by freedom would be onesided if it were
not related to certain other key conceptions, especially the will to
power and eternal recurrence. Thus a general xonderstanding of Nietzsche's
philosophy as a whole is essential to understanding his educational
thought. Works treating Nietzsche as a philosopher will be cited as well
as more specialized works comparing him to other important thinkers. The
criteria for selecting the following works will be their relevance for
an understanding of Nietzsche's conception of freedom, as well as his
educational thought.
Walter Kaufmann is perhaps the best known commentator on Nietzsche
in the United States . His Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist^
is a major work in the field. General in character, it is a scholarly work
on the development of Nietzsche's thought as well as a work which presents
Nietzsche as a serious philosopher. To Professor Kaufmann, Americans owe
not only a scholarly presentation of Nietzschean thought, but many translations
of Nietzsche's work, as well as an insightful overview of Nietzschean scholar-
ship and research. Professor Kaufmann is very straightforward in showing
that Nietzsche's sister did much tampering with her brother's manuscripts in
such a way as to foster her own pro-German and anti-semetic views. His
Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist .
Vintage Book. (New York; Random House, 1968). Hereafter cited as Kaufmann
Nietzsche.
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presentation of the "Nietzsche Legend" has done much to lift the onus
of fanaticism, militarism and anti-semitism from Nietzsche's reputation
in American philosophical and cultural circles.
Kaufmann analyses Nietzsche's two central conceptions: the
will to power and eternal recurrence. Instead of contradicting each
other, he finds the two conceptions intimately interrelated. His thesis
is that the will to power is essentially the drive of the individual
to grow, to become more, to develop himself by means of self discipline
and subliiid:ion. The conception of the overman and eternal recurrence
are based on a Dionysian faith that the self overcoming man will realize
the infinite value of each moment of time as well as his own irectricable
involvement in the totality of the cosmos. "In affirming his own
2
being, he also affirms all that is, has been or will be." Kaufmann
also writes a most interesting and helpful chapter for this author
on Nietzsche and Socrates. The relationship is important for an understand-
ing of the ideal student-teacher relationship in Nietzschean educational
thought. There is no doubt that Kaufmann emphasizes the rational in
Nietzschean philosophy. Nietzsche is not an irrationalist for Kaufmann.
True, the irrational is present as is the rational but both are overcome
by the conception of will to power
.
^"The Nietzsche Legend". Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 15-28.
^Ibid. p. 320.
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Another excellent, although different interpretation of
Nietzsche is Karl Jasper’s Nietzsche; An Introduction to the Understanding
of his Philosophical Activity^ Jaspers maintains that Nietzsche was
essentially an existentialist who felt that the dynamic flux of reality
lay far beneath the superficial glance of the intellect. Jasper's
dialectical style itself is an attempt to manifest Nietzsche's methodology
as well as involve the reader totally in a struggle for truth. Kaufmann
asserts that "Jaspers is in many ways instructive and his array of
quotations is sometimes eye-opening." Unfortunately, however, the English
translation of the work does not give any indication where the quotations
are from; thus the student has no idea whether they are from the earlier or
later works or from the unpublished notes. Moreover, Jasper's contention
that Nietzsche constantly is involved in a process of self contradiction
is hard to substantiate for the English reader because the reader does
not
know whether he is experiencing a change of view with age and more
knowledge,
or whether there is constant dialectical thinking taking place.
Since
Jaspers himself is given to dialectical thinking, one wonders
whether this
is not more a manifestation of Jasper's own methodology
or in truth what
Nietzsche constantly did when engaged in philosophizing.
Nevertheless,
^Karl Jaspers.^^in^fnferoduction to the Understanding
of His Philosohical
Activity.
University
Translated by Charles F
.
of Arizona Press, 1965).
Wallraff and Frederick Schmitz. OTucson
:
Hereafter cited as Jaspers Nietzsche .
Walter Kaufmann. letter to author. May 25, 1972.
^Regarding this point, see Walter Kaufmann 's "Ja^ers
Nietzsche" in his Existentialism from Doestoevsky
to Sartre.
Doubleday, 1963. p. 283-319.
Relation to
New York:
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Jaspers work stands as a great source of Nietzschean scholarship
which forces the reader not only to study but a tually assimilate
and appropriate Nietzsche's thought, and more, to often go beyond
it. The latter according to Nietzsche is the mark of any truly
educative process. As Japsers said:
To philosophize with Nietzsche means to be
constantly taking issue with him. In the
fire of his thought, one's own existence can
become purified to the point of awareness of
genuine self-being when tested by the boundless
honesty and danger of Nietzsche's critical
questioning. Such self-being can only be experienced
as something that passes, not into existence, and
not into the objectivity or subjectivity of world
being, but rather into transcendence. Nietzsche
does not lead one to this at once-he tries rather
to free one from it. But the earnestness of the
total surrender that Nietzsche achieves is, in spite
of his rejection of transcendence, like an unintended
simile and archetype that expresses the profound
experience of being consumed through transcence. One
grows shy in the presence of this incomprehensible
^
one who is transparent to the source but not to us.
Although many authorities would agree that Nietzsche as an educator intended
to lead each reader to an understanding of who he is and who he wants to
become and the vialble means for achieving selfhood, one must certainly
question Jasper's conclusions about Nietzsche's writings as a source of
leading one to a realization of transcendence. Whether Jaspers is being
true to Nietzsche's philosophy in this conclusion is questionable and often
one has great difficulty in seeing how Jaspers reaches these conclusions.
However, when one realizes the philosophical Weltanschauung of Jaspers, one
can at least understand why he regards Nietzsche as the source of an individual's
coming to an awareness of transcendence. Although Jaspers does not treat
^Jaspers. Nietzsche, p. 458.
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the questions of Nietzsche’s educational philosophy per se, his
work is a manifestation of Nietzsche’s educational methodology.
Another general work on Nietzsche is George Allen Morgan’s
What Nietzsche Means^ This work is an analysis of the main concepts
of Nietzschean philosophy, especially the will to power and its
relevance to a theory of morality, art and culture.
2Salter’s work, Nietzsche The Thinker was one of the first
works in English to deal with Nietzsche as a philosopher. It was
published in 1917. A chronological attempt to understand Nietzsche,
it divides his works into three stages. Salter tries to show his
his philosophical view developed and matured through these stages. This
author found the work extremely helpful in its presentation of Nietzsche’s
conception of truth and ultimate reality as will to power. It an
an extremely comprehensive work.
Two other works that were of central importance in the preparation
of this dissertation on Nietzsche were Arthur C. Danto’s Nietzsche as Philosopher'
4
and F.A. Lea’s The Tragic Philosopher . Danto’s chapter on perspectivxsm
was of considerable assistance in developing Nietzsche’s view of knowledge.
His attempt to interpret the works of Nietzsche in such a way that all of
it conforms into a very understandable system of thought which can be analyzed
is perhaps questionable since Nietzsche himself stressed over and over again
”I am no system-builder. I am too prejudiced for a system."^ Danto feels
^George Allen Morgan. What Nietzsche Means . (New York: Haper and Row,
1965).
“William Mackintire Salter. Nietzsche The Thinker: A Study. (New
York: Henry Holt and Co. 1917.)
^Arthur C. Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher. (New York: The Macmillan
Company
,
1965.)
4
F •A • •
Hereafter cited as Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher .
The Tragic philosopher. (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957).
nr\
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that the system revolves aroimd the central conception of nihilism.
**I shall take nihilism as the central concept in his philosophy."^
Although I find this thesis highly questionable, the work relfects an
attempt by a contemporary linguistic analyst to understand Nietzsche which,
in itself, is very refreshing and puts a different perspective on some
of Nietzsche's thought.
Lea's work The Tragic Philosopher is also chronological in framework.
The most helpful part of this work was Lea's discussion of Nietzsche's early
works. In addition, a work by Otto Manthey-Zom Dionysius-The Tragedy
P
of Nietzsche was of great interest. It is an attempt to present the
works of Nietzsche in chronological order in order to show the inception and
growth of the Dionsian view and its central importance in all of Nietzschean
thought. This conception is important for an understanding of Nietzsche's
conception of freedom and thus the role of the teacher as liberator. Manthey-
Zom 's work also contained an excellent chapter on "Reflections on Integrity"
and "The Dawn of Sublimation" both of which are important for an understanding
of Nietzsche's educational thought.
R.J. Hollingdale' s biography of Nietzsche entitled Nietzsche: The
Man and His Philosophy^ is perhaps the best available biography we have in
English on Nietzsche. Hollingdale ' s analysis of the Wagner-Nietzsche,
Schopenhauer-Nietzsche relationship - concrete examples of Nietzsche's idea
of the student-teacher relationship - were extremely pertinent. In
both
Instances, Nietzsche was completely won over by the example of these
men and
^Danto. Nietzsche As Philosopher, p. 22.
^Otto Manthey-Zorn.- Dionysius- The Tragedy of Nietzsche.
Amherst:
Amherst College Press, 1956.
^R. J. Hollingdale. Nietzsche: The Man and His
Philosophy. London
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
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yet in time, out of integrity and in the service of his own growth, he
had to reject most of their teaching. Yet, he always retained something
from each of them; from Wagner a conception of friendship and intense
living and from Schopenhauer "the picture of a philosopher who stopped
at nothing in search for truth, who was not afraid of 'hard truths.'"^
There are a few works that point up the relationship of Nietzsche
to other thinkers. Constantine Nicholas Stavrou has written a work comparing
the psychological and philosophical insights of Walt Whitman and Friedrich
2
Nietzsche: Whitman and Nietzsche: A Comparative Study of their Thought.
Throughout the work there are interesting comparisons between Nietzsche and
Whitman's conception of the ideal teacher, both of which stem from Socratic
thought. Erich Heller in his work The Disinherited Mind: Essays in Modem
German Literature and Thought^ shows the relationship of Nietzsche to
Burckhardt, Rilke and Goethe. William D. Williams Nietzsche and th^
French^ is another work in which the author attempts to show the influence
of Nietzsche ' s French reading on his thought . The influence of
Roussea
,
Pascal, Montaigne, Voltaire, La Rochefoucauld and Stendhal are closely
studied and provide good insight into the formation not only of
Nietzsche's
general philosophy but also his conception of freedom.
^Hollingdale. Nietzsche, p. 81.
^Constantine N. Stavrou. Whitman and Nietzsche : A Comparative
Stu^
of their Thought . (Chapel Hill: University of N.C. Press,
1964) .
^Erich Heller. The Disinherited Mind: Essays in M
odem German Literature
and Thought. (Philadelphia, 1952).
"^W.D. Williams. Nietzsche and The French^ (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell Ltd
1952.)
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A.H.J. Knight's Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche and
Particularly of His Connection with Greek Literature and Thought ^
was important for this study because, with the exception of Kaufmann's
chapter on the Socratic influence on Nietzsche, Knight's work is the
only one wherein the author discusses Nietzsche's indebtedness to
Socrates. He asserts that "In no way was he more like him that in the
2
Ideal of being a teacher." He then goes on to sugges that like Socrates,
Nietzsche ironically pretends to have knowledge while recognizing that
ultimately life is hopeless. Although one might question Knight's
conclusion about Nietzsche's pessimistic Weltauschauunq
,
his study of
Nietzsches relationship to Socrates was helpful.
Geor^ Brandes agrees with Kaufmann and Knight that there is
a great deal of affinity between Socrates and Nietzsche in the following
areas: the role of philosophy, the ideal of the teacher, the nature of
eros and the socratic conception of "physician of the age." His work
3
Friedrich Nietzsche is of particular interest because Brandes was
a contemporary of Nietzsche whom Nietzsche asserted understood his vcrk.
The influence of Nietzsche on English thought is well covered
by David S. Thatcher in Nietzsche in England 1890-1914: The Growth of a
Reputation.^ Specifically, Thatcher deals with the influence that Nietzsche
had on John Davidson, Havelock Ellis, William Butler Yeats, George Bernard Shaw.
^A.J. Knight. Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche and
Particularly of His Connection with Greek Literature and Thought . New York
Russell and Russell, 1933.)
^Knight, p. 176
^Georg Brandes. Friedrich Nietzsche . Translated by A. Chater. (London:
Heinemann, 1914.) Four essays by the Danish critic who introduced Nietzsche's
work into Denmark dated 1889, 1900, 1909, 1910.
^David S. Thatcher. Nietzsche in England 1890-1914: The growth of
A -Reputation. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970.)
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Bemd Magnus has written a new work on Heidegger's MetaHistory of
Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being and Truth in which he attenpts to show how
Heidegger in his work on Nietzsche misinterpreted some of the most important
Nietzschean conceptions, especially eternal recurrence "propelled by an
inner necessity of his own thinking which pursues the meaning of Being.
Basically, Magnus agrees with Kaufmann that Heidegger's study on Nietzsche
reveals more of the author's philosophy than Nietzsche's philosophy. He
contends that Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche as "the last metaphysician
of the West places a burden on the theory of eternal recurrence which
2
that doctrine cannot easily bear." Furthermore, in showing how Heidegger
misinterpreted much of Nietzsche, Magnus hopes to manifest that the "growing
practice among Heidegger scholars. . .of interpreting the great philosophers
from Heidegger's point of vantage... is ruinious to the history of philosophy
3
as a discipline." This study was most useful for this dissertation in
its probing of the psychological concept of revenge and non acceptance of
transcience and the necessity of overcoming this trait in the process of
becoming free.
Joan Stambaugh has also written a new work on Nietzsche's Thought
of Eternal Return^ . The work is an analysis of this important conception in
of the life of the individual. Like Kaufmann, Stambaugh emphasizes
the infinite importance of the moment. "It is to be lived fully and at once."
^Bemd Magnus. Heidegger's MetaHistory of Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being
and Truth . (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hage. 1970) p. xiii.
^Ibid .
3
Ibid . XIV.
^Joan Stambaugh. Nietzsche's thought of Eternal Return . (Baltimore
Jolin Hopkins Press, 1972).
^Ibid. p. 26.
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Moreover, Stambaugh tries to show that there is an "intimate
connection between the moment, ourselves and all existence. We
and all existing things are not just accidently existing in the
moment. Rather we are so bo\md up with the moment that if we affirm
it we affirm the whole of existence."^
In order to concretely experience the liberation of a student
of Nietzsche's, the author studied the works of Nicolas Berdyaev. Berdyaev
makes very clear in his autobiography Dream and Reality that Nietzsche
was his most important educator in his quest for liberation and as such,
one time was negated and gone beyond. True to Nietzsche s
philosophy, he felt he had to find his own way. "My later resistance
to Nietzsche...was due to his stubborn "earthiness" and "this worldliness,
to his confinement within the closed circle of this world which made
his very intensity stuffy and suffocating." Yet, if one looks at
Berdyaev's The Meaning of the Creative Act
^
one cannot help but realize
the great indebtedness of Berdyaev to Nietzsche, an indebtedness
which
he himself acknowledges.
Karl Lowith's From Hegel to Nietzsche includes an interesting
selection on Nietzsche's educational thought as well as his
conception of the
herd man and the overman. With regard to Nietzsche's
conception of
^Stambaugh, p. 24.
^Nicholas Berdyaev. Dream and Real ity: An Essay in
^tobiograph;^.
New York: Collier Book, 1962. Translated by
Katherine Lampert. p. 128.
^Nicholas Berdyaev. The Meaning of the Creative kc^,
Translated by
D. Lowrie. London, 1955.
^Berdyaev. nrpam and Reality p. 98. Also consult
chapter p. 275-91.
^Karl Lowlth. Heael to Nietzsche .
New York, Dobuleday, 1967.
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knowledge, this author found Hans Vaihinger The Philosophy of As
to be most helpful. In addition, George Chatterton Hill's The Philosophy
. 2
of Nietzsche: An Exposition and an Appreciation contains a very
insightful chapter on Nietzsche's view of knowledge. Chalres Morris
3in his Six Theories of Mind presents Nietzsche as an Instrumentalist and
tries to show the relationship of his thought to the pragmatic view of
knowledge
.
With regard to the student-teacher relationship, one of the
personal relationships in Nietzsche's life of which we can glimpse some
of his pedagogical views is his relationship with Lou Salome. Although
romantic in nature eventually, at one time Nietzsche did think of himself
as her educator and his views about what constitutes an ideal teacher-student
relationship is expressed in some of his letters to her. Rudolph Binion's
4
Frau Lou: Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple is a first rate study of
Lou Andreas-Salome and her relationship to Nietzsche as well as others.
Two other works on Nietzsche are Frederick Copleston S.J. work
Frederick Nietzsche: Philosopher of Culture^ and Subhash C. Kashyap
g
The Unknown Nietzsche. The former is mainly a critical work from a
Roman Catholic conservative position. Given Father Copleston 's Thomistic
bias, Nietzsche's philosophy is, in my view, distorted. However, Father
^Hans Vaihinger. The Philosophy of As If. Translated by C.K. Ogden.
New York: Harcourt and Brace Company, 1924.
^George C. Hill. The Philosophy of Nietzsche; An Exposition and
Appreciation . New York. Appleton, 1914.
^Charles Morris. Six Theories of Mind . Chicago, 1932.
"^Rafflolph Binion. Frau Lou: Nietzsche's VJayward Disciple . Princeton, 1968
^Frederick Copleston. Frederick Nietzsche: Philosopher of Culture.
London; -Bums, Oathes and Washboume, 1942.
°Subhash C. Kashyap. The Unknown Nietzsche. Delhi: National Co. 1970.
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Copleston does present a suggestive chapter on Nietzsche and Culture which
had interesting insights into a Nietzschean ideal curriculum in the
secondary schools. Subhash C. Kashyap's work is ganeral, the first part
being devoted to his social and political thought and the second part
treating Nietzsche's influence on contemporary thought and practice. The
work also contains a chapter on Nietzsche's educational views which, although
general, is something one does not usually encoxanter.
With regard to unpublished dissertations, there were a few that
were helpful in analyzing the main conceptions of Nietzsche's thought: for
example. Arthur Rudolph's Superhistorical Individuality in Nietzsche's Thought^
Martha Elaine William's The Problem of Man and His Justification in the
2
Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and Charles Raymond West, Jr. Nietzsche '
s
3
Concept of Amor Fati . Rudolph's dissertation was helpful in sheeding
light on the relationship of Nietzsche to Socrates whereas Williams work
rendered an excellent insight into Nietzsche's conception of culture and
its implications for human living. West's work was an attempt to unify all
of Nietzsche's thought around the conception of Amor Fati. This work was
especially helpful in its insight into the relationship between freedom and
necessity, freedom and eternal recurrence, freedom and will to power. Nietzsche'
affinity to Emersonian thought is also explored as well as Nietzsche's concept-
ion of eros which was also important to this author. Rose Pfeffer has also
^Arthur William Rudolph. Superhistorical Individuality isi Nietzsche's
Thought . University of Southern California, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
1963.
^Elaine Williams. The Problem of Man and His Justification in the—
_
Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Bryn Hawr. Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, 195
^Charles Raymond West, Jr. Nietzsche's Concept of Amor Fati.
Columbia University. Unpublished Dissertation for Ph.D. 1957.
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written a dissertation on Nietzsche entitled The Tragic View in Nietzsche’s
Philosophy^ in which she also set out to show the unity of his thought.
However, instead of the focus being amor fati
,
she feels that the unifying
element in all of his thought was his conception of the tragic
view which is not a moral but an aesthetic phenomenon. "It is not
negative anddestructive
,
but affirmative and creative. It can best
.2be defined aspessimism and its overcoming."
James Hillesheim's dissertation Nietzsche's Philosophy of Education:
3
A Critical Exposition was also important for this study. It is the only
full length work that deals with Nietzsche's educational thought and thus it
is important for contemporary educational philosophy. The work is long: it
first deals with Nietzsche's life, his epistemology, ontology and axiology.
Having teated Nietzsche's general philosophy, Hillesheim then turns to his
philosophy of education and discusses certain educational applications of
Nietzsche's philosophy and finally Nietzsche's ideal of the educated man,
the overman. In contrast to Hillesheim 's dissertation, this study will focus
on Nietzsche's conception of freedom as the end of all education and the
role of the teacher as liberator. Rather than treating Nietzsche's educational
philosophy and general philosophy.as distinct, the two are treated here as
a whole. Education for Nietzsche was, to use Hillesheim 's words, a constant
self-surpassing, a ceaseless struggle for self perfection and self fulfillment;
it was the very process of becoming free and as such was eguated with life.
^Rose Pfeffer. The Tragic View in Nietzsche's Philosophy. Columbia
University. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1963.
^
Ibid
. p. 1.
^James Hillesheim. Nietzsche's Philosophy of Education : A Critical—_
—
Exposition. University of Southern California. Unpublished Ed.D. Dissertation,
1968.
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Ric±iard Schmitt has p\ablished an excellent article on Nietzsche's
psychological theory^ in which he "attempts to provide in
outline a continuous account of his psychology, thereby attempting
2
only what Nxetzsche hxmself hoped someone would do for him."
In this article, Schmitt shows how Nietzsche tried to reformulate the
soul hypothesis in such a way that man would cease to think in dualistic
terms and begin to consider the organism as a whole as the agent of all
our actions. The will to power is shown to be the central conception
of his psychology. "This will is a force, not a faculty... it the active
3
striving which we observe in all of nature, including man." Moreover,
"the activity which Nietzsche calls the will to power manifests itself as
attitudes in which we approach the world; it determines what we look for,
what we expect to find, what we regard as important, what we notice, what
4
we value or abhor."
With regard to the will to power, Heinz Ansbacher presented a
paper on "Adler's concept of striving for power in relation to methodology
and the concept of man," in which he tried to show that Nietzsche's
^Richard Schmitt. "Nietzsche's Psychological Theory." journal of
Ebcistential Psychiatry. Volume II. #5. Summer '61. pp. 71-92.
Ibid , p. 1.
^
Ibid
. p. 15-16.
'^
Ibid. p. 22.
^Heinz Ansbacher. "Adler's Concept of Strivingfor Power in Relation
to Methodology and the Concept of man." Paper presented in part at the ninth
annual meeting. Association of Humanistic Psychology, Washington, D.C.
September 7-10, 1971. Session on "The Will to Power Re-examined."
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conception of the will to power was of great discovery in the understanding
of the human being and played a central part in the psychology of Adler.
Adler regarded Nietzsche as "one of the soaring pillars of our art of
psychotherapy . " Like Nietzsche
,
Adler thought of the will to power as "an
active and creative striving toward some value or goal or desire."
Furthermore, Adler asserted that "man's active striving is towards overcoming,
not towards power, that striving for personal power is only one of its
forms, likely to be found among patients and that individual psychology
demands the reduction of striving for personal power and the development
of social interest with a striving for overcoming on the generally useful
s ide."^
Paul Tillich, the late Protestant theologian, agrees with Adler
and asserts that the will to power is "the drive of everything living to
realize itself with increasing intensity and extensity. . .It is the self
affirmation of life in its self transcending dynamics, overcoming internal
4
and external resistance." Tillich depicts Nietzsche as the "physician
of the age" intent on convincing man that he should rise above the mediocre
5
values of the times.
^
Ibid
. p . 5
.
*
^
Ibid .
* p. 1
^
Ibid
. p. 4.
^Paul Tillich. Love, Power and Justice. (New York: 1954.)
p. 37.
^Paul Tillich. "Nietzsche andthe Bourgeois Spirit". Journal of the
History of Ideas. VI (1945). p. 273-84.
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Four articles on Nietzsche's conception of eternal
recurrence are of extreme importance. For a long time, there has been
a tendency to ignore eternal recurrence when analyzing Nietzsche's
philosophy. However, this is no longer true although interpretations
as to its ultimate meaning and relation to his total thought varies.
Karl Lowith in his "Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence"^analyzes
the conception and attempts to show wherein lie inherent contradictions.
2James Gutmann's article "The Tremendous Moment" describes the vision
that Nietzsche had in August 1881 and its importance for Nietzsche.
3
Rose Pfeffer in her article on eternal recurrence tries to show the
central importance of the doctrine in all of Nietzschean thought. She
thinks that the conception "represents a vital and essential unity in
4
whxch the varxous aspects of Nxetzsche's thought are synthesized."
5
Giles Driscoll in his "Nietzsche and Eternal Recixrrence" , although he treats
eternal recurrence as a myth, thinks that it is a myth of extrem.e importance
to the philosophy of Nietzsche and like all myths reveals a great deal
of the basic meaning of Nietzschean thought.
^Karl Lowith. "Nietzsche's Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence." Journal
of the History of Ideas VI (1945) p. 273-94.
P
James Gutmann. "The Tremendous Moment". Journal of Phxlosophy
51 (1954) p. 837-42.
3
Rose Pfeffer. "Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's Philosophy".
Review of Metaphysics . XIX (December, 1965) p. 276-300.
'^
Ibid. p. 276.
^Giles Driscoll. "Nietzsche and Eternal Recurrence." The Personalist
47 (March-April 1966) p. 461-74.
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has written an excellent article entitled "Eros and Psyche: a Nietzschean
Motif in Anglo American Literatiire"^ in which Nietzsche's conception
of eros is shown to have influenced the work of D.H. Lawrence and Eugene
O'Neill.
In order to gain an overview of Nietzschean literature since
World War II, Herbert Reichert has written an article entitled "The Pres6±
2Status of Nietzsche: Nietzschean Literature in the Post War Era." This
article is excellent for indicating the important literature available and
also the different interpretations by various authors with regard to the
important conceptions of Nietzschean thought.
There have been a few articles which dealt specifically with
Nietzsche and his educational views. J. Broene as early as 1909 wrote
3
an article entitled "Nietzsche's Educational Ideas and Ideals." Broene
interprets Nietzsche's ideally educated man as the ideal of the Renaissance
era: the aristocratic thinkers, the man devoted to hinnanities, letters and
the elevation of the hijman mind. Broene concludes that "Nietzsche's
educational ideal is wholly impracticable and, what is more, undesirable.
The main purpose of education never has been, excBifcing during the Renaissance,
and never ought to be the production of the rare genius. The main purpose
4
of educa.tion should be the uplifting of the masses."
^G. Steinhauer. "Eros and Psyche: A Nietzschean Motif in Anglo
American Literature." Modem Language Notes. 64. 1949. p. 217-28.
^Herbert Reichert. "The present Status of Nietzsche: Nietzschean
Literature in the Post War Era." Monatshefte fur deutschen Unterricht.
(March, 1959). p. 103-20.
^J. Broene. "Nietzsche's Educational Ideas and Ideals." Educational
Review . (January 1909). p. 55-70.
”^Ibid. p. 70.
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R. W. G. Randall's "Nietzsche and German Education"^ is an interesting
article in which he stresses Nietzsche's warning expressed in his early
works that German education was becoming no more than a tool of the State
and thus serving as a vehicle for enslaving men. Randall sees Nietzsche's
overman as a whole or complete man in the ancient Greek sense, rather
than a man prepared to take a position within the state bureaucracy.
^R. W. G. Randall. "Nietzsche and German Education." Quarterly Review,
224. (July 1915.) p. 124-35.
Chapter Two: Education and Culture
One of the primary aims of education for Nietzsche was the
acquisition and appropriation of cultxire in the service of man's becoming
free and creative. In his The Use and Abuse of History Nietzsche defined
culture as "before all things, the unity of artistic style in every outward
expression of the people's life."^ As if he realized that this definition
might lend itself to misundertanding
,
he immediately said:
This must not be misunderstood as though it were
merely a question of the opposition between
barbarism and 'fine style.' The people that
can be called cultured must be in a real sense
a living unity, and not be miserably cleft
asunder into form and substance. If one wishes
to promote a people culture, let him try to
promote this higher unity first, and work for
the destruction of the modem educative system
for the sake of true education.
For Nietzsche, the modem educational system in Germany was doing everything
to hinder the acquisition of cultiire and the development of free men.
It was as if it was deliberately setting out to do everything to "prevent
personalities becoming 'free', that is, sincere toward themselves and others,
in both word and deed. Only through this sincerity will the inner need
and misery of modem man be brought to light and religion come as
true helpers in the place of that sad hypocrisy of convention and masquerade,
^The Use and Abuse of History. Collins Translation with an introduction
by Julius Kraft. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, The Library of
Liberal Art
Series, second edition, 1957).
^Ibid. p. 25.
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to plant a common culture which will answer to real necessities and
not teach, as the present 'liberal education' teaches, to tell lies about
these needs, and thus become a walking lie."^ He was convinced that a
people of culture are superior men, men who have taken upon themselves
culture's goal "to win power in order to come to the help of nature
(physis ) and to correct her foolishness and clumsiness a little—at
2
first, admittedly for oneself, but eventually for everybody." The
man of culture has one supreme task: the transformation of physis , the
redeeming of man.
This is the fxmdamental idea of culture,
insofar as it sets but one task for each
of us: to further the production of the
philosopher, of the artist and of the saint
within us and outside us, and ^hereby work
at the consummation of nature.
For Nietzsche "the aim of mankind can lie ultimately only in its
highest examples.""^ These highest examples in the past have been philosophers,
artists and saints and Nietzsche's educational ideal will have much in
common with them; they will share in their acceptance of the task to transform
the nature of man into something higher and more worthy of being called
human. A man who is possessed of this calling is characterized by a
certain
wholeness whD.ch enables him to acknowledge and affirm all the elements
of
self and tradition. He is a man who is strong enough for the
ultimate
^
Ibid. p. 30
^
Ibid
.
p. 26
^F. Nietzsche. Schopenhauer as Educator . Translated
by James W.
^
Hillesheim and Malcolm R. Simpson. Introduction by Eliseo
Vivas. Chicago
Henry Regnery Company, 1965. p. 56
^The Use and Abuse of History p. 59.
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freedom. He can allow himself every liberty because he has mastered
himself. He himself is his own master; he is master of his own
life and not its victim. He has ceased letting his life "resemble
an xjnthinking product of chance."^
The acquisition of culture at other times is referred to as
2
"giving style to one's character" and the "disciplining of oneself
3
to wholeness." It is a process that requires self discipline, courage
and perseverance as well as suffering. It is a slow process which includes
the integration of the objects of culture into the student's very personality
and once having done this, the student then takes upon himself the goal
of self perfection, never to be attained but always aimed for through the
dynamics of self overcoming. It is this h\aman task voluntarily assumed by
educated men which aids in the transforming of nature into something human.
This man "voluntarily takes the pain of truthfulness upon himself and
this suffering. . .prepares for that complete revolution and reversal of
4
being, the attainment of which is the actual meaning of Ixfe." In our
usual state, our animal state, we can contribute nothing to the production
of superior men. Once the student realizes his task, he is willing "to
5
fight against every great odd for what is beneficial to all." He xs
willing to renounce his quest for happiness, security and comfort and "look
for and produce those favorable conditions under which those great redeeming
men can come into being." The educated man for Nietzsche is the man who
is convinced that the goal of all culture is the furthering of "the genesis
7
of true human beings and nothing else." .
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 4.
^
Twilight of the Idols . Portable , p. 509.
^
Ibid
. p. 554.
^Schopenhauer as Educator p. 43.
5
Ibid , p. 45.
^Ibid
. p . 60
.
n
Ibid, p. 63.
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Education then is the process of overcoming our animal state
and of the student's "placing himself in the sphere of culture, for
culture is the child of every indiv idual ' s self knowledge and
inadequacy."^ This student is then in the position to say:
I see something higher and more human
than myself above me. Help me, all of you,
to reach it, as I will help every person who
recognizes the same thing and suffers from
the same thing, so that finally man may again come
into being he who feels himself infinite in
knowing and loving, in seeing and ability, and
who with all his being is a pa^ of nature as
judge and criterion of things.
This man is characterized by Nietzsche as a free, creative man. The
3
free man has the ability to "feel life, which means to suffer from life."
"Creation, that is the great deliverance from suffering but if the creator
4
is to exist, suffering itself is needed." Rather than the scholar, the
cultured man is the man who out of his knowledge and experience has the
capacity to create beyond himself. He has learned and appropriated his
tradition which instead of enslaving him, has freed him for the ability to
live life fully in every moment and develop the necessary courage to
become a creator. The cultured man is a man who is engaged in constant
self overcoming; he is ever becoming more and more creative, which of its
very essence involves destruction:
In all creation is annihilation. It
is only as creators that vie can annihilate...
The will to create is... the will to become,
to grow and to shape...b^t destruction too
is involved in creation.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 61.
^
Ibid
.
p. 46.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Hollingdale Translation, p.
Ill
^quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche
.
p. 152.
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It is these men of culture, these creators who will give life its meaning
and value. "As yet no one knows what is good and bad, except the creator.
He is the one who creates the good for mankind and gives the earth its
meaning."^ Never before was there such a need for creators, men who would
establish new values to guide mankind. The old values were for the most
part discarded and modem man was in the process of being plunged into a
nihilism which could only be overcome by means of creative men, who out
of courage, intelligence and integrity would take it upon themselves to
create new meanings for modem man.
The waters of religion are receding, leaving behind
swamps and stagnant pools, nations are again
dividing into opposite camps, with the aim of destroying
one another. The sciences, pursued without measure
and in a blind laissez faire spirit, are dismpting and
dissolving all firm beliefs; states and the educated
classes are carried along by a contemptible economic
system. Never was the world more worldly, and never
was it poorer in love and goodness. The educated
classes no longer serve as beacons or sanctuaries in
the midst of all this restless secularization; they
themselves, day by day, become more restless, thoughtless
and loveless. All this. . .serves the approarching
barbarism.
Nietzsche was convinced that culture was becoming non-existent
in
experience the consequences of a doctrine which
has been preached from all the housetops: that the State is the highest
goal of humanity and that there are no higher duties for a man to serve
than the State." Thus, to the extent that the German State was in
complete control of the educational system in Germany, one could expect
a continuance of the decline of culture in the nation and a preservation
of the values of the State.
^Jaspers. Nietzsche, p. 151.
^Nietzsche. Schopenhauer as Educator. p. 37.
3
Ibid, p. 36
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There is sxifficient reason for this. In the end,
no one can spend more than he has: that is true
of the individual, it is true of a people. If one
spends oneself for power, for power politics, for
economics, world trade, parlimentarianism and
military interests— if one spends in this direction,
the quantum of understanding, seriousness, will and
self overcoming which one represents, then it will be
lacking for the other direction.
. .Culture and the State,
one should not deceive oneself about this, are attagonists. .
.
One lives off the other, one thrives at the expense of
the other. All great ages of culture are ages of
political decline: what is great culturally has always
been unpolitical, even anti-political
.
Since the production of cultured free men, men who were characterized by
a "mity of artistic style in every expression" of their life is the work
of educators, it followed for Nietzsche that the quality of the
German educational institutions were also sharply declining in Germany.
"There is nothing of which our culture suffers more than of a super-
abundance of pretentious jobbers and fragments of humanity; our universities
are the real hothouses for this kind of withering of the instincts of
the spirit." "The terrible thing to my eye is to find men shattered in
3
pieces and scattered as if over a battle-field of slaughter." Instead
of furthering the production of creators, free men, the schools in Germany
had become slaves of the State and were intent on producing men to take their
places in the bureaucratic machine. At present, Nietzsche was convinced the
educational institutions had only one aim: "to train a vast crowd of
young men, in the smallest amount of time possible, to become useful and ex-
ploitable servants of the state. Rather than freeing men, education
was becoming a process of deep enslavement and culture , as the aim
of education, was entirely lacking. "The fatal flaw
^
Twilight of the Idols . Portable , p. 508-09.
^
Ibid
.
p. 508.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Hollingdale Translation p. 160.
"^Twilight of the Idols. The Complete Works, p. 55.
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of our present school system is that it is unable to inculcate severe
and genuine culture.'*^ Nietzsche asserted in his Birth of Tragedy
that the "cultural power of our higher educational institutions has
2
never been lower or feebler than at present.
In his view, Germany society had a distorted view of culture;
thus to aim at producing men with the characteristics of the "artist,
the philosopher and the saint"; men interested in the very redemption
of mankind, was completely foreign.
They think culture to be a knowledge about
culture, and a false and superficial knowledge
at that. False and superficial because the
Germans endure the contradiction between life
and knowledge and do not see what is characteristic
of the culture of really educated peoples: that
it can only rise and bloom from life. But by the
Germans it is worn like a paper flower, or
spread like an icing o^ a cake and so must remain
a useless lie forever.
Nietzsche was convinced that life was not experienced as whole by the
German people. Due to a rampant dualism which had permeated their every-
day thought, they had severed themselves off from experience; the dualism
of mind and body, knowledge and action, as well as knowledge and life
was manifest in their everyday existence. Life itself was split in two
and the essence of culture was absent--that unity of an artistic and
harmonious way of life. The modem German citizen no "longer dares
trust himself, but asks history against his will for advice, 'how he
ought to feel now,' is insensibly turned by his timidity into a play-actor,
and plays a part or, generally, many parts—very badly, therefore and
superficially. Completely taken up with knowledge about things, the
^
Future of Educational Institutions . The Complete Works , p. 60
^
The Birth of Tragedy . Kaufmann translation, p. 122.
^
Use and Abuse of History . Adrian Collins translation p. 66.
^Ibid. p. 32.
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German educated person is more like a "machine for thinking, writing
and speaking." In a sense, he was immobilized from actualizing
himself by the very accumulation of facts he had mastered. In
divorcing knowledge from life, he had lost the essence of culture.
Knowledge h.-ik.M in excess without
hunger, even contrary to desire, has
no more effect in transforming the
external life and remains hidden in
a chaotic inner world... thus it is
not a real culture but a kind of knowedge
about culture. . .from which no ^decision
as to its direction can come.
This type of knowledge is actually harmful to the student—in Nietzsche's
view it is crippling. Knowledge to Nietzsche was not an end in itself
but an instrument, an instrrxment that must serve life, that is, aid
in the student's coming to know himself and what he wants to become.
It must aid in helping us to live more reflective thoughtful lives; it
must manifest itself in our actions; otherwise, it is often a means for
leading the person away from originality, self knowledge and decisiveness.
We modems have nothing of our own. We
only become worth notice by filling ourselves
to overflowing with foreign customs, arts,
philosophies, religions and sciences; we
are wandering encyclopedias, as an ancient
Greek who had strayed into our time would
probably call us. But the only value an
encyclopedia lies in the inside^ in the
contents, .. .not in the wrapper.
Nietzsche envisioned the cultured person as one who had not only integrated
the objec ts of culture into his very personality and being, but somehow
remained true, without a break to the instincts of childhood which are
essential for the development of that "unity of artistic style" which
is
^
The Use and Abuse of History p. 31.
^Ibid
.
p. 23.
^Ibid. p. 24.
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the essence of culture. Above all, it is this unity that is important.
Its lack can be recognized in people who completely lack style. Culture
is not an adornment of life but a unity of thought and will, life
and appearance, action and experience. Nietzsche thought that
modern Germans actually lacked insight into the very value of life itself.
Thus they did not really experience life.
We are too corrupt to live, to see and
hear truly and simply, to understand what
is near and natural to us. We have not
yet laid even the foundations of culture,
for we are not ourselves convinced that
we have sincere life in us.
Itodem society is sick to the extent that it is alienated from the very
life instincts and life needs. A pseudo-philistince culture results when
men lose touch with life itself. Modem man is characterized for Nietzsche
as alienat ed from nature, from others and from himself.
There is something the child sees, that
he does not see, something the child hears
that he does not hear, and this something
is the most important thing... He has lost
or destroyed his instinct, he can no longer
trust the ' divine animal ' in him and let
the reins ^ang loose when his understanding
fails him.
This is not to say that Nietzsche believed, like Rousseau, that man was
innately good and that true culture would result if he would somehow return
to nature again. Throughout his works, he completely rejects the noble
savage thesis, and on the contrary, feels that the usual result of following
nature is mere caprice.
^
The Use and Abuse of History p. 68
^Ibid. p. 2S
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So now the lazy fellow lives under French
conventions that are actually incorrect...
In the belief that he was returning to
Nature he merely followed caprice and comfort,
with the smallest possible amoxmt of self-control...
Everyone acts at his own sweet will- -which is not
a strong or serious will—on laws dicated by the
^
universal rush and the general desire for comfort.
In order to advance in culture, the student must to take it upon himself
consciously and deliberately. This willing to be more is made manifest
in our actions. Nietzsche speaks of the student learning to deal with his
higher self;
Everyone has his good day, when he fins his higher
self; and true humanity demands each to be appraised
only according to this state and not according to the
work days of dependence and servitude. . .But men them-
selves deal different with their higher self...Many
live in awe and humility before their ideal and would
^
like to deny it; they are afraid of their higher self.
But he who is willing to live in accord with his ideal is living
sincerely. To the extent that his actions manifest a self discipline
and integrity in relation to this ideal self, to that extent he is
cultured
.
CXilture demands from him not only an inner
experience, not only the judgement of the
exterior world ^f flux, but finally and
chiefly action.
Culture for Nietzsche is a life long process of growth in kno/ledge and
wisdom. Man alone has the ability to overcome his nature and elevate
it into an artistic whole. In this way he justifies existence. It
is this struggle, this constant overcoming which constitutes the
difference
^Ibid. p. 25
^quoted in Mitchell Ginsberg. "Nietzschean Psychiatry" in Nxetzsche:_
A roll action of Critical Essays . Edited by Robert Solomon.
New York: Doubleday
^Schopenhauer as Educator p . 62
1973.
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between man and apes. "And life itself told me this secret. Behold it
said, I am that which must overcome itself again and again. Man is
something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?"
^
Nietzsche envisioned the educational institutions of his time as
the involuntary forcing houses for the withering up of the life instincts
and the consciouslpreventing of the acquisition of real culture.
From time to time I come in touch with
German universities: what an extraordinary
atmosphere prevails among the scholars.
What desolate spirituality—how contented and
lukewarm they have become
The first purpose of a university for Nietzsche is not to offer survey
3
courses of all kinds but to "initiate the students into philosophy."
By philosophy, Nietzsche does not mean some abstract discipline, but
a way of life, something to be lived. "I judge a philosopher by whether
he is able to serve as an example. . .the example must be given though
visible life and not merely through books, that is, as the Greek philosophers
taught, through one's expressions, attitudes, clothing, food and way of
. .
4
life rather than through speaking and least of all through writing.
Later, he asserts "the only criticism of a philosophy which is possible,
and
which also proves something—that of seeing if one can live by it—has never
been taught at the universities: but always criticism of words by words."
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p.
^
Twilight of the Idols . Portable p. 508.
^
Future of Educational Institutions . The Complete Works p.l8.
'^
Schopenhauer as Educator. Simpson and Hilesheim translation p. 18.
^Ibid. p. 99
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Leaming an array of facts about this philosophical system and that
philosophical system and being able to compare them with other systems
is not philosophy but a mockery- -"not philosophy at all but preparation
for a philosophical examination."^
From a doctoral examination . "What is the
task of all higher education?" To turn
men into machines. "What are the means?"
Man must learn to be bored. "How is that
accomplished?" By means of the concept of
duty. "Who serves as the model?" The
philologist: he teaches grinding. "Who is
the perfect man?" The civil servant. "Which
philosophy offers the highest formula for the
civil servant?: Kant"s: the civil servant as
a thing- in-itself raised up to b^ judge over
the civil servant as phenomenon.
This type of learning is completely divorced from the student’s
experience and thus merely serves to clutter up his head with things that
have no relevance to his life. "Imagine a youthful and inexperienced
mind in which fifty verbal systems and fifty criticisms of the same are '
stored next to each other in confusion—what mockery of philosophical
education."^ Students forced to deal with mere words eventually come
to the point where they have no trust in their own feelings. Such
students are they who can say"I am permitted the empty esse, not the full
. ... 5
green vivere*. Rather than living students, "they are mere thinking beings,"
who have become "passive instruments whose tones find an echo in similar
instruments...The original note sang of action, need and terror, the overtone
5
lulls us into a soft dilettante sleep."
^Schopenhauer as Educator p. 99
^
Twilight of the Idols. Portable p. 532.
^Schopenhauer as Educator p . 99
"^
The Use and Abuse of Histoiry p. 69.
^Ibid.
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Nietzsche conceived of educational institutions that
would be able to meet the needs of students. One of these needs
is to develop an outlook on the world - a philosophy of life. Instead
of this occuring in higher education, this is more tme to form:
The young man has to begin with a knowledge
of culture, not even with a knowledge of
life itself. This knowledge of culture is
mixed and instilled into the youth as historical
knowledge: that is to say, his head is stuffed
with a vast mass of ideas drawn from second
hand acquaintance with past time and peoples,
not from immediate contact with life.
Rather than this passive type of knowledge, Nietzsche realized that
curriculum in schools must answer to the need of a student who
desires to experience something for himself and
to feel himself a closeknit, living system of
personal experiences growing within him: but
his desire is dazed by the intoxicating illusion
that it is possible in a few years to amass
within himself the highest and noblest experiences
of ancient times.
Nietzsche was well aware that "inquiry must take for its starting
3
point a problem that is concrete and not artificial or merely academic."
In order for knowledge to be meaningful it must originate in experience.
"Our small daily life gives rise to a thousand problems, painful,
4
abashing, exasperating problems'.' It is these problems that must be
the starting point for inquiry -into knowledge, problems that create a
need for knowledge truly felt by the student. Learning from experience takes
^
The Use and Abuse of History p. 67.
^
Ibid .
3
Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 90
^Dawn of Day. The Complete Works, p. 195.
-44-
time. An education that aims to inculcate culture into her students
can not be learned in a few years and this is something thatmodem
ed ucational institutions do not recognize.
In present day Germany, no one is any
longer free to give his children a noble
education. . .everywhere an indecent haste
prevails, as if something would be lost if
the young man of twenty three were not yet
'finished* or if he did not know the ^nswer
to the 'main question' which calling?
Nietzsche felt that if a student is educated in such a way that he becomes
a man of cul ture and thus free, he is characterized by certain traits
whi h, given the contemporary education milieu are anathema: slowness,
care, precision, willing to always begin again in the quest for knowledge.
He has time, he takes time, he does
not even think of 'finishing': at
thirty-one he is, in t^e sense of high
culture, only a child.
Such a student has learned the art of learning from experience. He can
make absolutely no sense of the many current educational practices in
schools. For example:
the insane method that carries our young
sculptors off to art shops and galleries,
instead of the studio of a master, above
all, to the one studio of the only master-
Nature. As if one could pick up on a
brief tour through history the technicalities
and artistries of t^e past times, the very
'
* fruit of our lives
.
Given this type of education, he realizes that it is not surprising
that the typical graduate is no more than "an incarnate compendia, abstractions
made concrete."^ The typical student is trained to be a specialist, a
researcher. In actuality, he is no more than a technician.
^
T';\/ilgiqht of the Idols . Portable p. 511.
^
Ibid .
^The Use and Abuse of History p. 67.
4. Ibid.
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For Nietzsche the current practices in education were hideous.
Our higher schools are all set up for the
most ambiguous mediocrity.
. .our overcrowded
secondary schools, our overworked, stupefied
secondary school teachers are a scandal : for
one to defend them, as the professors at Heidelberg
did recently, t^ere may perhaps be causes—reasons
there are none.
Nietzsche explicitly rejected the educational ideal of the medieval scholar
which permeated all of German educational institutions. For him"scholarship
has the same relationship to wisdom as righteousness has to holiness: it
is cold and dry, it is loveless and knows no deep feelings of inadequacy
2
or longing." He felt that the German people had blindly accepted the old
"idea of the 'educated man' as the necessary and reasonable basis of the
3
system." For him, knowledge must be related to life and experience; it
is not something to be learned passively. The latter type of knowledge "ossifies
4
our humanity." In Dawn of Day, he thinks back on his own education and
reflects on how unreal and useless it was at times:
Think of that period of our lives when we had
math and physics forced down our throats,
instead of being first of all made acquainted
with the despair of ignorance. . .instead of leaving
our little daily life, our activities and every-
thing occurring in our houses. . .split up into
thousands of problems, and thus having our curiosity
made acquainted with the fact that we first of all
require a mathematical and mechanical knowledge
before we can b| allowed to rejoice in the absolute
logic of logic.
Knowledge as an end in itself is the enemy of life and culture. "As long as
we mean by culture t he furthering of scholarship, culture passes by the
great suffering man with pitiless indifference because scholarship sees
^
Twilight of the Idols . Portable, p. 511.
2
Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 71.
O
The Use and Abuse of History p. 67.
^Schopenhauer as Educator p. 71
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only problems of knowledge and because suffering is really within their
world something irrelevant and incomprehensible, that is, at most another
problem to be solved,"^ There is a great danger in treating all of life
as an intellectual problem to be solved:
If one accustoms oneself to translating
every experience into an intellectual
matter, it is astonishing in how short
a time, man can wither u^ and become a
bunch of rattling bones.
It is in The Use and Abuse of History that he appeals to the youth of Germany
to "shake to their very foundations the present corruption of health
3
and culture" which exists in the German educational system. In its very
methodology, it relies upon facts and dead matter rather than live experience.
It is more interested in large n^ambers of graduates than in quality of
graduates and slowly it is sapping the nation of creativity which is the
source of all culture. Nietzsche points out that if a revolution is
successful within the educational institutions, a new system must be created;
a system which would adjust the curriculum to the life needs of the students.
The whole future of study lies in this:
that we should study on what we feel we
should like to imitate; what we gladly
take up and have the desire to multiply;
what is really wanted is
^
progressive
_
.
_
. canon of -the ideal model
.
He was convinced that the learner is not just an intellect to be trained but
rather a total organism with needs that must be met if education is to take
place. Nietzsche realized that there are emotional, volitional and
intellectual elements to the total organism and that education, to be truly
a process of cultivation, must cultivate all of these elements.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 71.
^Ibid.
^
The Use and Abuse of History p. 71.
4
Ibid.
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There is no doubt that this type of education would be
totally new to the German scene. As a matter of fact, the products of such
an education would be so different from the traditional scholars in
Germany that they would probably be considered "uneducated,"
They will have \anleared much and
have lost any desire even to discern
what thoseeducated men especially wish
to know: in fact, their chief mark from
the educated point of vi^w will be just
their want of education,
Nietzsche was convinced that learning must cease to be an end in itself;
rather, it should be directed toward life and treated as a tool for
solving the problems of life. What the student learns must be related
to his experience and "even though it may at times damage serously the
2
current standards of education" it will once agaxn return some meaning
to life so that "at the end of the cure men will again be men and have
3
ceased to be mere shadows of humanity,"
^
The Use and Abuse of History , p, VI,
2 .
IbiQ ,
^Ibid, p, 71-72,
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The Aristocratic Basis of Nietzsche's Conception of CXilture
Theirs is no doubt that Nietzsche had an airistociratic conception
of culture and that he was interested in the education of the elite. In
The Future of Educational Institutions he makes his view very clear:
Two seemingly antagonistic forces, equally
deleterious in their actions.
. .are at present
ruling over our educational institutions.
. .a
striving to achieve the greatest possible
extension of education.
. .and a tendency to
minimize and weaken it on the other hand. The
first named would fain spread learning among
the greatest possible number of people, the
second would compel education to renounce its
highest and most independent claims^in order
to subordinate itself to the state.
Nietzsche was convinced that unless there were some drastic changes in
education, it would result in a watering down of all curriculum which, in
effect, would make education meaningless and completely devoid from
its aim of the inculcation of culture. He advocated the "limiting and
concentrating education as antithesis of first forces above mentioned
and ... strengthening and moving toward independence of education as antithesis
2
of second forces." For him, this involved the training or educating of
those students who were capable of achieving "education's ...highest and
most independent claims." The training of the masses- was completely
antithetical to his educational thought.
In order that there may be a broad, deep
and fruitful soil for the development of art,
the enormous majority must, in service of the
minority be subjected to life's struggles, to
a greater degree than their own wants necessitate.
^
The Future of Educational Institutions . The Complete Works ,
p. 12-13.
^Ibid.
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At their cost, through the surplus of their
labor, the privileged class is to be relieved
from the struggle for existence in order to
create and satisfy a new world of want.
Nietzsche was most clear, however, in all of his works to point out the
burfen that this elite must take upon themselves and often most men are
justjnot strong enough for the pain, hardship and suffering involved. His
conception of the Elite is one found in the tradition of the Ancient
Greeks, an elite, not based on money, position or hereditary but on the
willingness to give up the comforts of the middle class and engage in
the endless pursuit for knowledge and freedom. Nietzsche was violent
in his hatred for democracy. It was not that he hated the masses but
rather hated the levelling off process that he was sure would result if
democracy took hold. Inevitably all culture would be diluted; education
would be watered down and everyone would suffer. For him, democracy meant
mediocrity, conformity to the status quo value system and a deep lack of
culture. Nietzsche was convinced that to the extent that Germany persisted
in their pursuit of higher education for the masses, to that extent it would
resit in the loss of all freedom for human society. In the Twilight of the
Idols he says;
Higher education and huge numbers, that
-
-is a contradict-ion to start with. All
higher education belongs only to the
exception. . .What conditions the decline
of German culture? That higher education
is no longer a privilege, the democratism
of the bildung i^hich has become "common"
all too common.
^ Future of Educational Institutions.
^Twilight of the Idols. Portable. p.550.
The Complete Works, p. 24,
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Nietzsche believed that the state's attempt to give everyone an
education was its way of making sure that the masses conformed to the
state's conception of values, morality and society. He was convinced
that given large nijmbers of students, the result would be a philistine
culture, "men with no real understanding of either art or philosophy or
culture, but rather a superficial acquaintance with enough of everything
to feel entitled to criticize and pontificate."^
It was for these reasons, and not his contempt of the masses,
that he was against the spread of mass education and the attempt of the
state to "minimize and weaken it" for its own interests. In his view
classical education is only for the few-the strong few. Not everyone
wants or could endure the suffering involved in the total educational
process. However, society needs the few who are willing to "take the
pain of truthfulness upon themselves." The others can take their place
in the society as "civil servants, merchants, officers, farmers, and
technicians." But we need leaders, leaders who because of their education,
are in a position to question the values of the times and bring others to
the point of creating new values.
“I V • •
Often Nietzsche has been represented as a philosop'~eu ^as
only interested in the genius, and who had no care for the .
" '
•
’-S
a misunderstanding. In Schopenhauer as Educator , .le ass<. r.'. . "c! ' e Cvone
has within himself a productive uniqueness as the nucleus of being. However,
due to a lack of proper education, the child often does not realize the
beauty of his uniqueness and the terrible fact that this "uniqueness carries
^quoted in Lea. The Tragic Philosopher. London: Methuen and Co,
1957. p. 60.
Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 28.
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with it a whole nexus of duties and obligations."^ It is the unusual
exceptional student that is willing to "biorden himself with this chain of
2dutxes." Nietzsche's deepest hope was that this situation would change
by means of educators who would be willing to take it upon themselves to aid
students in the process of self liberation. The freedom sought involves
suffering and pain and no one stressed this more than Nietzsche. However, it
was his faith that given the right kind of education, more and more heroic
students would voluntarily become free and foresake the ordinary goal of
happiness as the essential meaning of their lives. In the Will to Power
,
he expressed his love of the masses when he talks about "My Kind of Pity."
This is a feeling for which I find no
name adequate. I sense it when I see
precious capabilities squandered. . .or
when I see anyone halted, as a result
of some stupid accident, at something
less than he might have become. Or
especially, at the idea of the lot of
mankind, as when I observe with anguish
and contempt the politics of present-day
Europe, which is, under all circumstances,
a web of the future of all men. Yes, wha|
could not become of "man" if .
Education, for Nietzsche, is the process by which man can truly become
human. Late in his career, he dedicated one of his works to educators who
he saw as the salvation and redeemers of mankind. "To educate educators.
4
But the first ones must educate themselves and for these I write."
Ultimately, his faith lay with educators who would take it upon themselves
to assume responsibility for aiding students to become who they are
- always
striving to become more and more fully human. He was convinced that
the
German educational system had one aim: to expedite "to do for the
masses
what cannot be done for the masses. what must be done reverently
for each individual
Notes . Portable , p. 50.
.
Kaufmann Translation, p. 198
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one by one." Slogans like "equality for all men" were attempts by the
state and the masses to actually enslave men in mediocrity and ignorance:
The doctrine of equality. There is
no more poisonous poison anywhere
for it seems to be preached by justice
itself, whereas it is really the
termination of justice. Equal to the equal,
\anequal to the unequal, that would be the
true slogan of justice and also its corollary -
never make equal what is unequal.
Nietzsche's view of the evils of democracy as a form of government was in
many ways conditioned by his times. However, in no way does his hai^d
for democracy violate the importance of his educational philosophy for
modem times. In his love of mankind and in his appeal to each individual
to engage himself in the process of liberation, paradoxically, his philosophy
could result in the nearing of the Ideal of democracy envisioned by men
such as John Dewey. For an Ideal it was and has always remained. In his
insight into the main role of teaching as liberating, his philosophy is an
invitation to all teachers to engage themself in the process of liberalizing -
democratizing in its deepest sense. In his plea to educators to take the
uniqueness of each student and help him to develop it into something useful
to society, he touched the essence of the educational process. In his view,
it was a crime that educators out of self complacency, ignomace and conformity
refused to aid students to develop their talents
:
In such a highly developed hiamanity as the
present, each individual naturally has access
to many talents. Each has an inborn talent,
but only in a few is that degree of toughness,
endurance and energy bom and trained that he
really becomes a talent, becomes what he is,
^
that he discharges it in his work and his action.
^
The twilight of the Idols , p. 553.
^Human all too Human. The Complete Works. Volume 5 page. 224
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This is the prime role of the educator, to liberate, to aid individuals
in becoming themselves.
Nietzsche’s Tragic View of Culture
When Nietzsche viewed cultiire as an essential ingredient of
education, it is a tragic view of cult\ire that he envisioned. A tragic
culture is defined as one in which existence is affirmed, intensified
and even deified in all of its inevitable suffering. It is characterized
for Nietzsche by an overflowing love or eros in praise of life. Zarathustra
tells man constantly that what is needed is a complete change of view with
regard to life. Man should learn to bless instead of pray. A culture
permeated with gratitude for life is one which can affirm suffering as the
very condition of existence.
The most spiritual human beings, if we
assume that they are the most courageous,
also experience by far the most painful
tragedies but just for that reason they
honor life because it pijs its greatest
opposition against them.
The ideal of a tragic culture was based on Nietzsche's love
of the tragic culture of Ancient Greece. It was also based on ms
view
of human existence, which he considered finite and condii. loned by
cufrc-mg
and death. Becoming for him had no goal, no end; ir ;as et.
ur
any given meaning or value. It always generates itself anew
and ics
totality cannot be circumscribed by the values of finite
man. To the
end, Nietzsche accepted the teaching of Heraclitus that
all is flux and
characterized by eternal opposition- -struggle and strife.
^The Twilight of the Idols. Portable , p. 524.
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With the highest respect, I accept the name
Heraclitus. . .He will remain eternally
right with his assertion that Being is an
empty fiction. The "apparent" world is
the only one: t^e "true" world is merely
added by a lie.
The world is conditioned by an endless giving birth and destroying, often
symbolized by Nietzsche as a game.
In this world only play, play as artists and
children engage in it, exhibits coming-to-be
and passing away, structuring and destroying,
without any moral additive, in forever equal
innocence. . .Not hybris but the ever self-renewing
impulse to play calls new worlds into being. The
child throws away its toys from time to time and
starts again in innocent caprice. But when it does
build, it combines and joins and forms its
^
structures regularly, conforming to inner laws.
Suffering for Nietzsche is an inevitable law of development. A culture
which tries to avoid it or deny it is basically attempting to evade life
3
itself. This is not to assert, as some authors have, that Nietzsche had
a pessimistic view of htman existence: "The tragic artist is no pessimist;
he is precisely the one who says yes to everything questionable, even
to the terrible; he is Dionysian . " Nietzsche was convinced that the
introduction of Christianity into Western thought had brought this tragic
view of existence to an end. In its place, it attempted to substitute a
love and joy of an afterworld, a heaven where siaffering had no place. As
a result, man began to live in this world not for its own sake but in
preparation for another illusionary world in the hereafter. Life itself
was robbed of its value, value and meaning that man creates who has the
strength to view this world as the true and only world. In his
use of
symbols, Nietzsche compares the two world views:
^
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable , p. 480-81,
^Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Cowan Translation.
(Chicago
1962) p. 62.
^Confer A.H.J. Knight "s Some Aspects of the Life and
Work of Nietzsche.
New York: Russell and Russell, 1933.
^
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable . 484.
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Dionysus against the Crucified. This contrast
is not a difference of opinion concerning
martyrdom itself, it simply has another mean-
ing...The problem concerns the meaning of suffering
and whether it has a Christian or tragic meaning.
In the first case, suffering is supposed to lead
to a holy existence, in the latter case, being
is considered holy enough to justify even an
immensity of suffering. The tragic man affirms
even the harshest suffering: for this he is strong
and whole enough and quite capable of deifying;
the Christian man will deny even the happiest lot
on earth... The God on the Cross is a curse on life
and a sign to seek release from it: Dionysus cut
into pieces is a prophecy of life: it will ^temally
be reborn and return home from destruction.
To accept the tragedy of endless dissatisfaction in our quest for meaning
and knowledge is Nietzsche's proof of the dignity of man. In tragic
culture, life celebrates its own justification. Such a culture is an
affirmation of the world of becoming and the supreme achievement of yea-
saying. It consists in the perfection and harmonious integration of
all aspects of hijman life in the conquest of necessity by man's will
and actions. Its conquest is the manifestion of man's creativity, he
2
in effect creates his own world. Thus, it is not moral but creative.
not negative but affirmative. It is based on a love of life, a new
innocence and a new view of the world itself
.
Albert Camus, in his work The Rebel , makes clear the Nietzscheai
view that .once maji would accept the death of God and the illusions of the
afterworld, he, whether he realizes it or not, "becomes responsible for
everything alive, for everything that bom of suffering is condmened to suffer
from life. It is he and he alone who must discover law and order by which
3
to live a truly free and human life."
^Ecce Homo. The Complete Works p. 143. Portable , p. 459,
Williams, Elaine. The Problem of Man and Hfs Justification in th^
Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche . Bryn Mawr. Unpublished Dissertation
1959. p. 18,
^Albert Camus. The Rebel. New York: A Vintage Book, 1956. p.
70.
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It is this acceptance of responsibility that constitutes freedom.
"For what is freedom? That one has the will to assume responsibility for
oneself."^ Man, himself, is determined by the necessity of inner laws. "Man
is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally "unfree", that is, if one
means by freedom the foolish demand to be able to change one's essentia
arbitrarily, like a garment, a demand which every serious philosopher has
2
rejected with proper scorn." For Nietzsche, God was dead; he had to die
so that man would realize that he himself out of his own will must create
meaning and value for himself. If we fail to find grandeur in God, we find
it nowhere, therefore, it follows that it must be created. To create
meaning, values and new goals for mankind is the responsibility of all free
men. If there is no Eternal law, then it follows that man must create his
own laws for "chaos means slavery for humanity. Without law, there is no
3
human freedom."
Redemption for man is not something given, but something to be created
by man within tragedy and within suffering - not beyond it. Redemption is
realized in the strength and force of man's creative willing to take upon himself
the need to justify his own existence.
It is with this insight that a culture is
inaugurated that I venture to call a tragic
culture. Its most Important charac': -eristic
is that wisdom takes the place of sc' .ice a-
the highest end, wisdom that, uninfluenced
by the seductive distractions of science, turns
to a comprehensive view of the world and seeks
to grasp it, with deep feeling of love, the
eternal |uffering of man and the universe as
its own.
^
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable , p. 542.
^Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks . Cowan Translation p. 63
^Albert Camus. The Rebel, p. 71.
^The Birth of Tragedy. Kaijifmann translation, p. 112.
Nietzsche’s Attitude Toward the State in Relation to Education
For Nietzsche, the state was the enemy of education and
personal liberation. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he portrays
the state as a cold monster, an "idol" which spews forth lies everytime it
opens its jaws. He was convinced that the state is never concerned
with culture but rather its own self preservation.
The state. .. strives. . .after the greatest possible
expansion of education, because it always feels
strong enough to bring the most determined
emancipation, resulting from culture, underits
yoke, and readily approves of everything which
tends to extend culture, provided that it be of
service to its officials or soldiers, but in
the main^to itself, in its competition with other
nations
.
Nietzsche was convinced that the values of the state were hedonistic,
materialistic and militaristic and as such served to foster a society
in which true culture was completely foreign. Since it was the state
that completely controlled the German educational institutions, eventually
for meaningful reform, independent schools would have to be established
where educators could aid in the process of individual's becoming free.
In the Germany of the 1870 's the industrial revolution and the
state organixation had resulted in a large bureaucracy. This large machine
necessitated the creation of well trained men who would be willing to take
their place within the system and not question the ultimate values of the
state. Slowly the state had been gaining more and more control over the
content of the public schools. The system of state examinations, degrees
and licenses were slowly becoming the end of education and the curriculum
was being designed in such a way as to prepare the student solely for
the
examination. In Twilight of the Idols , he asks;
^Future of Educational Institutions. The Complete Works p.
38
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What is the task of higher education. To
turn men into machines. What are the means?
Men must learn to be bored. How is that
accomplished? By means of the concept of
duty.
The main aim of education for the people was to make money. "All
education is detested which makes for loneliness, and has an aim
2
above money making and requires a long trme." The whole system was
geared to get the student through in as short a time as possible.
Nietzsche's early works, especially Futxire of Educational
Institutions and Schopenhauer as Educator were a reaction to the
prevailing educational mores of his day. In his view education is
the process of self development in respect of form, grace, precision
and clarity, crowned by the achievement to a unified style of life aid
integration of all the powers of oneself into a unified whole. Of
its very nature, it takes time and the work of an educator. Educators
are needed who
themselves are educated, superior and noble
intellects, who can prove that they are thus
qualified, that they are ripe and mellow
products of culture at every moment of their
lives, not the learned louts who like 'superior
wet nurses' are now thrust upon the youth of^
the land by public schools and universities.
^r Nietzsche, only the man who "knows his real needs in distinction from
the needs of the state has the possibility of becoming free. Thus,
a certain drawing back from the state and reflecting on its mores and
values is mandatory before any educational change will be effective.
^
Twilight of the Idols . Portable . p. 532.
^
Future of Educational Institutions p. 29.
^Twilight of the Idols. Portable , p. 509.
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It demands an unusual degree of reflection to
be able to look away from the present educa-
tional institutions. The difficulty lies
in changing one's way of thi^ing and setting
oneself a new creative goal.
Education as it existed in Germany had one aim: "to turn men into
2
mchines." In order to change this, some men must withdraw and begin
to think of alternatives. "In an age which is led blindly by the
3
most sensational desires of the day" men who have enough self discipline
must take it upon themselves to step back and begin to analyze the role
of education in modem society. Although there had been a number of
attempts at curriculum reform throughout the sixties and seventies, most
of these reforms had amomted to nothing.
The niomerous alteration which have been
introduced within recent years, with
the view of bring them (the schools) up
^
to date, are distortion and aberrations.
For Nietzsche, the control of the state over the content of philosophical
examinations within educational institutions does much to crush free
thinking and "placed the advantage of the state over the freedom of
individuals."^ Rather than educators, the state is interested in pedantic
scholars who can be useful
:
his scholarship can cool his feeling for
justice, courage, unselfishness and
cast a slick doubt .over all hc^esty
and downrightness of feeling. _
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 79.
^Twilight of the Idols. Portable p . 532.
^
The Future of Educational Institutions , p. 62.
^
Ibid. p . 9
.
^ Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 80
^The Use and Abuse of History p. 64.
"^Ibid.
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Men in the teaching profession in German educational institutions were
safe, harmless men interested in money and security; they were not
about to challenge the values or control of education by the state. They
were men who "do not scare, do not turn things upside down and never
hurt anybody."^ They are the antithesis to the Socratic gadfly. They
remind one more of an old woman, rather than men of learning in
pursuit of wisdom. For Nietzsche, it
was not surprising that those who know
the goddess only as an old woman
are themselves hardly men and therefore
justifiably no longer are take^ into
consideration by men of power.
Knowledge in Service of Life
Must life dominate knowledge or knowledge
life? Which of the two is the higher
and decisive power? There is no room
for doubt: life is the higher and
dominating power, for the knowledge that
annit)ilated life would be annihilated
too.
Nietzsche contended that the concepts of knowledge and the
categories of \mderstanding are empirical in origin and take their
rise as instruments of the will to power of man in his
struggle for
mastery and growth. Knowledge is synonomous with
utility if utility
be defined as that which enhances the growth,
power and elevation of
mankind. Nietzsche contended that man's fundamental
concepts of
knowledge have evolved in the course of his
gradual adaptation to his
environment and represent a balance between man
and his world.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 107.
^Ibid. p. 109.
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"The inventive power which creates categories is working in the service
of our needs, namely, of security and rapid intelligibility on the
basis of conventions and designs."^ He believed that the
aberration of philosophy is that instead of
seeing in logic and the categories of reason
means toward the adjustment of the world for
utilitarian ends (basically toward an expedient
verification)
,
one believed one possessed in
them the criterion of truth and reality...
Instead of employing the forms as a tool for
making the world manageable and calcuable, the
madeness of philosophers divined that in these
categories is presented the concept of that
world to which the one in which man does live
does not correspond—the means were misunderstood
as measures of value, even as a condemnation
of their real intention.
For Nietzsche, man is an evolving creature. Zarathustra constantly
asks: Man is something that is to be overcome. What have you done to
surpass him? Thus, Nietzsche contended that it was logical to assiome
that "among a higher kind of creature, knowledge too will acquire new
3
forms that are not yet needed." Instead of being fixed and set, forms
are evolutionary and take their rise from experiential problems. Thus
for Nietzsche, it was conceivable that man many years from now will possess
a completely new set of categories with which to cope with their experience.
Hietzsche rejected the world of being of the traditional philosophers.
In a world of constant flux, there is no "reality-^ in- itself " or "thing-in-
itself." Man is always active in the shaping of reality and everything is
appearance*.
~
Knowledge: the making possible of experience
by a tremendous simplification of real events both
on the part of the acting forces and on the part
of our shaping forces: so that there appears to
be something like similar and identical things.
^quoted in Vaihinger. The Philosophy of ’As If : London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1924. Translated by C.K. Ogden, p. 358.
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation p. 314.
^Ibid. p. 329.
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.
Knowledge is a falsification of the manifold
and mcountable into the identical, the
similar, the countable. Thus life itself is
possible only through such an apparatus of
falsification; thinking is a falsifying, reshap-
ing; willing is a falsifying, reshaping. In
^
all this there lies the power of assimilation.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche talks about the will to truth
as the will to power.
Will to truth... a will to the thinkability of all
beings: this I call your will. You want to make
all being thinkable, for you doubt with well-founded
suspicion that it is already^thinkable. But it
will yield and bend for you.
Ultimately the will to truth is assimilation, reshaping, a creative
process. In his later works, he called this view of knowledge
"perspectivism." By this he meant that ultimately there are no
facts, only interpretations conditioned by the perspective of the knower.
"There is only a seeing from a perspective, only a 'knowing' from a
perspective." One must realize that "the world, apart from our condxtxon
of living in it, the world that we have reduced to our being, our logic,
our psychological prejudices, does not exist as a world "in-itself".
it is essentially a world of relationships under certain conditicns,
4
it has a different aspect from every' point." T'tzs as Arthur Eanto
points out, the world for Nietzsche was a world of relate onshj.ps. This
means that the only world we can signifigantly speak of is the "apparent
world." That is all there is. Consequently it is useless to speak of
5
another world
,
a world in itself
.
It is true that there might be a metaphysical world:
the absolute possibility of this is hardly to be
^The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation, p. 306.
^Arthur C. Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher . (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1965) p.77
'‘
^Ibid
. p. 78.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Hollingdale Translation, p.
225.
^Danto. p. 78.
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disputed , , . But one can do very little with this
bare possibility, much less bring happiness,
salvation and life from so slender a thread. For
concerning the metaphysical world, nothing could
be said except that it would be a different world
but an inaccessible and incomprehensible one.
Even should the existence of such a world be proven,
this would still be the most irrelevant knowledge.
For Nietzsche, our knowledge of this world is basically an interpretation.
As time passes, it is conceivable that the interpretations will change
significantly in order to make sense of the world as we know it. Gien
new data and new phenomenon, it becomes essential for man to construct
new interpretations.
That the value of the world lies in our inter-
pretation. . .that previous interpretations have
been perspective aluations by virtue of which
we can survive in life, that is, in the will to
power, for the growth of power... that every elevation
of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower
interpretations. . .opens up new perspectives and
means believing in new horizons. . .The world with which
we are concerned is false... it is 'in flux '...as a
falsehood always changing but never getting near the
truth, for there is no "truth."
Vaihinger points out that Nietzsche was convinced that man lives in a world
of fictions from which he cannot escape. Religion, science, art, philosophy
and common sense are all fictions, all creative interpretations. One system
is not any more true than another. "Insofar as the word 'knowledge' has
any meaning, the world is knowable, but it is interpretable otherwise; it
has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. . .Perspectivism. " Knowledge
is merely an instrument for man. Hi the end, it is no more than "our
.4
needs that interpret the world." Rather than being an end in itself,
knowledge is a tool of man's by which he becomes master of his environment.
"The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and
simplification——directed not at knowledge but at taking possess-i.on of things.
^quoted in Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher , p. 78.
The Will to Power. Kaufmann translation, p. 330.
3^
I
Ibid, p. 267. Ibid. p. 274.
Tbid.
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Foir Nietzsche, man's purpose is not to know in ordeir to know but in order
to create. Thus all knowledge must serve life, and its interpretation
must necessarily be a metaphor, an illusion which organizes the instincts
which create the values of life.
And a thing can live only through illusion.
For man is creative only through love and
in the shadow of love's illusion, ^only
through the belief in perfection.
Nietzsche's Theory of Truth
There seems to be ample evidence to support the view that Nietzsche
was working toward a pragmatic definition of truth in his mature philosophy.
He completely rejected the conception of absolute truth and viewed it
as a judgement that grows directly out of the problems of life. Reason
is not regarded as an inborn faculty which has the capacity for grasping
some eternal kind of truth but rather as a tool for making order out of
our world of experience. Truth then becomes power for Nietzsche, a vital
function that gains content in the act of existence. Rather than thinking
of truth as some end or goal, it becomes a process, a way of life, a constant
experimenting in the search for more and more satisfactory answers to the
problems of life. Truth is not to be construed as a relation between
what peopel say and the world but rather the definition of truth only
becomes meaningful when we have made clear the nature of the activity of
2
seeking and finding truth.
However, this is not to assert that Nietzsche had a completely
developed theory or truth. Walter Kaufmann is most specific on this point:
^The Use and Abuse of History p. 42.
^Confer Charles Morris. Six Theories of Mind.
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Nistzsch© ' s sxpeiriiriBntalisrn may seam suggestive
of P^^Qniatism j and as a matten of fact thejre aire
in his writings... a great number of passages that
read like early statements of pragmatic views. This
will surpise nobody who has considered the historical
roots of pragmatism which must surely be sought, above
all, in Darwin and Kant... It so happens that Nietzsche's
formulations, while barely later than Pierce's, antedate
most of the others. For the most part, however, they
are to be found in his notes; and. . .Nietzsche seems to
have withheld them because they were not fully developed.^
Arthur Danto in his insightful chapter on Nietzsche's theory of knowledge
goes a bit further. He claims that Nietzsche did develop a pragmatic
theory of truth. "Although he had developed a pragmatic theory of truth,
he often spoke in an idiom more congenial to the Correspondence theory of
truth which he was trying... to overcome. The inconsistency is not in his
thought so much as in his language." Truth for Nietzsche is defined
specifically in terms of what is useful to mankind. Thus truth was not
absolute, but subjective, relative and forever in the process of becoming
true.
Truth then is not something present all along
that merely needs to be discovered; it has to
be created. The word "truth" is the name of
a process .. .that in itself is never final, not
a process of being aware of the truth as semething
initially independent, fixed and determinate bijt
of conferring and actively decidir._. the treeh.“
In another part of his notebooks, he speculates more on the view that
truth is instrumental and subjective; "All knowledge is an interpretation
of being provided by a living and cognizing subject; there is no truth
^Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 88-89.
2Arthur Danto . Nietzsche as Philosopher.
3
Nietzsche. Will to Power. Kaufmann transation p, 329.
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that is not entertained in thought and believed; that is, that is not
found within that encompassing being that we are, and that is all the
being that there is. Thus truth is not something independent, un-
conditioned and absolutely universal. Rather it is inextricably involved
with the being of a living siibject and the world that he has constructed.
But this world as it appears to us is, like ourselves, in a constant
process of change."^ Truth for Nietzsche is a function of the will to
2power - the drive to assimilation - on which all growth depends.
The will to power is the capacity of the human organism to appropriate
and control his environment. Hence knowledge becomes a tool of man's
3
will to power and truth is that "which increases our feeling of power."
4
It is, in Vaihinger's term "the most expedient form of error." Thus
the will to truth is a fxmction of the process of humanizing the world.
Will to truth you call it...A will to
the thihkability of all being: this
I call your will. All being you want
to make thinkable: for you doubt, with
well founded suspicion, whether it is
thinkable. ^et, it shall yield and
bend for you.
As an on-going process, it is man's most important work - a work of creativity
to humanize nature. "To humanize the world, that is to feel ourselves
6
more and more masters within xt."
^
Will to Power . Kaiifmann translation, p. 290.
^Ibid. p. 323.
^
Ibid .
^Vaihinger. The Philosophy 'As If ' op. cit. p. 352.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra-. Portable , p. 225.
^Will to Pov;er. Kaufmann Translation, p. 329.
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Nietzsche is most emphatic regarding the creative nature of
all knowing. Man for him is basically a creative animal and in his
creativity he justifies his own existence.
The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth", the
ascertaining of facts in general, is fimdamentally
different from creative positing, from forming,
shaping, overcoming, willing, such as is of the
essence of philosophy. To introduce a meaning...
On a yet higher level is to posit a goal and mold
facts according to it; that is, active^interpretation
and not merely concqtual translation.
Science, itself, is regarded as a means to an end - an end that has
to be created by man. "Science - the transformation of nature into
concepts for the purpose of mastering nature - belongs under the
2
rubric "means .
"
Nietzsche's theory of truth and knowledge is a theory of
experimentalism. "Truth is not something that is there to be found and
discovered. . .but something that must be created and can be called a process,
or better, a will to conquer which has no end, it is a word for the 'will
to power. This process iteself is Nietzsche's justification for human
existence. By means of this process we create meaning. The process
manifests the same characteristics of life itself: struggling, erring, and
finally overcoming.
^The Will tooPower . Kaufmann Translation p. 327.
^
Ibid. p . 328.
^Ibid. p.329.
CHAPTER THREE : FREEDOM
In this chapter
,
I propose to analyze the meaning of personal
freedom in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. This will involve an analysis
of Nietzsche's conception of the will to power and eternal recurrence as they
are pivotal for an understanding of Nietzsche's conception of freedom.
Freedom for Nietzsche is equated with the question of how one becomes oneself.
It is the power of self realization, or in his terms, the ceaseless process
of self overcoming. Viewed internally, man's greatest task is the conquest
of himself. He must develop in himself the power to channel his energies into
the organization of a whole personality. Victory rests with the free man
who has learned how to control and sublimate his impulses, thus harnessing
them for use in the endless process of self overcoming. In Twilight of the
Idols, Nietzsche asks: "What is freedom? Freedom is the will to be
responsible for ourselves."^ This type of freedom is not given to man at birth
but rather is a task that has to be conquered. It is a difficult task and
throughout his writings, Nietzsche stressed the sxiffering and sacrifice that
is involved when freedom is sought.
Every smallest step in the field of free thinking,
and of the personally formed life, has ever been
fought at the cost of spiritual and physical tortures..
.
change has required its innumerable martyrs... Nothing
has been sought more dearly than that little "It of
; . hman reason and se^se of freedom th' • is no the
basis of our pride.
~
^Twilight of the Idols. Portable, p. 542.
^The Dawn of Day. The Complete Works, p. 26.
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To assume responsibility for oneself and all of nature is one of
the primary aims of education. It is an aim which makes the entire
process of education the most "humanizing" enterprize that men
engage in, an aim which justifies man in his very existence.
The proud knowledge of the extraordinary
privilege of responsibility
,
the conscious-
ness of this rare freedom of this power
over oneself and one ' s fate has sunk right
down to his innermost depths and has become
a dominating instinct. But there is no
doubt about^it, the free man calls it his
conscience
.
Freedom or the becoming of self is an endless process of self overcoming
for Nietzsche. Zarathustra comes to give man a message:
I will teach you the overman. Man is
something that shall be overcome. What
have you done to overcome him?
^
The Geneoloqv of Morals .
2
Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
The Complete Works , p. 65.
Portable, p . 124.
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Nietzsche thought that one could measure the amount of one's
freedom by questioning oneself in this way; "How much did it
cost me?" In IFhe Will to Power, he says:
the degree of resistance that must be
continually overcome in order to remain
on top is the measure of freedom, ^whether
for individuals or for societies.
Throughout all of Nietzsche's philosophy, he constantly is concerned
with the betterment of mankind. His hatred of where man was at
at the end of the nineteenth century and his longing for the realization
of genuine human possibilities is the key to his entire philosophy.
"What arouses our repugnance today? That such vermin as human beings
2
can predominate and multiply. . .Not one of them is a complete bexng."
His love for what mankind could become permeates all of his works. He
felt that the basic error of educations and philosophers was "to place
the goal in the herd and not in single individuals. The herd is a
means, no more."^ The herd means conformity to the status quo , mediocrity,
and the impeding of man's growth in self realization. Nietzsche s
profound faith in man to grow spurred him on to write endlessly about the
need for men to be shaken out of their complacency. In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra he asks : "How does it come that I am forever hungering
for men...What I can love in man is that he is an overture and
a going under
4
And in you, too, there is much that lets me love and hope."
^-Phe Will to Power , Kaufmann Translation, p. 404.
^quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche , p. 125.
The Will to Power, p. 403.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable, p. 399.
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Zscsthustfa is shocked that others do not share his deep sorrow
over the smallness and baseness of modem man and do not yearn for
hisovercoming. "You are sorry for yourselves but not for mankind.
None of you is grived by what grives me."^
Nietzsche's philosophy of freedom must be viewed in the
context of Darwinism. He accepted for the most part the results of the
Darwinian revolution but with some exceptions. He disagreed that fte
environment played such a great role in the formation of humanity that
Darwin seemed to suggest and he also thought that in man there was a more
basic instinct than that of the instinct for survival and that was the
will to power.
The influence of "external circumstances" is
overestimat ed by Darwin to a ridiculous extent:
the essential thing in the life process is precisely
the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from
within which utilizes and expbits "external circumstances "-
The new forms molded from within are not formed with an
end in view; but in the struggle of the parts, a new form
is not left long without being related to a partial
usefulness and then, according to its use, develops itself
more and more completely.
In the same work, he says: "One cannot ascribe the most basic and primeval
activities of the protoplasm to a will to self preservation. . .A living
3
thing wants above all to dis charge its force." tzsch'
questioned whether we had evolved from apes or not; he accepted it as given.
He felt that the distinction between ape and man was qualitative and resided
in the nature of man's creativity to humanize existence.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p.
2
The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation, p. 344.
^Ibid. p. 345
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Albert Camus in his work The Rebel puts it well:
Nietzsche's message is summed up in the word
creation
,
with the ambiguous meaning it has
assumed. Nietzsche's sole admiration was for
the egotism and severity proper to all creators.
The transmutation of values consists only in
replacing critical values by creative values;
by respect and admiration for what exists. Divinity
without immortality defines the extent of the
creator's freedom. Dionysos, the earth god, shrieks
eternally as he is tom limb from limb. But at
the same time, he represetns the agonized beauty that
coincides with suffering. . .And to accept everything,
both suffering and the supreme^contradiction simultaneously
is to be king of all creation.
Thus, for Nietzsche, the question of freedom and creation
and the question of how does one become oneself is the same question
and at the heart of all educational philosophy. Education for Nietzsche
was the process of self liberation. In order to penetrate Nietzsche's
conception of becoming oneself, one is forced to become enmeshed in all
sorts of paradoxes, that is, one is forced to become involved in the
dialectical thinking of his educational philosophy. From the first
work to the last, the question of how one becomes one's self is all
pervasive. Ecce Homo is’ subtitled "How One becomes What Orie Is."
And yet, in a way, the question remains open; it can
have rib answers for it entmls a process of becoming and eridless change.
As long as there are unique human beings, the answer is always in the
.making. In The Will to Power , Nietzsche reminds the educational philosopher
who is seriously involved in forming some type of philosophy relevant to
modem man that answers per se are impossible because of the essence of
the individual human being.
^Albert Camus. The Rebel. An Essay on Man in Revolt . New York:
TTintage Books, 1956. p. 74.
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The individual is something quite new which
constantly creates new things. It is he who
is absolute.
. .all his acts are entirely his
own. Ultimately, it is the individual
who derives the values of his acts from
himself, because he has to interpret in a quite
individual way even the words he has inherited.
His interpretation of a formula at least is personal,
even if he does not create a^formula: as an
interpreter he is a creator.
As we interpret Nietzsche's philosophy of education as the process of
liberation, we must bear in mind that, given each individual reader,
values will be individual and hopefully creative in the establishing
of new ideas and values for our modem educational institutions. In
the writing of philosophy and in the very reading of exegesis, we are
already in the process of creating new interpretations:
We no longer esteem ourselves s\afficiently
when we communicate ourselves. Our
true experiences are not at all garrulous.
They could not communicate themselves even
if they tried. That is because they lack
the right word. Whatever we have word for,
we have already gone beyond.
If the overman, the whole man, is to become a reality, one thing
is needed: educators. Nietzsche is most clear that the process of educating
a man to freedom does not r_esi.de in any curriculijm or methodology but
rather in the ability of true educators to take upon themselves the
responsibility for helping other men achieve freedom out of a love for
man, not as he is perhaps, but as he can become. It is not his role
^
The Will to Power, p. 403.
^The Twilight of the Idols. Portable , p. 530.
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to make men better, to preach morality in
any form to them, as if 'morality in- itself
'
or any ideal kind of man were given; but
to create conditions that require stronger
men who for their part have a morality
that makes them strong.
It becomes the educator's role "to create the conditions under which
2 3
such elevation is possible." "Education as breeding" is essential.
Thus for Nietzsche, knowledge as well as educators are instruments
or tools in the process of self liberation. Congruent with his
theory of knowledge, Nietzsche envisioned the educator as a man who had
accepted the responsibility of creating constant problems that would
challenge the student and help him to continually grow - to continually
be engaged in the process of "restoring energy to the slack fibers and
4
toughness to the will to live."
It followed for Nietzsche that the educator must be hard on
his student, for only in this way can he aid the student in becoming
free.
The most desirable thing is still under all
circumstances a hard discipline at the proper time
i.e. at the age at which it still makes one
proud to see that much is demanded of one. For
this is what distinguishes the hard school as a
good school from all others; that much is demanded,
and sternly demanded, that the good, even the
exceptional is demanded as the norm; that^praise
is rare, that indulgence is non-existent.
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation p. 513.
^
Ibid
. p. 477.
^
Ibid .
^
Ibid
. p. 482.
^Ibid. p. 482-3. .
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The educator is aiming to produce a man whose work itself is suffident
satisfaction; praise of others is not necessary. "To desire no praise:
one does what profits one, or what gives one pleasure or what one
must ."^
Nietzsche was aware that his own philosophy possessed the
inherent danger of withdrawal from this world based on a false assumption
of superiority. The freedom that educators should be concerned with
developing in their students is that
mattire freedom which is self control and
discipline and gives access to many
modes of thought... to that inward comprehensiveness
and superabundance which excludes any danger
of the spirits becoming enamoured and lost in
their own path a^d lying intoxicated in some
comer or other.
Nietzsche was adamant in his rejection of withdrawal and mysticism; on
the contrary, he was concerned with a freedom that is characterized by
"formative and restorative powers which is the sign of splendid
health, that excess which gives the free man the prerogative of being
entitled to live by experiments and to offer himself to adventure. . .the
3
free man ' s duty of leadership .
"
No educator knows in advance what the overman, the free man
will look like. Nietzsche was convinced, however, that he will possess
(20xrtain traits, traits that must be willed first and then consciously
fostered by educators if superior men are to take their place of leadership
in society. Throughout his work, Nietzsche manifests a belief in courage
combined with intelligence and the appropriation of culture. His
^The Will to Power . Kaiifmann Translation, p. 498.
^Human All Too Human. The Complete Works . p. 6.
^ Ibid
.
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admiration for the egotism and severity that characterizes all
creators never wavers. His insistence on hardness, self discipline,
and the cultivation of wisdom; his faith in the development of a creative
eros in man was never forgotten. In the Will to Power , he makes
clear that he does not know in advance how the creation of these
free men should be fostered, step by step. However, he is able
to say that he is sure of somethings. As educators
we can increase courage, insight and
hardness, independence and the feeling of
responsibility; we can make the scales more
delicate and then hope for the assistance
of favorable accidents.
. .As an educator,
one will have to scourge a race of "blessed
people" mercillessly into unhappiness.^
When Nietzsche says in Thus Spoke Zarathustra "I will teach men
the meaning of their existence, the overman" he is presenting a
vision of a free man who is able to say yes to the world, to reproduce
it, and simultaneously recreate the world and himself - in short a vision
of the creator. This creator, aware of the death of God and the
supernatural realm, takes upon himself the task of creating his own meaning
and life, and more than that, to aid in the very transformation of nature.
He has the ability - has developed the ability to
reach out beyond his personality the c”‘L“
day, the society, across the abyss of transitoriness,
and out of a passionate painful overflowing of
love, affirm the total character of life. . .beauty
is not given^to man... it is conquered, willed, won
by struggle.
^
The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation p. 480.
2
Ibid, p. 539.
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The overrnan is characterized by an eros which is communicative and
creative. He is the meaning and justification of life. Life
itself possesses no inner meaning; the overman gives it meaning.
I teach that there are higher and lower men and
that a single individual can, under certain
circumstances, justify the existence of a whole
millenia, that is a full, rich, free, whole
human being in relation to Jhe countless
incomplete fragmentary men.
These whole men are those capable of redeeming humanity. They
will be ’’commanders and lawgivers: they say: Thus shall it be. They
determine first the whither and why of mankind, and thereby set aside the pre-
vious labor of all philosophical works. They grasp at the future with
a creative hand and what is and was becomes for them a means, an instru-
ment. Their knowing is creating, their creating is lawgiving and
2their will to truth is will to power.”
^
The Will to Power , p. 518.
2
Beyond Good and Evil. Zimmem Translation. p. 211.
-78-
The Will to Power and Freedom
For Nietzsche, the will to power is conceived as the
will to overcome oneself, the basis of growth. In essence this
is what constitutes freedom, constant self overcoming, constant
creativity. For Nietzsche freedom appears only in creation, in
action. And it is the nature of man to express this creativity
or this will to power. "It is within our nature to create a
higher being than ourselves, to constantly create beyond oiarselves."^
2
"He who wants to create beyond himself has the p\arest will."
The will to power is the basic drive which is the foundation
of all individual growth and cosmic development. It is the principle
that unites Nietzsche’s earlier conceptions of the Appollonian and the
Dionysian. For Nietzsche, behind everything was the "will to power,
3
the mexhausted procreative will of life." Speaking in educational
terms, the will to power is the inherent drive of the organism to grow
and develop and constantly be more than it is. It is dangerous and
involves risk, experimentation and guidance. It means leaving behind
the secure, the known and over and over again ventiaring out into the
unknown. For Nietzsche, it also implies a negation of all absolutes
at some time in the educative process. This, fo r him, is a prereq’jisite
foiTpefsonal growth. Eventually all must be destroyed so that creation
can take place, .the creation of one's own values* The risk is great.
^quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche, p. 167.
p
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable . p. 235.
• 3
Ibid. p. 226.
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One might perish completely. Or one might be successful in creating
new values and new meanings for life. One thing is certain, however:
not to grow, not to venture into the unknown is to stagnate and die,
and is contrary to the basic impulse of himan nature - the will to
power.
The will to power becomes the basic
principle of the world. My theory contends
that all productive energy is will to power
and there is no physical, dynamic or psychological
force besides it.
The theory of will to power was Nietzsche’s attempt to explain human behavior.
It exists not only in human beings but in all of nature. It is the
active striving that we observe in all of nature. It ’’can manifest itself
only where it encounters opposition; it therefore, seeks what will resist
it. . .Appropriation and assimilation is above all a will to overcome, is
shaping, forming and transforming until the victim has completely entered
2
and enhanced the attacker's sphere of power." The will to power is "the
drive to assimilation, that basic organic function on which all growth
depends." It is manifest in many ways. For example, the desire for
knowledge is a form of the will to power: in knowing one tries to grasp
.
4
reality "in order to master it and press it into service."
Every animal, including la bete pn i osoph --
strives instinctively for the optimum
conditions under which it may release its
power.
i
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation, p. 366.
^Ibid
. p. 346.
^quoted in R. Schmitt. "Nietzsche's Psychological Theory". See
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Translation, p. 178-79.
'^The Genealogy of Morals. The Complete Works , p. 137.
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Hence, even the philosopher constantly tries to create conditions in which
he is assured of mastery; his whole activity is the striving to lay hold
of his world and control it for the sake of creativity. Thus, Nietzsche
can say that even the ascetic priest is among the "conserving and affirmative-
creative forces of life."^ Power is not for Nietzsche what is was for Hobbes
or Bacon. As one studies Nietzsche, one realizes that he is not concerned
with power over nature and other men but rather the development of a creative
instinct and inner drive to grow and perfect and assimilate into oneself the
external world. Man is by nature a creator, shaping the outside world into
some kind of order which has meaning for the individual. By means of his
will to power or urge to grow, man lives.
That imperious something the people call 'spirit'
wants to be master within itself and aromd itself
and to feel itself master. Its needs and
capacities are the same as those assigned by
physiologists to everything that lives, grows
and multiplies. . .Its aim is the incorporation
of new 'experience' .. .growth; more precisely, the^
feeling of growth, the feeling of enhanced power.
This process of growing in self perfection is an end in itself
for Nietzsche:
there is no other end for education or for life. It in fact
constitutes
freedom. It is never achieved once and for all but is a
continuing renewal
an endless process. "Whatever I create and however
much I love it
^Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Translation , p. 226
^
Ibid. p. 178-79.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p. 227.
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Nietzsche signifies that this will to power involves
contradictions, oppositions, despair, struggle and strife and it is
these very contradictions, these oppositions that are the cond'tions of
further growth. " The degree of resistance which has to be
continually overcome in order to remain at the top is the measure of
freedom.
. .freedom being understood as the will to power. Thus
Nietzsche can say in Twilight of the Idols;
The highest type of free man should be
sought where the highest resistance is
constantly overcome.
Such a man has overcome his animal nature, organized the chaos of
his passions, sublimated his impulses and given style to his character,
mtalking of Goethe, Nietzsche at times uses him as the model of a free
man - a man who has
disciplined himself to wholeness. He created
himself .. .Goethe conceived a human being who would
be strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily
matters, self-controlled, reverent toward himself
and who might dare to afford the whole range and
wealth of being natural, being strong enough for such
freedom; the man of tolerance, not from weakness
but from strength, because he knows how to use his
advantage ... the man for whom there is no longer
anything that is forbidden-unless it be weakness...
such a spirit has become free and stands amid the
cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism. . .he does
not negate any more. ^ faith... I have baptized
~ with the name” of Dionysus
.
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation.
/
^I'he Complete Works , p. 216.
2
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable, p. 542.
^Ibid. p. 554.
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In the development of his theory of will to power, there is a great
similarity to Arnold Toynbee's challenge theory of the development
of civilization, that is, that all development in mankind is
brought about by challenges presented by the environment that have to
overcome in order to survive. This overcoming is in itself a creative
instinct
:
Will to power, or the creative instinct to develop
signifies contradictions and despair but these are
the conditions of growth. It is a will to grow,
a will to truth which is part of the will to live
^
and is defined as 'the most spiritual will to power.'
When Nietzsche used the term power, he was using the term in the
sense of creativity, doing, making, shaping, assimilating, ordering
the environment outside of us. Paul Tillich in his work Love Power and
Justice expresses it well
:
The Nietzschean will to power is the dynamic
self affirmation of life... The drive of
everything to realize itself with increasing
intensity and extensity. . .it is the self
affirmation of life in its self transcending
dynamics, o'^ercoming internal and external
resistance
.
Nietzsche was convinced that any educational philosophy which overlooked
this basic drive of life would be not only naive but actually harmful
in the production of free men. _
Man has one terrible and fundamental wish,
he desires power, and this impulse, which
^
is called freedom, must be the longest restrained.
Thus, he realized that without the process of cultivation which education
should include, this basic impulse which must express itself in one way
^
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Translation p. 178.
^Tillich. Love, Power and Justice . (New York: 1954) p. 36-7.
^The Will to Power. The Complete Works, p. 185.
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or another could be harmful to mankind as a whole. It is the
task of education to harness this power of creativity, develop
and nurture it to the point that it can produce beautiful actions
for the good of mankind. In its origin, it is neither good nor evil.
It is neutral, but by means of education it can become the creative
force that can shape mankind into something "intelligent, beautiful
and divine." Without power, man is incapable of creative acts; with
power that is harnessed and channelled man is capable of the most
beautiful of acts.
Life for Nietzsche is a continual actualization within a
world of becoming. Each enco\jnter of power, whether in form of
animal, man or nature, requires a choice as to the amount of power embodied
in the opposition and whether it can be overcome or absorbed. Life
itself consists of these constant decisions. It becomes a continual
process of absorbing, rejecting, assimilating, aligning, disbanding,
uniting, increasing, changing and resisting that which is external or
in opposition. Involved is continual growth.^
Nietzsche makes clear that the will to power does not just
express itself in the growth of hman beings. For him, it was a cosmic
power - the very stuff of the universe. This central idea he expresses
this way
;
And do ye know what the universe is to my mind...
a
monster of energy, without a beginning or end; a
fixed and brazen quantity of energy which grows
neither bigger nor smaller but only alters its face;
^Charles West, Jr. Nietzsche's Concept of Amor Fati. ( Columbia Ph.D
dissertation, 1957) p. 194-5.
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as a whole its bulk is immutable ... It does not
stretch into infinity but is a wuantum of energy...
the play of forces and force waves and at the same
time one and many, agglomerating here and diminish-
ing there, a sea of forces storming and raging, in
itself, forever changing, forever rolling back over
incalcuable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and a
flow of its forms, producing the most savage and
contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid
and most frozen material and then returning from the
play of contradictions back into the delight of
consonance, saying yes unto itself... a becoming which
knows not satiety or disgust or weariness—this, my
Dionysian world of eternal self creation, of eternal
self destruction, this mysterious world of two-fold
voluptuousness, this my 'beyond good and evil' without
aim unless there is an aim in the circle. . .This world
is the will to power and nothing e^se. And even you
yourselves are this will to power.
Walter Kaufmann defines Nietzsche's will to power as a creative eros, that
which impels man toward self perfection. Nietzsche, like Plato, was
convinced that man reflects a generative power which renders him the
capacity to grow. All of life is an expression of this basically
erotic drive, an energy which endlessly renews itself, a continual
creativity, a leap upward, not toward some fixed static goal but within
a world view that immanently creates its own perfectibility as it evolves
eternally. This creative impulse toward perfectibility never reached,
but always posited and sought for, is the basis of man's "ontological
predicament". Man creates ideals for himself but never achieves them.
Hi“yeams for immortality but~ knows that he will die. By means of his
creativity, man transforms the earth, humanizes it and brings meaning to
it, but he is never entirely satisfied. Always finite, always aware of
his severe limitations, he constantly wants to become more, to do more.
Nietzsche throughout his work emphasises this predicament of all men.
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation, p. 549.
^Kaufmann. Nietzsche, p. 255.
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NietzSche assTJined that this predicament was
characteristic of the whole cosmos and that
all of nature was pervaded by an Eros he
called the will to power. .. (everything) craves
neither the preservation of their lives, nor
merely freedom from something, nor even power as
a means to accomplish some specific end: what they
desire is power itself; ainother life, as it were,
richer and stronger; a rebirth in beauty and perfection...
He (Nietzsche) leaves no doubt that the will to power
is an Eros pd can be fulfilled only through self
perfection.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche himself contends that
his will
toc.power and eros are the same:
And life itself confided this secret to me:
"Behold", it said, "I am that which must
always overcome itself. Indeed, you call it
a will to procreate or a drive to an end, to
something higher^ farther, more manifold, but
all this is one.
Eros, or the fundamental love Impulse is the will
to power. There
is no doubt that Freud who also held that eros
is the basic energy of
life was anticipated by Nietzsche. Freud defined
the basic impulse
as "a striving to form living substance into
ever greater unities so
that life may be prolonged and brought to
higher development."^ Nietzsche
equates it with the will to power, the very
stuff of creation. The
fundamental education problem that fecomes the ici’.
rectior. i'- i.ia i,.pv.lse
by means of self mastery toward the
creation of beautiful thoughts words
and deeds. Ultimate joy for man consists in
"controlling, sublimating
and employing one's impulses, not in
considering them evil and fighting
them." Before man can be reborn in
beauty, however. he has to go through
the sixffering of becoming free.
255.
Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche p
Portable, p. 227.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra
.
^Sigmund Freud. Collected Papers.
(London, 1950) V. p. 135.
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Kaxifmann points out that "Nietzsche speaks of the 'reborn' in
Ecce Homo and Thus Spoke Zarathustra and often uses pregnancy figuratively in
his works, presumably following out the suggestions of the Symposium ."^ Like
Plato, Nietzsche recognized the innate striving of man for self perfection and
immortality, a striving for wholeness, and yet at the same time, man's constant
awareness of unfulfillment and failure. The will to power is basically a
creative force. The powerful man is a creator, a man who can be a law into
himself and through his actions eternally strive towards becoming more and more.
A creative act by its very nature contains its own laws and every creation is
a creation of new laws.^ Ultimate creativity for Nietzsche was expressed in
his ideal of the Dionysian state, a state of being achieved by men who are
0nough for freedom and thus can allow themselves every liberty. They
have refined their passions and truly become master of their own drives. The
question for each individual striving for perfection is always the same in
analyzing the worth of one ' s actions
:
Are you the victorious one, the self
conqueror, the commander of your senses...?
Or is it the animal and need that speak
out of your wish?...Man is a rope, tied
betwee^ beast and overman, a rope over an
abyss
.
Nietzsche's treatment of eros in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is most
revealing. When Zarathustra comes down from the mountain to
mankind, he says:
"I love mankind...! bring him a gift.""^ For Zarathustra,
the necessary correlative
of loving is giving, not out of need but out of
plenitude. It is the nature of
healthy love to give it to someone; if there is no
one to receive it, the lover
will suffer.
^Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 254.
^Ibid. p. 250.
^quoted in Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 310.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable . p. 123
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I love him who does not hold back one
drop of spirit for himself, but wants
to be entirely thespirit of his virtue...
I love him whose soul squanders itself,
who wants no thanks and returns none, for
he always gives away... I love him whose
soul is overfull so that he forgets
himself ... I love him who do not first seek
behind the stars for a reason to go under
and be a sacrifice, but who sacrifice
themselves for the earth, that th^ earth
may one day become the overman's.
Nietzsche was convinced that it is man's nature "to create a being
2
hljgher than ourselves, to create beyond ourselves." Love for
Nietzsche was procreation, the basic drive that leads the individual
to long for and yearn for higher things. Zarathustra tells man:
But even your best love is merely an ecstatic
parable and a painful ardor. It is a torch
that should light up higher paths for you.
Over and beyond yc’orselves you shall love
one day. Bitterness lies in the cup even
of the best love: thus it arouses a longing
for the overman; thus it arouses your thirst
for creation. Thirdst for the creator, an
arrow and longing for the overman.
Nietzsche, even more than Plato, emphasized the suffering and
torture
involved in that love which urges man to constantly become more
than
he is. Because he knew that sufferijig was essential, that
"for the
creator to appear, suffering itself is needed, and much
transformation^"
he wished for all of his disciples suffering.
To those human beings in whom I have a stake
I wish suffering, being foresaken, sickness,
maltreatment, humiliation - I wish that they
should not remain unfamiliar with profound
self contempt, the torture of self mistrust,
and the misery of the vanquished: I have no
pity for them because I wish them the only
thing that can prove today whether ^ne is
worth
anything or not - that one endures.
^
Ibid
.
p. 127.
^quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche , p. 167.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p.
183
^Ibid.
. . „ r\ n r\
-88-
Suffering is an essential condition of growth; it is the very prime
material out of which creativity arises. Nietzsche was convinced
that to eschew suffering is to sin against life itself. Deprivation,
pain, is that which impels man to create, to become more than he is.
In thinking of the will to power as awill to more or a
creative eros, Nietzsche sees this power as a kind of giving back, an
act of return in gratitude for existence.
You force all things to and into yourself
that they may flow back out of your well
as the gift of your love...Power is she,
this new virtue; a dominant thought is she,
and aromd her a wise soul: a golden su^,
and around it the serpent of knowledge.
The relation of the will to power to eternal recurrence is expressed
somewhat in the above passage. Joan Stambaugh in her Nietzsche '
s
Thought of Eternal Return points out that the will to power and
2
eternal return are not the same but they are "however inseparable."
The relation of increase (Will to Power) to the
Same (Eternal Return) is certainly difficult
to fathom but it is by no means self contradictory.
It points toward a dimension in which the More
becomes an assimilating power, a dimension which
makes possible eternal return as Sel.-gpreisut iq
^
_
-(intense joyful affirmation). Life i a so
of joy. Joy is a plus feeling of power, a
symptom of the feeling of attained power...Joy,
however, "wants itself, wants eternity, wants
recurrence, wants all things eternally like itself..
Joy does not want heirs... joy is "more terrible,
more mysterious than woe; it wants itself."
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable . p. 176.
^Joan Stambaugh. Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return .
Baltxmore
John Hopkins Press, 1971. p. 15.
^Ibid. p. 16.
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The Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence and Freedom
Behold, we know what you teach:
that all things return eternally,
and we ourselves wi^h them, all,
all things with us.
For Nietzsche, human freedom was compatible with the necessity of a
deterministic view of the universe and in fact was inconceivable
without it. Total acceptance of total necessity is his paradoxical
definition of freedom.
Man is necessity down to his last
fibre, and totally "unfree", that is,
if one means by freedom the foolish
demand to be able to change one's
essentia arbitrarily, like a garment -
A demand which every serious phil<^sopher
has rejected with proper scorn./
Camus points out that Nietzschean philosophy replaces the question
'free from what' with the question 'free for what.' Liberty coincides
with heroism. "It is the asceticism of the great man, the bow bent
3
to the breaking point."
Many interpreters of Nietzsche's philosophy have tended to
dismiss the doctrine of eternal recurrence as not important to
an understand-
ing of his thought. However, for an understanding of his
conception of
freedom, it is all important, the foundation of his amor fa^ and compatible
with his conception of the will to power. Nietzsche first
hints at the
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable p. 332.
^Philosophy in the Tragic Aae of the Greeks, p. 65
^Albert Camus. The Rebel , p. 72.
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doctrine in his work Joyful Wisdom:
What if a demon crept after thee into
the loneliest loneliness some day
and said to thee: This life, as thou
livest it at present thou must live
it once more and also innimerable times.
If that thought acquired power over
thee as thou art, it would transform
thee and perhaps crush thee.
In his belief in the eternal recurrence of all things, one sees his
active acceptance and affirmation of all that must be. In Thus
Spoke Zarathustra in his "Drunken Song" Nietzsche related his conception
of eternal recurrence to the feeling of joy analyzed as the conscios
possession of power or creative instinct and mastery:
Pain, too, is a joy. Have you ever said
Yes to a single joy... then you said Yes
to all woe. All things are entangled...
If you ever wanted one thing twice, then
you wante^ back all...For all joy wants
eternity.
Jaspers views the doctrine of eternal recurrence as a symbol for
3
the "whole man facing the whole mystery of life." As a vision, it
serves as a dynamic existential imperative for man to take seriously
the realization that all will recur. As an imperative, Nietzsche
realized the effects that it might have on man:
Even if the circular repetition is only a
probability or possibility, even the
thought of a possibility can shatter and
transform us, not only ourexperiences
but our expectations. Think how the
mere possibility of eternal damnation has
worked
.
^Joyful V/isdom. New York: Ungar Publishing Company. 1960. Translated
by Thomas Common. Originally part of the Complete Works, p. 271.
2
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 435.
3
Jaspers. Nietzsche. p. 360.
4 • r\r
Nietzsche, quoted in Stambaugh op. cit . p. 26.
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Throughout Nietzsche's philosophy, the importance of the moment is iways
there. "Act as if it will be forever."^ For Nietzsche no moment can
exist for any other; each moment is an end in itself. Thus the
doctrine can serve as an existential imperative which "demands that I
measure everything I feel, will, do, and am by one standard: whether I
accomplish it in such a way that I should like to do it repeatedly in
the same way, or in other words, whether I can will that this same existence
2
occur time and time again." It should induce man to attain to the
highest of which he is capable. What he does now is his eternal being;
in his choice he chooses for all eternity.
The doctrine of eternal recurrence could have a profound effect
on students. It would encourage them to take each act seriously and
not to defer the task of creation for a time that may never come. Each
moment becomes sacred and is to be lived fully and at once. Its
I
importance must always be viewed for Nietzsche in light of his teaching
I "Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have you done to
i
3
j
surpass him." "Goal: to attain the overman for one moment. For this
i
.
4
j
I will suffer everything."
I
~
‘
-^Joyful Wisdom . The Complete Works , p. 21^,
I 2
' Jaspers. Nietzsche. p. 359.
j o
1
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Hollingdale Translation p.
I ^quoted in Stambaugh. p. 26.
I
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For Nietzsc±ie, there is an intimate connection between the moment,
ourselves and all of existence. We and all existing things are not
just accidently existing in the moment. Rather, we are so boimd up
with the moment that if we affirm it we affirm the whole of existence.
If our soul has trembled with happiness
just once, all eternity was needed to
produce this one event and in this single
moment of affirmation, all eternity was
redeemed, justified, and affirmed. . .if we
affirm one moment, we thus afj^irm not only
o\irselves, but all existence.
Nietzsche saw his doctrine of eternal recurrence as an imperative for
the individual to confront himself and thus become aware of the importance
of every moment in his life in his ceaseless struggle to create himself
to his highest potential. As a vision, it has the power of forcing man
to face his shallowness and begin the process of taking one's self
development seriously. Educationally, the importance of the moment,
once imprinted in the heart of the student, can have an awesome effect
in leading the student to take upon himself the burden of selfhood, the
responsibility and duty of self development.
The doctrine of eternal recurrence is also Nietzsche's way of
finding something absolute in a world of change. "That everything recurs
2
is the closest approach of a world of becoming to a world of being."
Joan Stambaugh in her work on Nietzsche ' s Eternal Return puts forth the
following interpretation;
^quoted in Stambaugh. Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return .
Ibid , p. 24.
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann translation p. 61.
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Because there is nothing permanent in the
world, the only possibility of having something
endure is to have it perish but return. In
relation to the will to power, eternal return
constitutes the conditions for increasing will
to power. If the will to power is a continuous
self overcoming, a continually "willing to be more"
then it needs something stable, something which
eternally remains to be overcome andthus give rise
to more.
In willing eternal recurrence, man has the ability to absolutize
time for himself. His doctrine of eternal return requires from the
individual the affirmation of every moment of his life into all
eternity. "Only he who considers his existence worthy of being
2
eternally repeated will be left." For Nietzsche, acceptance of
eternal return is the highest test of affirmation of life:
I would like to tell you the history of my
Zarathustra . Its fundamental conception, the
idea of eternal recurrence, the highest
formula of affirmation t^at can ever be attained,
belongs to August, 1881.
Magnus in his Heidegger’s Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being
and Truth asserts that the doctrine of eternal return was Nietzsche's
conscious method of stamping being upon becoming and yet at the same
time remaining true to his own dictum "Brethren, remain faithful to the
earth. He himself experienced the^ontologicaj^ predic^ont of air
human beings: the great need for eternity and at the same time the
i^0ali2ing of man's finitude. Christianity had solved the predicament
'for medieval man; eternal return Nietzsche thought could serve the same
basic human need for modern man. When the will to power impresses
^Stambaugh. p. 13-14.
^Joyful Wisdom. The Complete Works , p.273.
^EcceHomo. Kaufmann translation p. 295.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable, p. 188.
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an eternal round bn the becoming of life as its ultimate meaning,
the hman mind approaches as near as possible to being. Magnus
however is clear in pointing out that for Nietzsche eternal recurrence
is not equated with being. Its basic meaning must be understood as
the "attempted ultimate affirmation of becoming."^
The eternal recurrence stamps the
character of Being upon becoming. It
is not Being itself. And it stamps this
character upon becoming in the name of
lifer "the task is to live in such
a way that you must wish to live again."
The purpose of the doctrine of eternal
recurrence is to proclaim the "highest
state which a philosopher can attain: to
stand in dionysiac fashion related -^o
existence—my formula for amor fati .
The doctrine of eternal recurrence was Nietzsche's way of intensifying each
moment by making it eternal. "Even as a mere possibility," it exalts
this world against all supernatural realms. The eternal recurrence
of the same demands a Sysyphus who is jubilant in the affirmation of
his fate as its response. Until the very end of his life, Nietzsche
rejected a belief in Being and insisted that all is flux. Being that is
stamped on becoming in his doctrine is a necessity for Nietzsche. But it
is a stamp that is willed by him 5 in no way did he ever assert that it
was there. "In becoming, everything is hollow, flat, illusory. . .The
riddle which man must solve can be solved only through being, a being that
is just what it is and cannot perish." For Nietzsche this being is attained
when man not only accepts but affirms eternal recurrence; this in essence is
what constitutes amor fati , a love of fate or a love of eternal recurrence.
^Bemd Magnus. Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy : Amor Fati,
Being and Truth. The Hague: 1970. p. 139.
2
Ibid .
^Ibid .
“^quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche , p. 368.
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Involved is a complete affirmation of man's present existence as
well as an affirmation of man's past. This affirmation itself -
this yea- saying of both present and past is what constitutes "seizing
of being within becoming."
The doctrine of eteral recurrence involves a union of
freedom and necessity for Nietzsche in a "joyous fatalism." He
expresses what he means in one passage when speaking of Goethe:
In Goethe, we find a kind of fatalism
which is almost joyous and confiding,
which neither revolts nor weakens , which
strives to make a totality out of itself,
in the belief that only in totality does
everything seem ^ood and justified and find
itself resolved.
The role of determinism in Nietzsche's philosophy of freedom is real.
Freedom for man resides in the awareness that there is no immanent
purpose in the evolving diverse. The innocence of the ceaseless
becoming of existence, the ceaseless change of all constitutes man's
freedom. Necessity exists within becoming, the necessity of taking
the chaos that is and imposing form and meaning on it. The awareness
of the necessity comes once the individual decides to develop
himself
to his highest potential. "To consider oneself a fatality, not
to wish to
heather than one is." Nietzschean asceticism, self imposed discipline,
becomes meaningful only when one recognizes the fatality of it
all. It
is as if I realize that I seem to be "unavoidablely
determined by what
has already been decided, and still to be bascially free
insofar as I am
3
capable of making my own decisions."
^Jaspers. Nietzsche , p- 363.
^The Will to Power. The Complete Works , p- 80.
^Jaspers. Nietzsche , p. 209.
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For Nietzsche, freedom is never absolute. It involves
the individual's power, his capacity to create himself. It involves
his acceptance of responsibility for himself and his willingness to
step out into the unknown, make decisions always within his objective
situation. This freedom is made manifest in his will for exercising
his strength over himself, his creating, his knowing. It is made
manifest in his self imposed limitations, in his cutting off possibilities
for himself in order to concentrate on the field he has chosen. It
is made manifest in his ability to impose form on his nature, to create
himself into something whole. He "could not be the same as another" once
he took the burden of selfhood upon himself. Of his verynature he
is unique.
Nietzsche ' s conception of freedom is paradoxical . "Total
acceptance of total necessity is his definition of freedom."^ In the
absence of a memory of previous lives, I am free to choose my own
destiny. I do not know what I shall become except in so far as I make
rational and intelligent choices to the best of my ability. Still, the
awareness of the eternal recurrence of all things intensifies every choice
that I make. What I decide now I decide for all eternity. Each
moment of our lives is immortal. For Nietzsche^_ the doctrine
of eternal
return* represents the fullest expression of Nietzsche’s tragic
view of
existence, a means by which man can celebrate his union and
reunion with
the creative and ever recurring forces of nature:
^Camus. The Rebel
.
p. 72.
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Man is a xmion of creature and creator,
in man is material, clay, mud, nonsense
and chaos, but in man too is creator,
sculptor, hammer hardness, the^Divine
Spectator and the Seventh Day.
Thus for Nietzsche, I am free to create my determined fate. Without
knowledge of what lies ahead, I only know that my past is sealed in
eternal recurrence. And in changing "it was" to "thus I will it
I affirm all that is in my past. Then and only then does my future
emerge as open possibility.
To redeem the past and to transform every 'It was"
into an ' I wanted it thus I ' - that alone do I call
redemption. ..' It was' that is the will's teeth-
gnashing and most lonely affliction. . .this alone
is revenge itself: the will's antipathy towards
time and time's 'It was. '..I led you away from
(this) when I taught you: 'The will is a creator'.
All 'It was' is a fragment, a riddle, dreadful
chance—until the ^reative will says to it 'But
I willed it thus .
'
It is in this way that the "will becomes its own
redeemer and bringer
of joy...has unieared the spirit of revenge."^ When the
individual
can say 'Thus I willed it' he can accept responsibility
for his past
without trying to blame and thus will himself to a_
state where he is
free to create himself in the future. His
willing to accept the necessary
the given in life releases him from resentment
and revenge and frees
him for creation. Artists know this well.
They know only too well that precisely when
they no longer do anything arbitrarily and
everything of necessity. Their feeling of
freedom, subtlety, of power, of creatively
fixing, disposing and shaping reaches its
climax, in^
short that necessity and freedom are the
same thing.
The Twilight of the Idols. Portable, p.
^Thus sroke zarathustra . Holllngdale
Translation, p. 161-63
^
Ibid. p . 163.
^Beyond Good and E^^il. Zimmem
translation p. 156.
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Nietzsche was well aware that often the determinism of a doctrine
like eternal recurrence can result in a fatalism that saps men's
strength. Yet, he believed that his doctrine in no way conflicted
with man's ability to create a better humanity. On the contrary,
he thought that Doctrine was a safeguard to life and the creative
power of man to constantly surpass himself. Professor Lea in
his work The Tragic Philosopher, quotes a letter of Nietzsche's
in which he asserts:
Now that religious belief is declining
and man is learning to regard himself
as ephemeral and uneseential. . .he does
not exercise so much effort in striving
and enduring. The result is a vulgar
hedonism. Without distracting our attention
from the things of this world, as the old re-
ligions had done, the idea of eternal
recurrence would yet enable us to s^amp the
impress of eternity upon our lives.
in another letter he says: "My doctrine is
this: live so that you
mayest desire to live again. That is the task."
^ With eternal
recurrence, man chooses and acts in every
moment for all eternity.
"I am fatum and throughout Eternity, it
is 1 who condition existence."
This weltauschauunq can result in a
seriousness about our every day
life that makes a difference - that
encourages us to take upon ourselves
-T:he- necessity for acting with intelligence
and meaning. Each day takes
us an awesome Importance and every
moment a deep meaning. A man
who views himself in this way possesses
a certain d^h, seriousness and
conscientiousness that contributes to all of
humanity. Such a person
has won his freedom. For Nietzsche
"he lives in a joyous and confident
fatalism within the All in the faith
that nothing is to be rejected but
^
the unrelated that in' the Whole,
everything is to be redeemed and
affirmed."
^quoted in Lea. p. 217.
^
Ibid .
of the Idols. Portable^ p. 554.
Thus, paradoxically each student is free by necessity and any attempt
to escape this freedom is an effort "to get rid of the bxirden of
ourselves at any price.
The error in passive resignation to fate
is the inability to recognize that the
individual man is himself a part of fate.
The capacity to rebel, struggle, are
part of the same fate. Your greatest
enemy is yourself and all meaningful struggle
is ultimately within yoiirself.
Passive resignation is a way of escaping the burden of selfhood. In
The Will to Power he points out that "the belief that the world is
as it ought to be, is a belief of the unproductive who do not desire
3
to create a world as it ought to be." Freedom thus remains a task
to be won by each and every student: "it is not something one has or
4
has not, but something one will have and that one seizes by force."
Eternal recurrence in no way eliminates the obligation for the individual
student to win this freedom by developing his capacities to hhape his
own destiny and creatively effect his environment. After Zarathustra
announces his doctrine of eternal recurrence, he assures man: "The
earth is free even now for great souls... a free life is free for great
5
souls. " - ;
quoted in Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher , p. 115.
"Ibid.
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann translation p.
317.
^The Twilight of~the Idols . The Complete Works
p. 95,
Chapter Four: Liberation as the Aim of Education and Life.
Nietzsche would agree with John Dewey when he said in Democracy and
Education "Philosophy may be defined as the general theory of
education. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic and verbal
or a sentimental indulgence for a few, its auditing of past experience
and its program of values must take effect in conduct."^ Nietzsche
was in opposition to all philosophizing which resides in mere speculation
or the contemplation of "abstract" problems for its own sake. For
him the only test of a philosophy "which proves something is that of
2
seeing whether one can live by it." He detested all systems of
philosophy and insisted that philosophy based on experience of its very
essence is open ended and defies systemization. He was aware that
The mass of a (philosophical) system attracts the
young and impresses the mwary; but cultivated
people are very dubious about it. They are
ready to receive hints and suggestions, and the
smallest truth is ever welcome. But a large
book of deductive philosophy is much to be
suspected. Unproved abstract principles without
number have been eagerly caught up by sanguine
men and then carefully spun out into books and
theories which were to explain the whole world.
^
But the world goes totally against these abstractions.
For Nietzsche, as for Dewey, educational philosophy and philosophy of
life were one. If philosophy is unrelated to life as it is lived, it
2_j«j.0 ]_0Yant and morethan that i hairmful to man in his existential
situation. To the extent that it does not help him in his every day life,
it is useless and at times sxiffocating. For Nietzsche the aim of
education
^John Dewey. Democracy and Education . New York: Collier, 1944. p.
Schopenhauer as Educator, p.99.
^Ibid. p. 102.
328 .
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and life is liberation, the endless process of self-overcoming
.
"Your educators can be nothing more than your liberators."^ Educational
philosophy of its very essence must concern itself with freedom of the
individual. Thus the individual's experience and his ability to
understand this experience as a prerequisite for self overcoming is
also essential.
Nietzsche drew a sharp distinction between the scholar, the
man interested in scholarship for its own sake and the free man.
Scholarship has the same relationship to
wisdom as righteousness has to holiness:
it is cold and dry, it is loveless and
knows no deep feelings of inadequacy or
longing. It is as useful to itself as
it transmits its own character into the
^
latter, thereby ossifying their humanity.
This is not to say that scholarship is not important but "if not
guided by higher maxims of education and if it is increasingly
xinleashed to the principle 'the more the better' it is certainly
harmful for scholars." It is for this reason that Zarathustra eventually
has to leave the land of scholars; he found them cold and sterile. To
the extent that they had divorced themselves from life, they had lost
the very verve of life; their lives themselves had become irrelevant,
~^d~ they were no longer capable of love or longing for the overman.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 6.
^Ibid
. p. 71
^Ibid. p. 10.
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For this is the truth: I have moved from the
house of scholars and I even banged the door
behind me. My soul sat hungry at their table
too long; I am not, like them, trained to
pursue knowledge as if it were nutcracking. I
would rather sleep on ox hide^ than on their
decorum and respectabilities.
Their philosophy was something they talked about in classrooms or
wrote about in their books. In contrast, Nietzsche thought of philosophy
as a way of life. "I am too hot and burned by my own thoughts ... But
they sit cool in the cool shade: in everything they are mere spectators...
like those who stand in the street and gape at the people who pass by,
2
they too wait and gape at thoughts that others have thought."
Unfortunately, these scholars often end up as educators at the viniversity
who because of their view of knowledge and scholarship are incapable of
the very thing they should be there for: educating. Sterile and dull,
they have no more ability to involve students in the quest for truth,
culture and wisdom than does a "flour bag."
If you seize them with your hands they raise
a cloud of dust like flourbags, involuntarily...
When they pose as wise, their little epigrams
and truths chill me; their wisdom often has
an odor as if it came from the swamps and verily
I have often heard frogs croak out of it...
They are skillful and clever.^. Thus they
knit the socks of the spirit. , _ -
These educators instead of aiding in the liberation of men
actually cut
it off. Their dullness and sterility if anything turns
students away from
knowledge and the quest for truth. They are nothing but
good "clockworks.
•»But take care to wind them correctly. Then they indicate
the hour without
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 237.
^
Ibid .
^Ibid.
-103-
fail...They work like mills and like stamps: throw down your seed-com
to them and they will know how to grind it and reduce it to white
dust.'*^ If anything, the student who yearns for freedom would do
best to stay away from universities that serve as havens for these
scholars
.
For Nietzsche education's one aim for the individual is
freedom. To the extent that knowledge and educators serve as
liberators, they are necessary as means. Thus, for Nietzsche, the
educator becomes the focal point of educational philosophy. He
puts it concisely in his preface to Future of Educational Institutions :
I do not propose to furnish formulae or new plans
of study for Gymnasia or other schools...! shall
be content if only... I may obtain a general survey
of the ground. . .Indeed I see a time when serious
men, working together in the service of a completely
rejuvenated and purified culture, may again become
the directors of a system of e-^eryday instruction
calculated to promote culture.
For Nietzsche freedom is a process of the student becoming the being
that he is. For this to occur, educators are essential to create
conditions and develop relationships which of their very nature will
aid the student in self development.
How Does One Become Oneself
Nietzsche ' s philosophy of education is a dialectical process
of moving from the stage of dependence to the stage of independence.
^Ibid.
^The Future of Educational Institutions. The Complete
Works, p. 3-4.
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The process requires the student's constantly engaging in the
process of self overcoming. Nietzsche expresses the process symbolically
in his Thus Spoke Zarathustra when talking about the stages of the Camel,
the Lion and the Child.
Of three metamorphoses of the spirit
I tell you: how the spirit becomes
a camel; and the camel, a |ion, and
the lion, finally a child.
This symbolization of the camel, the lion and the child is a key to
understanding the process of self liberation. The stage of the camel is
the stage of early exposure to education, the time when the child learns
to develop skills in thinking, talking and writing. It is characterized
for Nietzsche by the development of the right kinds of habits that will
be useful in developing the ability to think reflectively upon
experience. It is also the time when one learns the art of sublimation
and solitude. This is the time for Nietzsche when educators as models
and as leaders are so essential. It is a time of reverence and obedience,
a time of preparation. This is not to say that it is not a time of value
in itself, for it is. Nietzsche considered it of utmost importance that
the early stage of education be considered an end in itself. Congruent
with his philosophy of freedom, each moment of life is an end in itself.
However, it is a most difficult stage "but the difficult and the most
2
difficult are what its strength demands."
In one of his earliest writings, Schopenhauer as Educator ,
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable . p.
^Ibid. p. 137.
Nietzsche felt that he had indicated a possible way for a student
to engage in the process of becoming a self. He asserts that in the
early years, the student is really xmaware of who he really is and often
mistakes himself for something he is not. "What he usually thxnks of
as his self is nothing more than the unesssential aspect of his relation
to the objective world. For Nietzsche, the student's "true self lies
immeasurably high above him"^ and thus involves a constant process of
self overcoming. "Be Thyself. All that which you now do
and
think and desire is not what you are. Yoxir true self does
not lie
hidden deep inside you but immeasurably high above you."
Nietzsche
feels that the Socratic dictxjm "know thyself" is insufficient.
It is
not merely a matter of intellectually arriving at
a conception of who
I am but realizing myself in my actions. "That
your very self be in
your actions as the mother is in the child, let
that be your formula."^
Nietzsche thought that most men do not realize
themselves to
their fullest potential because of fear and
laziness.
Out of fear of his neighbor who demands
convention and idleness. . .the tendency
of most men is to remain inert ... Thus
,
we may hear the call of conscience Be
Yourself but out of laziness and fear
run away from the daimon.
It is this fear and laziness that must be
conquered by means of self
“5Isd:piine Sur'ing the stage of ‘the camel.
The laziness requires self
which hopefully the educator by example
and exhortation will provide.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 4
- 5 .
^
Ibid
. p . 2
.
^
Ibid.
'^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p.
H2
^Schopenhauer as Educator p . 2
.
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Fear often is the result of ignorance. Given an educator who has
the intelligence and the ability to lead one to a knowledge of why
things are the way they are, fear can be eradicated. Men who for
lack of true educators do not conquer their fear and laziness and
often are blocked in their individual growth.
For he is all exterior without any
core and if one is correct in saying
the inert man kills time, then one
must see to it that an era which puts
its salvation in public opinion, that is,
private inertia, is actually killed:
I mean that it is deleted from^the history
of thetrue liberation of life.
The task of the educator during this initial stage is to lead
the child to an awareness of his capacity for critical thinking and to
guide him in this process. Given the ability to think critically
and attain a knowledge of why things are, man he felt could cease being
ashamed of himself and take upon themselves the responsibility for creating
a better community. He would be able to look upon mankind not as something
ordinary ’’but beautiful and worth looking at in his uniqueness, that he
is
2
novel and incredible as any work of nature and by no means boring."
Thus, by means of educators, he could begin the process of self
liberation
"which means 'ceasing to let one’s' life be some hapiess'kccident and
taking
each moment seriously.^ It means developing the capacity
for guiding and
shaping one’s futxire and in effect creating oneself.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 3.
^
Ibid
. p . 2
.
^Ibid. p. 4.
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”The man who doesnot wish to belong to the mass need to cease being
self satisfied. Let him follow his conscience which calls him to
be himself."^ However, in order to recognize his ignorance, and lack
of adequacy, an educator is needed who has the ability to bring him
to this point. Even once the student realizes his ignorance, he must
go on to find his own imqiue way toward freedom:
The true end of man is to discover his
most personal conscience, to "become what he is"
and whoever undertakes to do that will learn,
not merely that comfort and security and
prosperity are things of secondary importance,
but their very opposite: pain, danger and
deprivation may be the quickest beast to
carry him to perfection.
It is most understandable that a student afraid of pain and struggle
would
close his ears to such a call and run away from himself. It is here
that the role of the educator is so crucial. Somehow the educator
must
be able to encourage the student to take this step and bear
the pain
that will be involved as well as manage the insecurity that
comes with
all growth.
Freedom is not only the' will to be responsible for ourselves
but that which will
preserve the difference that separates us
from other men. To grow more indifferent
to hardship, to severity, to privation. .
.
Freedom denotes that the verile instincts
prevail over the ^ther instincts. . .the free
man is a warrior.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 2
2
Ibid , p. 6.
^The Twilight of the Idols. The Complete
Works, p. 94
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Nietzsche was convinced that each student realizes the terrible
burden of selfhood and in that moment decide for all eternity.
T-F he says yes, isolation is probably imminent:
When we take the decisive step and
make up our minds to follow our
own paths, a secret is suddenly
revealed to us : It is clear that
all those who have hithert^ been
friendly are offended now.
Thus, the student finds himself alone. His friends begin to think
he is affected, or passing through a stage. The educator at this point
becomes all important to the student as a model that he can look up
to and imitate. He becomes the stepping stone in the student's
quest
for self liberation. At first, the educator can aid the student
in
making the committment to self liberation, and then in offering
himself
as an ideal for the student to emulate.
In making the decision to become himself, the student
begins
his quest for self knowledge. "But how do we know
ourselves? Man is a
dark and hidden thing. . .Besides, it is painful and
a dangerous undertaking
to dig down into oneself in this way and to
descend violently and directly
_±ntruthe shaft of one's own being. How easily he
could inquire hiinself
doing this, so that no doctor could ever cure
him".^ introspection and
self therapy are dismissed by Nietzsche at
this point. It is not only
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dangerous but it is counterproductive. Since knowledge is a creation
of man conditioned by the categories of the mind in relation to the
context in which he finds himself, introspection often degenerates into
a consideration of the individual qua individual instead of in relation
to his environment and his fellow man. This is not to say that Nietzsche
completely rejected the value of introspection, for he did not. However,
it can never be considered objective knowledge. Instead of introspection,
at this time, the student is advised to ask himself:
What have you really loved up till now,
what has drawn on yoxir soul? Consider
these venerated objects in order and
perhaps they will show you a law , the
fundamental law of your true self. Compare
these objects, see how one complements, extends,
surpasses and transforms the other. See how
they form a stepladder on which you have climbed
to your self so far, for your true being
does not lie hidden deep inside but immeasurably
high above you...Your true educators disclose
the true original meaning and basic material
of your being, which access to is difficult
since it is fettered and chained. . .Your educators
can be nothing more than your liberators.
Nietzsche admits that there might be other ways of finding oneself but
states: "I know of no better way than to think of one's educators.
Through his ability to serve as a model and to free the student
from
fear and laziness, the educator through his ve^.' being and
love for the
student has the capacity for liberating the student.
This is only the beginning but an all important beginning.
It is usually the period when the student is in school.
It is the period
of reverence, obedience and love for one's educators.
Through one's
1Schopenhauer as Educator. p. 5-6.
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experiences and the direction of one ' s educators
,
the student can be led to
a knowledge of his heritage. It is during this period, given true
educat-ors, that one can learn to feel life and to truly become conscious
of one's existence. "For the average man, life is never felt."^
In the period when one begins to feel the quality of everyday experiences
under the guide of one's educator, one is truly concentrating on oneself.
Nietzsche calls it a period of ideal selfishness, a necessary process in
becoming free. It is a’ good selfishness which the educator as liberator
will encourage. In an analogy to pregnancy, Nietzsche describes it well:
Is there a more sacred state than that of
pregnancy? To perform everyone of our
actions in the silent conviction that in
one way or another, it will be to the benefit
of that which is being generated within us , . .
.
At such a time, we refrain from things without
having to force ourselves to do so; we suppress
the angry word, we grasp the hand forgivingly,
our child must be bom from all that is best
and gentlest. We shun our own harshness and
brusqueness in case it should instill a drop
of unhappiness into the cup of the beloved
unknown. . .Everything is veiled, ominous, we
know nothing about what is going on, but
simply wait and be prepared. . .Something greater
than we are now is growin|...We prepare everything
with a view to its birth.
Through the relationship with the educator, who out of his overflowing
love for his student has generated a love for freedom in him, the
pregnancy or time of waiting has begun. This is the stage of the
camel
to simply wait and try to be prepared. It entails obtaining
the best
^Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 46.
^The Dawn of Day. The Complete Works, p. 383.
-111 -
education possible so that we will possess all the tools we need
to give creation to the most beautiful ideas of which we are capable.
If
We must be careful in Watching over and restraining our souls, so
that o\jr productiveness may come to a beautiful termination."^ This
is not the time to be creative, nor is it the time to "spend ourselves"
for we are not ready. It is the role of the educator to channel our
energy in such a way that we harness it for self development.
The Role of Solitude in the Educational Process
In describing the aim of education as the production of free
men, Nietzsche say: "The higher man has solitude not because he wishes
2
to be alone but because he is something that finds no equal." The
development of solitude is essential for Nietzsche in the educational
process of becoming free. It is in being alone that we learn the art
of reflection and contemplation and thus are able to act with meaning.
The stage of the camel is a stage of preparation and learning the art
of solitude. In the Dawn of Day Nietzsche speaks of the necessity
of solitude:
I am not a quick thinker; I must wait for
myself a long time. That is why I retire
into solitude. When I live in the midst
of the multitude my life is like theirs
,
and I do not likejnyself; and after some
“ time it always seems to me that the multitude
want to banish me from myself and rob me of
my soul. Then I get angry with all tiaese
people and am afraid of them and I must have^
the solitude to bee ome well disposed again.
^
Ibid .
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation p. 514.
^The Dawn of Day. The Complete Works, p. 344.
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For Nietzsche y an education which does not render the oppor±unity for
solitude and cultivate its use is meaningless. One of the major
defects in the established schools in Germany was that "nobody learns,
nobody teaches and nobody wishes to endure solitude."^
Nietzsche characterizes the restlessness of the modem day
teachers and students as a symptom of the attempt of so many to run away
from themselves. As a resit of this running away, we have a "new
barbarism." "At no period have the active, that is the restless, been
of more importance. One of the necessary corrections which must be
undertaken in the furthering of humanity is the strengthening of the
. .
2
contemplative element. . .Only such people can fulfxll a hxgher mxssxon."
Active work is essential - contemplation of itself is useless. However
activity without contemplation is meaningless - reflection is an essential
ingredient of all meaningful activity.
Nietzsche reminds students that it is only in solitude, in being
alone that one can reflect on one's experience. It is only at this time
that the student can begin to think of himself as truly important and take
upon himself the responsibility of becoming free. This responsibility
is a burden involving suffering and Nietzsche believed it v;as this
suffering
that caused so many people to ignore the question of becoming
free and
fulfilling one's highest potential. Rather than aaffer people
would rather
keep busy and not think about themselves truly.
When we are alone and quiet, we are
afraid that something will be whispered
in our ear, so we hate the silence
and drug ourselves with social life.
are too weak to bear tho^e moment
of self communion for long.
^The Daxm of Day . The Complete Works , p.
319.
too Human . Volume 5. The Complete Works^ p.
260.
as Educator, p. 54.
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When the individual gives himself a chance to
reflect on experience and
his own self development, his duties to
himself become apparent. And
often it is fear and laziness that keeps us
from talcing these duties
upon ourselves. When Zarathustra listens
to himself, he says:
I hear you...n\y abyss speaks... It
is the stillest words which bring
the stom. O solitude! 0 solitude!
My home. How blissfully and tenderly
does your voice speak to me... It i^
stinging me . Alas in the heart.
Nietzsche was convinced that the Europeans
of his day, lacking meaning
in their lives, feared the solitude
necessary for creative activity and
thus continually reacted to stimuli
rather than acting as intelligent
hvman beings. They were not willing
to take the time that true reflection
Involves either out of ignorance or
fear of facing the solitude necessary
for such reflection and the possible
meaningless of their lives that ttm
might become apparent. m Joyful Wisdom he
compares the European to
the Asiatic:
It is common to scare away ennui
in every way, just as it is common
to work eithout pleasures. It^
perhaps distinguishes the Asiatics
above Europeans, that they are
capab e
of longer and profounder repose.
Even
their narcotics operate slowly
and
reguire patience in contrast to the
obnoxious suddenness of the European
poison, alcohol.
in mh. wni to power one sees again
Nietzsche's emphasis on the need
for temporary solitude, that
is withdrawal from the world
of things and
^
Thus Spoke zarathustra .
Portabj^. p.
^
.Toyful Wisdom. Th. complete
Works^ p. BO
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people for reflection. It becomes an "escape from the daily rovind,
a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli that condemns us to reaction.
"^
In a letter to a friend, he says: "There is no limit to the solitude
2
I need around me in order to hear my inner voices." Creativity requires
solitude; however, it is the creative action that is the end, not the
itself. Tn another letter to a friend, he notes. The time for
silence is past; I must now give expression to that for which I have
endured solitude."^ Meaningless and unreflective activity however is futile
and leads man further and further away from finding any meaning in life
4
itself. "Where solitude ceases, the marketplace begins."
Education to be meaningful must involve the cultivation of the
art of solitude. For the most part it had either been despised or
ignored
in the traditional schools of Germany. Solitaries were thought
of as odd
people who think they are superior. The recognition of the
necessity for
temporary withdrawal before meaningful action was rare. In
the Wanderer_
and the Shadow , he speaks to the yount student:
When taking leave is needed . Prom what
you know and measure , you must take
leave at least for a time. Only after
having left town, you see how^high its
towers rise above the houses.
This-±s-nat to. say that students do Jiot need friends
as they are involved
^The Will To Power. Kaufmann translation, p.
484.
^Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche.
Edited and translated by
Christopher Middleton. Chicago. University of
Chicago Press, 1969. p.
^
Ibid. p. 213.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p.
163
^Wanderer and the Shadow. Portable, p. 185
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in the educational process. Nietzsche is most emphatic in all of
his writings about the necessity of deep friendship for man, friends
who learn from each other and grow in the love of each other.
However, Zarathustra reminds the student that "one goes to his
neighbor in search of himself, another to escape from himself."^
And herein lies the difference. Friendship and love are of value in
the process of becoming free although it is necessary to realize that
they are not based on man's weakness but rather on his strength. Friendship
is not an escape from oneself. When one is young, one must learn
the art of solitude as well as experience true friendship bom of
strength and love.
Since man is relational in nat\ire, his health and the cultivation of his
power in the direction of self mastery require other people and deep
friendship. Nietzsche has nothing but contempt for friendship bom
of pity. Pity itself is a sign of weakness. This does not mean
that one cannot suffer with a friend, but for the sake of the friend,
Mietzsche advises that one should hide this suffer:. :ig _^'ur -av - l^ rd
shell. "But if you have a suffering friend, be a resting place for
his suffering, but a hard bed, as it were... thus you will profit him
best."
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p.
Solitaries need love and companions with
whom they can be open and simple as with
themselves and in whose presence the
constraint of concealment and dissimulation
no longer exists. Take these companions
^
away and you give rise to a growing danger.
^Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 367.
"^quoted in Kaufmann. Ibid.
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Each friend ultimately is interested in helping his friend gain self
mastery for only in this way can he be free. Therefore, to commiserate
with him about his suffering can often, do more harm than good.
It is often necessary that one must negate one's friend
in the process of becoming oneself. Even if this is not necessary, the
necessity of withdrawing from one's friends at times, is essential.
In The Dawn of Day , Nietzsche wonders:
But why this solitude? I am
not angry with anybody. But
when I am alone it seems to me that
I can see my friends in a clearer
light' than when I am with them and
when I loved and felt music best, I
was far from it. It would seem that
I must have a distant perspective in
order to think well ofthings
.
Thus, the student comes to a recognition that it is in the cultivation
of solitude that he can become free, that is, come to an awareness of
his relation to himself and his fellow man and the contributions that he
can make to both in terms of meaningful activity. Solitude is the
avenue to the source of one's creativity, his strength and his uniqueness.
It is the antithesis of action and yet without it all action is
meaningless.
t
^The Dawn of Day. The Complete Works . p. 341.
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The Role of Sublimation in the Educational Process
For Nietzsche the basic hiiman drive was the will to power, the
will to grow and thus engage in constant selfovercoming. This basic drive
was not conceived as purely sexual as in Freudian psychoanaltic theory but
rather as eros, that drive to become more. Nietzsche was aware that often
it is sexuality that is sublimated for the sake of becoming more, its
energy being redirected in order to create. Walter Ka\afmann in his work
on Nietzsche explains the Nietzschean theory of the relationship of sexuality
to will to power in this way:
Sexuality is merely a foreground of something
else that is more basic and hence preserved
in sublimation: the will to power. The feeling
of potency is essential , while its sexual
manifestation is accidental; and thus the feeling
of sexual potency can be sublimated into that
ultimate feeling of power which the Brahmin King
Vishvamitra derived from thousand of years of
self control.
Sublimation for Nietzsche was not a repudiation of sexuality but rather an
active redirecting of the basic energy of human life. For Nietzsche, as
fQ^ -j^^0 Greeks, the sexual symbol was the most important symbol of life.
2
*’The sex impulse can be base, but it is 'capable of great refinement
"Ecstasies are different in a pious, sublime noble man, such as Plato and in
3
•^"camel "drivers 'Who'smdke hashish."
Throughout Nietzsche's philosophy one of the strongest threads is
his insistence that the passions of life are not to be renounced
but rather
used in the service of creation. A man without passion is
sterile and
thus incapable of any creative action; a man who renounces
his passions and
drives doaso out of weakness rather than strength.
^Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 222.
^quoted in Kaufmann. Nietzsche p. 223. ^
^ Ibid.
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Moral intolerance is an expression of weakness in a man;
he is afraid of his own 'immorality', he must deny his
strongest drives because he does not yet know how to
employ them. Thus the most fruitful regions of the
earth remain uncultivated the longest :^the force is
lacking that could here become master.
Nietzsche ' s view of the free man was a man who could use his passions , channel
them toward the creation of beauti ful ideas, and objects. He is a man who
has the strength and self discipline to impose form on his natxare for the
purpose of growth and self development. Sublimation becomes an essential
means to be cultivated by all students to want to grow. Very early in
life the student must begin to learn self control if he ever is to create.
When self control is lacking in small things, the ability
to apply it to matters of importance withers away.
Every day in which one does not deny himself some
trifle is badly spent and a threat to the following
day.
Education must involve the cultivation of sublimation in the interest of
the student. As he learns to model himself after his educator and accept
his advice, he will begin to realize the necessity of sublimation and the
fact that it is the antithesis from self assault. Sublimation is based
ultimately on a love of self - a love which manifests interest in all means
necessary to attain self development. In this willing to be more, the
studen'FbegiJis to realize the necessity of imposing lin.’\tatiof;s - on ..XiTiseli
.
Rather than plunging into nature and the life of no restraint, freedom
is conceived as self formation and self limitation. Nietzsche was
convinced
that the fashionable plunging into nature was more an escape from
oneself than
a sincere desire to become oneself, an escape from the necessity
of the hard work
and pain of sublimation.
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann translation. p. 383,
quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche, p. 134.
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”Thus men plxonge into nature not to find themselves, but to lose and
forget themselves. ^To be outside oneself* is the desire of the weak
and self discontented."^ Nietzsche's educated man is a man who has affirmed
all of his passions , his drives and is able to consciously use them to
their fullest extent in his creative task. "The well known 'wild beast'
in man has not been mortified; it lives, it floiorishes, it has merely
2
divinely been sublimated." The free man is a man of power, but the power
bears the mark of sublimation. It is a very slow process - the art
of imposing form on one's nature and must be "gradual and in small doses
3
imtil a new evaluation has created a new nature in us."
It is the fesk of the educator to create conditions which manifest
to the student that giving reign to one's instincts is self destructive.
4
"Our instincts contradict, disturb and destroy each other." Passions
unless sublimated can impede man's growth and yet all growith in rationality
and creativity is marked by passion itself.
When naked, to be sure, passions show
merely the 'wild, disgusting, unbearable
beast* in some men. In other men they
may elevate to lofty, grand and splendid
gesture. A third and thoroughly ennobled
person, may appear in his 'storm and stress'
like wild, beautiful nature and cause awe
and ecstasy, but for that very reason men
may fail to see the greatness ang serenity
of. the nature that he really is.
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann translation, p. 495.
^quoted in Otto Manthey-Zom. Dionysus; The Tragedy of Nietzsche.
(Amherst: Amherst College Press, 1956). p.l20.
^
Ibid
. p. 67.
^
The Twilight of the Idols. Portable, p.
^The Dawn of Day. The Complete Works , p. 67.
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In order to achieve a certain unity or wholeness, the student must learn
to impose an ’’iron pressxire on at least one of these instinct systems which
must be paralyzed to permit another to gain in power, to become strong.”^
2
In order to move toward freedom, he "has to be pruned." Nietzsche puts
it this way: "the individual still has to be made possible by being
3
pruned, possible here means whole." Freedom then becomes the antithesis
of caprice or giving reign to one's feelings but rather "creative self limitation."
Nietzsche had nothing but contempt for the philosophers who espouse
a "return to nature" concept. When applied to education, this philosophy results
in slavery rather than freedom and chaos rather than creation. At one
point in discussing himself in relation to Rousseau, he said "I am not talking
about a retxicn to nature but rather a going higher than nature, an overcoming
of nature."^ And for this type of overcoming, sublimation is essential.
"The former type of 'freedom' that purports to be mere willfullness and
instinct-living is in actuality slavery for it connotes no self mastery which
is indispensable for freedom."^ This return to nature concept can
trap the
student and impede his growth resulting in a stunted individual
who has become
less than he might have become. However, sublimation is
often a difficult
task and it demands a certain strength. "Strong souls have
the ability to
deal harshly with their virtues ai^ j.nterests of second rank."
These men
"find their happiness where others find their destruction,
in the labyrinth.
in hardness against themselves and others, in
experiments: their joy is self
t.S
conquest; asceticism becomes in them nature, need
and instinct."
^
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable
.
p. 546.
^
Ibid
. p. 546.
^
Ibid .
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 18.
^
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable , p. 552.
^
Ibid .
'^
The Joyful Wisdom , p. 266.
®The Antichrist. Kaufmann translation,
p. C 77 .
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A healtiiy love of self is essential in this process of sublimating. In
Beyond Good and Evil^ Nietzsche reminds the student that he must love his
own. egoism and cease looking at it as if it were evil: "I submit that egoism
belongs to the essence of a noble soul... the noble soul accepts the fact of
his egoism without question."^ Given this love of self and a decision to
take the responsibility of self development upon himself, the student has
chosen the way to liberation. The more self centered he is, the more powerful
he is- The completely self centered student is one who is strong enough to
be completely responsible for himself; he is strong enough to take upon himself
the duty of self discipline.
Nietzsche is not talking about asceticism as traditionally conceived
in Western thought. He believed that Christianity had perverted asceticism.
p^xDperly understood, asceticism can be a powerful instrument in the gaining
of self mastery and the development of creativity. He asserts emphatically:
"I want to make asceticism natural again; in place of the arm of denial, the
2
arm of strengthening ... an experiment with adventure and danger." For him,
renunciation of basic drives and instincts is lanhealthy and dangerous.
Renouncing the world before we know it
results in a fruitless and melancholy
solitude. This has nothing in common
with the vita contemplativa of the thinker
who chooses his_form of solitude:- HE V.TFIhES _
TO RENOUNCE NOTHING but on the conLra'ry , ne
would regard it as destruction of his own self
if he were obliged to continue merely in the
vita practica « He forgoes thi^ latter because
he knows it and knows himself
.
Conceived of in Christian terms, renunciation implied a
dualism which Nietzsde
"
The Will to Power . Kaufmann translation, p.
483.
^
The Dawn of Day . The Complete works , p.
165.
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this traditional view must give way. Sublimation becomes a tool through
which one gains power. When sublimation has been directed toward
creative actions "the spirit then abides and is at home in the senses
just as the senses abide and are at home in the spirit. . .With such perfect,
well formed men even the most sensual acts are transfigured through an
intoxication of highest spirituality via a simile; they experience a sort of
deification of their bodies and are furthest removed from a philosophy of
asceticism."^
Zarathustra reminds the student that it is in his actions that
he will express his art of self creation or sublimation. "I you say... But
greater is that which you do not wish to have faith in; Your body and its
2 . .
reasons; that does not say I but does I." Nietzsche in rejected the tradxtLonal
dualisms of body and mind, proposed to reclaim for natural man that which
traditional philosophers had relegated to the hereafter. •'What the sense
feeleth, what the spirit discemeth hath never its end in itself. Instru-
ments and playthings are sense and spirit; behind them there is still the
self."^
For Nietzsche to be free means that ones actions mirror one's
self as genuinely conceived, that one consciously impose form on one's nature
in accordance with one's own ideals. Such a man has "disciplined himself
to wholeness ... created himself and become a man of tolerance, not from
weakness but from strenth. He is a spirit who becomes free . Their lies
reflect a wholeness, a unity. "They feel the stimulus and charm of sensuous things
in a way that other men cannot possibly imagine. . .they are sensualists in the
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra .
^
Ibid .
^Ibid.
Hollingdale translation, p, 62.
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The stcige of the lion is the stage of no-saying:
In the loneliest desert, the second
metamorphosis occurs: here the spirit
becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom
and be master in his own desert. Here
he seeks out his last master: he wants to
fight him and his last god^ for ultimate
victory he wants to fight.
The student at this time has to say "no" to all absolutes. He rejects
absolutism and assiames the risk of making the value of truth his problem.
The will to truth needs a critique, let
that be our particular problem, as a
matter of experimen-^, the worth of truth
mixst be questioned.
During this time the student no "longer wants to hear of anything of all
3
those things and questions which do not permit experimentation." To the
student in this stage, anything is permitted which does not violate his
intellectual integrity. The intellectual conscience becomes the touchstone
of the genuineness of his will to power. The student is beginning to view
life as it is, together with the battle of the instincts, the contradiction of
the senses and the bold experimentation toward sublimation. He consciously
refuses to allow himself the security and comfort of metaphysics, religon
or any absolute morality which is not subject to questioning and experimentation.
In a letter to his sister at the age of twenty one, Nietzsche
express^ the s'enstiments of the lion well : -- ---i—
--
Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive
for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe!
If you wish to be a devotee of truth than inquire!
No, only truth, even if. it is abhorrent and ugly.
E]very true faith is infallible in as much as it
accomplishes what the person who has the faith
hopes to find in it. But faith does not offer ^
the least support for a proof of objective truth.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable p. 138.
^Beyond Good and Evil. Kaufmann translation, p. 9.
^The Joyful Wisdom. The Complete Works , p.
191.
\^tter to his sister. June 11 , 1865. Selected Letters
of FrledriA
]
^if^tzsche > Middleton Translation, p.
6-7.
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During the educational process, it becomes necessary as the student passes
through the stage of the lion to reject one's teachers. Nietzsche
himself rejected his two most important teachers: Wagner and Schopenhauer
in the interest of his own self development. In the Preface of The
Case of Wagner, he says with regard to Wagner:
Negation of one ' s educators and ther teachings becomes essential for the
student at this time. In negating all that he has accepted up till this
point, he is thrown back on himself and he begins to realize that he
himself
must create his own truths. Obviously, there is a great risk
involved. In
this rejection of one's educators, one's models and all absolute truths, the
student might become so frightened that he might perish. At
times, Nietzsche
sounds very pessimistic about the risk: "In all kinds of loss
the lower ad
coarser soul is better off than the nobler soul: the
dangers of the latter
must be greater, the probability that it will come to
grief and perish is
in fact immense."^ As the student consciously negates
all, he leaves behind
a great amount of security that is essential for
balance. Certainties no
longer exist and it is inevitable that eventually
the student will become
Not that I wish to be ungrateful to Wagner.
When in this essay I assert the proposition
that Wagner is harmful , I wish no less to
assert for whom he is nevertheless indispensable,
for the philosopher...! understand a philosopher
who declares 'Wagners sums up modernity. ' There
^
±s no way out, one must first become a Wagnerian.
very frightened:
We have left the land and taken to our ship.
We have bximed our bridges, more, we have
Kaufmann translation. Preface.
Zimmem translation, p. 251.
^
The Case of Wagner .
^Beyond Good and Evil .
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bumed our land behind us! Now, little ship,
take care! The ocean lies all around you; true,
it is not always roaring, and sometimes it lies
there as if it were silken and golden and a gentle
favourable dream. But there will be times when you
will know that it is infinite and that there is
nothing more terrible than infinity. . .Alas , if
homesickness for the land should assail you, as if
there were more freedom there-and there is no
longer any ' land *
.
once the student has negated the noOTS,
the certainties, there is no turning
back despite the fact that out of fear he
will inevitably want to at certain
periods in his life. It is as if he realizes
as crises occur that maybe he
has gone too far, that he needs those
certainties to carry him through life.
And yet, his self knowledge forces him
to acknowledge that in all honesty he
cannot have those certainties again, that
once negated they are part of his
past. Thus, the student is forced to
go forward and it is precisely here where
the role of the educator becomes so
crucial.
The stage of negation although essential
is merely a means toward
liberation. Of Itself, it is nothing.
If the student due to fear or be
lack of a true educator cannot find
the courage to go forward but remains
fiicated in the stage of no-saying,
he, in effect, remains a slave.
Oftai
the student has mastered the art
of dialectical thinking. He can
see the
- prosli^d-^ns of'every side of an-a^g^ent.
Although the latter is a great
virtue, it can also be a danger at
this stage. The student may become
cynical
about everything and Incapable of
coMnittlng himself to anything. "Not
even a dog would choose to go
on living like thxs.”
^71 771 Quoted in Hollingdale. Nietzsche: The
Man
^Joyful Wisdom. #124. ^°t
^
and His Philosophy . London.
Rout±e g_
^Schopenhauer as Educator^ p. 30.
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Nietzsche is emphatic that negation is without value except
as a precondition to creativity. "The free man is he who can lay
aside his chains, those grave misconceptions in religion, morality
and metaphysics."^ However, this is only a prerequisite for the
creating of new values. Even if one has rebelled against all absolutes,
and negated all, the enemy reappears as oneself. The task of freedom
demands the overcoming of one's self manifested in creative actions.
In aletter to Lou Salome in 1882, Nietzsche tried to explain that
the process of attaining freedom is never ending, that negation is not
a once and for all stage and that it constantly reoccurs as the need
to continually expel from oneself something that wishes death: it means
being cruel to all that isifeak and old in us. "Whatever I create and
2
however much I love it, soon I must oppose it and my love." It implies
destruction of that which we have created but gone beyond. Above all,
it requires that we at all times be conscious that we cannot afford to
become fixated in the stage of negation for of its very essence it is
negative rather than affirmative, destructive rather than creative,
and
as such only a means to an end.
Lou, Become the being that you are.
First, one has the difficulty of emancipating
oneself from one's chains and ultimately
-- one has to emancipate onesel" rrom~-..'w —
emancipation too!!! Each of us has to suffer,
though in greatly differing ways, from the
chain sickness, even after he has broken the
chains.
^The Anti-Christ. Kaufmann translation, p.
209.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 227.
^Letter to Lou Salome, 1882. Selected
Letters of Friedrich
Nietzsche, Middleton Translation, p. 191.
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Thus, the stage of the lion is characterized by no- saying, destroying,
asserting one's will in a negative mode. The student at this stage is an
experijmental thinker who insists on putting everything to the test of life.
He is honest with himself and with others. He is a negator in the pursuit
of self discovery, in the p\orsuit of meaning. Negation is preparation for
his ultimate work as creator, symbolized by Nietzsche as the work of the
child.
Stage of the Child in the Educational Process
But tell me, my brethren, what can the child
do, which even the lion could not do? Why
hath the preying lion still to become a child.
Innocence is the child and forgetfulness, a new
beginning, a game, a self rolling wheel, a first
movement, a holy Yea. Aye, for the game of
creating, my brhethren, there is needed a holy
Yea unto life : its own will , willeth now the
spirit; his own world winneth the world's outcast
(and he who had been losj to the world now
conquers his own world .
)
Nietzsche at times characterizes this stage as a state of being which affirms
the innocence of becoming. Devoid of resentment and revenge because of
the
eternal flux of all becoming, the child is totally affirmative,
totally yea-saying
and thus is capable of creativity. One could say that Nietzsche’s
philosophy is
an attempt to disprove all philosophical categories associated
with the
supernatural realm; that is, being, God, the one, self, thing-
in-itself
,
spirit,
ground of the world. m his development of the conception of wxll to
power,
he was attempting to conceptualize the world in such
a way as to reject all forms
of transcendence and return to the world a view of
itself basically innocent and
childlike.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Hollingdale Translation,
p. 55
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The Will to Power; Attempt at a new inter-
pretation of all occurrence. With the rather
dangerous title ’Will to Power' a new philosophy,
or more clearly expressed, the attempt at a new
interpretation of all occurrence is to find
expression.
Nietzsche was convinced that Western thought till modem times had been
characterized by a Platonic effort to reduce the value of existence to
something inferior to the supematxoral realm. He viewed all transcendental
concepts as attempts of philosophers to drain value from this earth. He
conceived his philosophy as an attempt to overcome this nihilism by restoring
value to the world of becoming and again manifesting the innocence of all
becoming
.
In one aphorism one can gain a good insight into Nietzsche's conception
of the history of philosophy and the values that lie hidden in each philosoph-
ical interpretation. Plato is thought of as the philosopher who began the
path to nihilism with his positing of the Idea as that which is static, the
standard by which the flux of all becoming is measured but never attained.
For Nietzsche Christianity was a form of Platonism for the masses which
right down to the time of Hegel continued to posit absolutes at the cost of
robbing the earth of its meaning and existence of its innocence. Sin,
guilt, shame, punishment are all corollaries of this continued philosophical
world view.
^quoted in Joan Stambaugh. Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return.
(Baltimore; The John Hopkins Press, 1971) p. 91.
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How the "True World" Finally Be ame a Fable; The History
of an Error.
1,
The true world-attainable for the sage, the pious,
the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it . (The oldest
form of the idea, relatively clever, simple and convincing.
A paraphrase of the sentence "I Plato ^ the truth.")
2. The true world-unattainable for now, but promised for
the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who
repents"). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle,
insidious, incomprehensible - it becomes female, it becomes
Christian.
3. The true world-unattainable, undemonstrable , unpromisable ; but
the very thought of it — a consolation, an obligation, an
imperative. (At bottom, the old s\an, but seen through fog
and skepticism. The idea has become sublime, pale, Nordic,
Konigsbergian.
)
4. The true waid-unattainable? At any rate, \anattained.
And being unattained, also TJinknown . Consequently, not
consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how can something
unknown obligate us? (Gay morning. The first yawn of
reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The "true"world - an idea which is no longer good for
anything not even obligating — an idea which has become
useless and superfluous - consequently - a refuted idea:
let us abolish it. (Bright day; breakfast; return of
bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush;
pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world - we have abolished. What world
remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no. With the
true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon:
moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error;
high point of humanity; incipit Zarathustra .
)
Nietzsche called this interpretation of the history of philosophy
the restoration
of innocence. He envisioned it as a return to a world
view consistent wxth the
pre-Socratics e_special-ly Heraclitus . He envisioned the nr
ocen-cf bccomyi-q
as the result of the fact that there is no being
apart from the whole of becoming.
It follows for him then that there is no final
goal for existence, no hidden order
underlying all of human experience and no absolute
truth. Man is not the center
nor the goal of history. Nietzsche was convinced
that it was man's obligation
^
The Twilight of the Idols . Portable, p. 485-86.
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to impose purposes upon nature and himself; this, in effect, is the
task of the creator. The norms to employ are not supernatural nor
external to man but products of his own creativity. The task is
awesome and the preparation of men who can take the task upon themselves
is the aim of all education.
We others, who desire to restore innocence to
becoming, would like to be the missionaries
of a cleaner idea: that no one has given man
his qualities; neither God, nor society, nor
his parents, nor his ancestors, no he himself -
that no one is to blame for him. There is no
being that could be held responsible for the
fact that anyone exists at all... It is a tremen-
dous restorative that such a being is lacking.
We are not the result of eternal intention, a
will or a wish: we are not the product of an
attempt to achieve an "ideal of perfection"...
any more than we are a blunder on the part
of God... There is no place, no purpose, no
meaning on whijh we can shift responsibility
for our being.
Nietzsche’s educational philosophy culmijiates in a picture of the free,
powerful man who views existence as innocent-. Master of himself, this
man has become childlike again, full of wonder. He has mastered
the
art of self overcoming and has learned to endure the pain of
destruction
in order to prepare for his self creativity. He is constantly
engaged
in the process of integrating the antinomies of his natiire
into a unifxed
whole; his instincts and passions are a very important
part of him and
manifest themselves in all of his actions. In his later
works, Nietzsche
termed this state, his ideal, as the Dionysian State.
It was characterized
by its capacity for affirmation and creation by
virtue of eros.
^The Will to Power . Kaufmann translation, p.
765.
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To create new values - that even the lion cannot
do; but the creation of freedom for oneself
for new creation, that is within the power of
the lion... But what can the child do that even
the lion cannot do. Why must the preying lion
become a child? The child is innocence and
forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self
propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred
"Bes". For the game of creation, my brothers,
a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills
his own will, and he who had been^lost to the
world now conquers his own world.
This sacred Yes, Nietzsche's Amor Fati is the ultimate state of freedom.
The man who can say Yes to all of existence, in its tragedy and sviffering
as well as its joy, is the man who can affirm eternal recurrence of all
things and thus has achieved a state where his very life is willed into
all of eternity. This man is not a pessimist, but rather an affirmer,
a creator and a man of joy. "And we should consider every day lost on which
we have not danced at least once. And we should call every truth false which
was not accompanied by at least one laugh. . .for in laughter all that is
evil comes together, but is pronoinced holy and absolved by its own bliss;
and if this is my alpha and omega, that all that is heavy and grave should
become light; ...Oh, how should I not lust after eternity and after the
nuptial ring of rings, the ring ^f_ recurrence?
Ultimately, the free man is a creator. He has passed the stage
of "Free from what"^ and is able to say, I am free for the
task of creating
my own laws. Zarathustra asks "Can you be your own
judge and avenger of
your own law?"^ "Terrible it is to be alone with the judge and
avenger of
one's own law? Are you willing to bear the suffering
involved in all creating?"
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable
.
p. 139.
^
H)id
. p. 343.
^
Ibid
. p. 175.
^Ibid .
^tbid.
The will to suffering: you creating ones,
you must live in the world. You must almost
be destroyed, and afterward bless your labyrinth
and your confusion. Otherwise you could not
create but only die off. You must have your
rise and decline. You must have your bad traits
and sometimes take them upon yourself again. You,
eternally recurring ones, you, yours|lves, should
make a recurrence out of yoiirselves.
In order to attain a state where man can create, he must be able to affirm
all of his past. Thus he is passed the need for blaming, for seeking
revenge, for resentment. He can look at all he has had to overcome and
actually bless it. He has also developed the ability to constantly die
to himself over and over again, destroying all that he has created and
loved when it becomes apparent that it is not serving life. "The child
is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self propelled
2
wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes." Only via destruction, letting
go of 3.11^ time and time agair^ can man constantly create. "Change of
values, that is a change of creators. Whoever must be a creator always
O
annihilates." Nietzsche's ideal creator is in Walter Kaufmann's words
4
a man who has achieved a certain "state of being" characterized by
"the whole man and those who achieve self perfection and affirm their own
jjelng and all eternity, backward and forward, having no thought of morrow.
They want ^ Eternal Reciirrence . "^ O^t of their fullness of their delight
in living and creating, men who have achieved this Dionysian state delight
in every moment. Their experiences are not spmething that happen to them but
always are their own and bear the imprint of their personality. They are
men of fate who have accepted complete responsibility for themselves.
^The Will to Power . Kaufmann translation, p.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable . p. 139.
^
Ibid
. p. 171.
"^Walter Kaiifmann. Nietzsche , p. 322.
Ibid.
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He is able to say with every day: "And whatever yet may come to me as
experience, a wandering and mountain climbing will be in it: in the
final analysis one experiences only oneself. The time has passed when
accidents can befall me: and what could still come to me that was not
already my own."^ Thus, the free man has a chie ved a state where he can
accept and love his past, his present and his future.
Magnus in his work Heidegger’s Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor
2
Fati, Being and Truth states that the innocence that characterizes Nietzsdie's
Dionysian State is marked by a lack of revenge, the conquering of the wills
aversion to constant change and flux. Zarathustra makes this very clear:
For that man be delivered from revenge,
that is the bridge to the highest hope
for me and a rainbow after a long storm.
The spirit of revenge, has so far, been
the siibject of man's best reflection...
This alone is revenge itself, ^he will's
aversion to time and "It was."
This view of experience is contrary to the view of traditional metaphysics.
Zarathustra says: "I led you away from all these fables when I taught
you
the will is a creator. "All", "It was", is a fragment, a dreadful
accident
4 -
until the creative will says: BUT THUS I WILLED IT."
Nietzsche believed that existence is ultimately man's creation;
history is absolutely indifferent to man's hopes or his
conceptions of good or
evil. Man has no right to look at nature isi a moralistic
way, as such
it is beyond good and evil. If man could conquer
his revenge, his resentment
toward the constant becoming of all things, he could
free himself to create
his own laws based on an affirmative view of
existence. Nietzsche realized
-Bemd Magnus. Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy:
Amor Fatx^ Be:^
and Truth. (The Hague: Martojaus Nijhoff, 1970).
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 250.
^Tbid.
4
-135 -
that "In this state of revenge man can contribute nothing to the task
of redeeming man because we hate ourselves."^ Zarathustra teaches that
one must learn to love oneself before he tastes of freedom.
One must learn to love oneself . . .with a
wholesome and healthy love, so that one
can bear to be with oneself... to learn
to love oneself, it is of all t^e subtlest,
the most cunning, the ultimate.
Given resentment and a lack of healthy egoism, man rails against his fate
by means of the creation of religious dogmas which offer assurances of
an afterworld. Unable to face the inevitability of death, man seeks to
create illusions that offer comfort and security he cannot find in this
existence. Deliverance from resentment does not require new dogmas but
rather a new world view toward all of existence characterized by Amor Fati .
It implies the recognition of the will to power , the affirmation of eternal
recurrence and a return to the tragic view of existence which existed
in the Greek world.
Chapter Five; The Teacher as Liberato
r
I absolutely cannot see how one can later make
up for having failed to go to a good school
at the proper time. Such a man does not know
himself; he walks through life without having
learned how to walk... The most desirable thing is
still mder all circ\jmstances a hard discipline
at ^ the proper time i.e. at the age at which it
one proud to see that much is demanded
of one. For this is what distinguishes the hard
school as a good school from all others; that
much is demanded and sternly demanded; that the
T the exceptional is demanded as the norm;
that praise is rare, that indulgence is non-existent;
that blame is apportioned sharply, objectively, without
regard for talents or antecedents.
Throughout the educational process, the educator is in the
Nietzsche. He is far more than a person the student seeks
to explain something he does not understand; he is far more than a resource
person. Although these roles are important, explainer and resource person,
much more important is the student's coming into contact with a man who has
the ability to initiate the art of education through his very life. Because
he himself has inculcated the dynamics of self overcoming and self discipline,
he can serve as a model to his students. Because he is in touch with his
own impulses and passions, he can enter into an erotic relationship with
his student and bring him to the road to wisdom. Through his hardness,
hones-^__and_ lack o:^ pity, he will attempt to keep him on -the path: urnina
him constantly in his quest for self mastery.
How is it possible to stay on one's own
path? Always someone crying calls us
aside; our eye rarely sees a case where
it does not become necessary to leave our
own task immediately. . .There is even a secret
1
The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation, p. 482-83.
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seduction in all this...our "own path"
is too hard... and too far from the love
and gratitude of othep...we do not at
all mind escaping it.
One of the important roles of the educator is, in Martin Buber's
words, "to keep the pain awake", to constantly prod the student out
of self complacency and laziness without forgetting his duty to constantly
aid the student in self liberation. "As a great educator, one has
to scourge such a race of 'blessed people' mercilessly into unhappiness.
2
The danger of dwarfing, of relaxation" is great to the student and
must constantly be overcome for the sake of freedom.
In one of his earliest works, Schopenhauer as Educator
,
Nietzsche draws a picture of his ideal teacher. He calls him the
Schopenhauerian man, the man who "voluntarily takes the pain of truth-
3
fulness upon hxmself." Assuming this as his task, he consciously wills
his own suffering, not as an end, but as a means toward freedom and
creativity. He has dedicated himself to "that complete revolution and
reversal of his being, the attainment of which is the actual meaning of
4
life." Further, he is "detached and remarkably calm in his personal
matters, full of a strong, consuming fire and far removed from the
contemptible neutrality of the so called 'scientific man' in his
pursuit of knowledge, .. .always sacrificing himself first to the recognized
truth and deeply conscious of the suffering which necessarily arises from
his truth. Nietzsche's ideal teacher relinquishes the ideal of happiness;
in place his ideal becomes freedom.
^
Joyful V7isdom . . The Complete Works , p. 338.
p
The Will to Power . Kaufmann Translation, p. 482.
O
Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 43.
^
Ibid .
id. p. 44.
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Nietzsche characterizes him as a heroic man rather than a happy man.
Because he is dedicated to freedom he is willing "to be hostile even
to the people he loves and the institutions in which he grew up."^
The Schopenhauerian man has awakened; he consciously wills himself and
creates himself within the context of his belief in eternal return.
Rather than letting experience merely happen to him, he actively wills
his every moment; he has the ability to take it upon himself to shape
and form himself and society around him. Nietzsche's ideal teacher loves
not only himself but mankind; he is characterized by an eros directed
toward the creative aspect of man rather than pity which is directed toward
the creature in man. Because he fastens his aim on the pot^al dignity
of man, he is a man of faith. He has faith in himself and his students
to endxire the hardship of liberation.
The most spiritual men, as the strongest, find
their joy where others would find their destruction:
the labyrinth, in hardness against themselves
and others. Their joy is self conquest: asceticism
becomes in them nature, need and instinct. Difficult
tasks are a privilege.
. .Knowledge, a form of ascet-
icism. They are the most venerable kind of men.^
In his early works, Nietzsche expresses a profound trust in all youth.
In the Use and Abuse of History he says: "And here I see the mission
of the youth that forms the first generation of fighters ...it will
bring a more beautiful and blessed humanity and culture. Its mission
is to shape to their foundations the present conceptions of 'health*
and 'culture' and erect hatred and scorn in the place of this rococo
mass of ideas...At first they will be more ignorant than the 'educated
man* for they will have unlearned much and have lost any desire even to
^
Ibid
. p. 45.
2 -
The Antichrist. Kaufmann transition, p. 57.
-139-
discxiver what those educated men wish to know... But at the end of the
cure they are men again and have ceased to be mere shadows of humanity."^
As he matured, however, Nietzsche began to doubt whether all youth
had the end\irance, the courage and the strength for the kind of
responsibility and love for mankind that he felt was involved in the
world of redemption of humanity. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra this awareness
is symbolized. At first, Zarathustra comes down to speak to all out of
love, to bring them the message that will return meaning to the earth.
But he soon learns that most do not have the ears to hear, nor the eyes
to see and tiiat if he is going to accomplish anything, he will have to
educate only the few students who are not asleep.
An insight has come to me: companions I need,
living ones...who follow me because they want
to follow themselves. . .Companions - the creators
seek, not corpses, not herds and believers...
I shall join the creators, the harvesters, the
celebrants: I shall show them^the rainbow and
all the steps to the overman.
With the realization that as an educator, he will only be able to enter
into a meaningful educational relationship with very few students comes a
certain release from the frustration of communicating with everyone and
a certain narrowing and focusing of perspective. Because the educational
relationship of necessity is limited to a few, the educator realizes the
imp)ortance of being capable of giving oneself sufficiently in order to release
the drive for freedom of a few kindred students. It is not that one's love
for mankind has been lost in a more narrow love for the few but that the
teacher realizes that only by entering into deep loving relationshxps
with
a few can one achieve anything as a liberator.
^
The Use and Abuse of History, p. 70-71.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable . p. 136.
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One embraces someone or other out
of love of mankind (because one cannot
embrace all) but this is what one
must never confess to the individual.^
Thus within Nietzsche's educational philosophy one finds a strong
humanistic as well as an elitist approach to education. There is
no doubt that Nietzsche was opposed to the spread of mass education
and the corresponding watering down of the curriculum on one hand and
an increase in the necessity for specialization on the other. Instead
of producing men of culture manifested in a certain unified way of
life, they were producing the scientific man, the onesided man
who wants to be able to make use of science
as soon as possible and stands on one side in
order to see life clearly. The result is
the historically and aesthetically trained
philistine, the babbler of old saws and new
wisdom on church, state and art, the sensorium
that receives a thousand impressions, the
insatiable belly that yet knows not what true
hijnger and thirst are. An education with such
an aim and result is against natxnre.*^
For Nietzsche, one of the main roles of the educator is to enter
into a loving relationship with his student which of its very essence
opens up possibilities for the student to explore human existence.
He had a profound feeling of sadness and regret when he saw the average
student at the university who lacked any real educator. At first,
the student comes seeking self knowledge and a sense of identity.
Essential in his education is the presence of an educator with whom he
can honestly communicate and establish a mutual trust, respect and love.
^
Beyond Good and Evil. Zimmem Translation, p. 100.
2
The Use and Abuse of History. Collins Translation, p. 66.
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Bfe is seeking an idology, a philosophy which can render meaning and
answers to many of the newly arising questions he has about himself and
his place in his society as well as broader questions about the meming
of life itself. He is interested in those perennial questions:
Why do I live? What lesson
shall I learn from life? How
have I become what I am? Why
do I siiffer from being as I am?"^
He is desperately seeking a Weltanschauijnq which is consonant with existing
theory and his own experience. Often he has come to the point of doubting
the answers of religion, his parents, his metaphysics and perhaps aren his
country. He is seeking a world view that will somehow make sense with
what he knows and yet he wants more. In the words of the neo-Freudian
psychiatrist, Erik H. Erikson, the student is seeking
A utopian outlook, a cosmic mood
or a doctrinal logic, all shared
as self evident beyond any need for
demonstration. What is to be
relinquished as 'old' may be the
individual's previous life; this usually
means the perspectives intrinsic to the
life-style of his parents ... it may
be part of himself which must henceforth
be siibdued by some self denial or it
may be the world view of other classes . .
The need for devotio^ is one aspect of
the identity crisis.
It is at this time that the educator plays his most decisive role. The
perennial questions and problems that the student is wrestling with are of
a natiire that throw the educator back on himself. To the extent that he
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 46.
^Erik H. Erikson. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and
History. (New York: Norton Company, 1958). p. 42.
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has seriously inculcated these questions into his every day existence
and his life reflects a quest for answers, only to that extent will he
be able to help the student. It is not for him to render 'answers'
but to provide a model and a relationship that will bring the student
to the point of positing and experimenting with his own answers. It
is this raodei that the student can turn to in his quest for self liberation.
El'iseo Vivas in the introduction to the Simpson and Hillesheim
translation of Schopenhauer as Educator provides a poignant description
of the beginnings of this quest on the part of the student and the
initial role of the educator:
A young person comes into your class on a
lovely day in the fall; after the lecture
he comes to the desk and in a shy manner
he asks an unusually intelligent question,
and what is more, one that shows that
he has done a bit of reading on it. You
keep an eye on him and maybe talk with
him in the office now and then. Gradually,
he begins to come in for a chat fairly
regularly. As you get to know him, you
begin to realize that he is not quite himself
yet and he knows it. Suddenly, by a miracle,
yes, it is a miracle, because of a book that
falls into his hand perhaps, or a bit of
verse or a picture, he tips in the womb of
nescience and you sense more than see that he
has begun to make his painful, groping_and
_____
wonderfully thrilling way to the light'; a
light that, after he reaches it he will call
his real world. He has taken his fi^st steps
in becoming a fully developed person.
And that in essence is the beginning of education, the painful, groping
and wonderfully thrilling way to the light. It will be a long time
before he has become free but the process has commenced. For
Nietzsche,
the role of the educator is essential and will continue to
be essential.
^Eliseo Vivas. Introduction to Schopenhauer as Educator.
Simpson
and Hillesheim Translation, p. xvi-xvii.
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In his love for the student, he takes the time and risk of getting involved
with him. His lectures, although important as a means of imparting culture
and knowledge itself are only a corollary to his main role as liberator. It
is a role that demands one's total involvement and Nietzsche was probably
correct in surmising that few people have the ability to do it. Because it
is a total giving of self, it demands men who are willing to risk themselves,
who are open, who trust themselves and therefore are not defensive. Like
Zarathustra, they can say "I do not guard against deceivers; I have to be
without caution: thus my lot wants it."^
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche suggests three stages that man
must pass through in order to become free: the stage of the camel, the lion
and the child. These stages are situated in time and each of them demand a
different role on the part of the educator. It is important that the educator
remain sensitive to these stages and where the student is at any given point
in his development. This means an intimate relationship between teacher and
student is essential, a relationship that is rare to find in any institutional
setting. The stages also dictate the educator's response to the student's
reactions when he tries to transmit knowledge.
The good teacher knows cases where he
is proud that his pupil remains true
to himself in opposition to him. At
times, however, the youth must not
understand him, or he
2
WOuld be harmed
by understanding him.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 368.
^Human All Too Human. The Complete Works . Volume Six. p.
135
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The Stage of the Camel
The camel stage is a stage of preparation. It is during this
time that the student should gain from his educator the basic tools
of reading, writing, mathematics, rhetoric and the like but he should
also develop a reverence and respect for the great works of the past,
not through drill and boring lectiires but by virtue of his intimacy
with his teacher. The educator aims to gain the student's trust
and confidence. Once attained, he is in a position to make stem
demands which he does without hesitation.
All education begins with great leaders and
with initial obedience. (The student) learnt
on the field of battle what he co\ild least
of all learn in the sphere of 'academic freedom'
that great leaders are necessary and that all
culture begins with obedience and the development
of habit.
Nietzsche was convinced that the stage of preparation involves obedience,
discipline and habituation. The nature of the child demands that he have
models on which to pattern himself. "I repeat, all culture begins with
the opposite of the presently vaunted 'academic freedom', with obedience,
2
subordination and with discipline and willingness to serve.'
The prevailing cult of academic freedom, then popular in the
G^an_secondary, schools, inst^d_ of fostering freedom was in fact leading
to the stagnation of student's growth, an inability to
realize themselves
in meaningful work. The cause for this stagnation
was that "they did
not find leaders they needed and therefore
perished."^ Nietzsche has nothing
but scorn for those who think that children
should be allowed a great deal
of freedom at an early age. He was convinced
that their opinion was based
^The Future of Educational rnstitutions.
The Complete Works, p. 139.
~Ibid. p. 140.
^Tbid.
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on fancy and lack of insight into the nat^Ire of children. instead
of fostering some kind of freedom, they should "take a look at the
student, discover from him, from his instincts, find out what he is
from his needs. They will then realize that children need and
want leaders and models. Teachers who espouse freedom at an early
age "have urged (the student) on to independence at an age when the
most natural and peremptory needs of his youth, so to speak, is a self
surrendering of youth to great leaders and an enthusiastic following
2in the footsteps of the masters." He felt that one of the saddest
aspects of the public schools was that they were "unable to inculcate
severe and genuine culture, which should consist above all in obedience
3
and habituation." Nietzsche denounced the present tendency to regard any
opinion as good as another. Children should not be encouraged to
develop opinions about political and social matters until they have
some knowledge of history, science and philosophy. Children should
not be considered as capable
of holding opinions concerning the most
important questions. Whereas the one aim
which proper education should most zealously
try to achieve would be the suppression of
all ridiculous claims to independent judgement
L — - . -r and the inculcahion upon yc'.’nc men cf ---
obedience to the scepter of genius.
‘
For a philosopher of freedom, these might sound like strange words.
Nietzsche was convinced however that freedom was not something that the
student was bom with but something that he cultivates. "All who wish
to be free must become so through themselves. . .freedom falls to
^
The Future of Educational Institutions . The Complete Works , p. 141.
o
"Ibid .
^
Ibid
. p. 142.
4
Ibid. p. 54.
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nobody as a gift from heaven." He was equally convinced that one of
the ways to prevent his attaining freedom is to encourage him to develop
his originality before he has the tools to do so. As a philosopher,
he had the deepest respect for creativity, but creativity based on
wide and deep knowledge. He had nothing but contempt for the vulgar
and cheap journalism that permeated much of his day. He was convinced
that the stage of preparation would be a stage when the basic aim
of the educator would be to "educate men to earnest and inexorable
habits and views .. .whereas the general laisser aller of the 'fine
2
personality' can be nothing else than the hallmark of barbarism."
For Nietzsche, lack of self discipline and "earnest and exorable habits"
is against nature and a hindrance to man. This lack blocks him in
his realization of growth and self overcoming:
It is nature therein that teaches man to hate
the laisser aller - that too great freedom -
and implants the need for limited horizons
,
for immediate duties. Nature teaches the
narrowing of perspectives and thus, in a certain
sense, that stupidity is a condition of
life and development. 'Thou must obey someone
and for a long time : otherwise , thou wilt
come to grief and lose all respect for theyself:
^
this seems to be the moral imperative of nature.
'
As long -as the public schools continue to preach academic freedom and
act accordingly; as long as they praise the 'fine personality' and neglect
their duty to inculcate "the immediate and practical discipline of
speaking and writing"^ they will hinder students from attaining freedom.
^
The Joyful Wisdom. The Complete Works, p. 137.
^Futi^T-e of Educational Institutions, p. 55.
^
Beyond Good and Evil. Zimmem tmaslation. p. 139.
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Rather than producing free men, they produce men who find themselves
in a dilemma that eventually leads to their powrlessness . These men
attone for this huge illusion of freedom by
ever growing inner doubts and convictions. He
(the student) feels that he can neither lead nor
help himself...He looks into his own breast,
analyzes his faculties and finds he is only peering
\anto hollow and chaotic vacuity... He now seeks
consolation in hasty and incessant action so as to hide
from himself .. .And thus this helplessness and want
of a leader drives him fromone form of life to another. .
.
There you^have a picture of this glorious 'independence'
of yoiirs.
Thus the stage of the camel relies on the inculcation of habit and obedience
as well as discipline, and obedience. The educator as a model or leader
can inspire the student with a zest for knowledge and a desire to perfect
the habituation necessary for the student to eventually master himself.
This development of good habits takes time.
Everyom who is in earnest in this matter will
have the same sort of experience as the recruit
in the army who is compelled to learn walking after
having walked all of his life as a dilettante or
empiricist. It is a hard time: one almost fears
that the tendons are going to snap and one ceases
to hope that the artificial and consciously acquired
movements will ever be carried out with ease... It
is painful to see how awkwardly one foot is set before
another. . .Then it suddenly becomes noticeable that a
new habit and a second nature has been bom of the
practiced movement.
v«th-regard ^:o habits, Nietzsche believed that the
schools should begin
with themother tongue. Educators have the
obligation of teaching their
students to speak well. "Our elegant writers,
as their style shows,
have never learnt 'walking' in this sense,
and in our public schools, no
one learns 'waldng' either." Culture begins,
however, with the correct
movement of language: and once it has
properly begun, it begets that
^Future of F.ducational Institutions, p.
57
^Ibid. p. 59.
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physical sensation in the presence of 'elegant' writers which is known
by the name 'loathing.'"^ Instead of encouraging students to produce
original essays and original short stories, the child should be taught the
skills of the language, how to use the language and how to appreciate it
when it is used at its best. The current stress on originality in the
educational institutions was for Nietzsche an indirect way of crushing
creativity and harming the creative potential of the child. The child is
just not ready at an early age for original work.
Their really independent traits, which, in
response to premature excitation, can
manifest themselves only in awkwardness,
crudeness and grotesque features, in short,
their individuality is reproved and rejected
by the teacher in favor of an unoriginal decent
average. On the other hand, uniform mediocrity
gets peevish praise. . .Originality is demanded here:
but the only shape it can manifest itself is rejected
and the 'formal' education that the system takes for
granted is attained to only by a very limite^
number of men who complete it at a ripe age.
For Nietzsche, the stage of the camel is the time when children should not
Qnly come to love their educatr as a model but should be led to find other
models: great models from classical literature. Prom them, he can leam
the art of writing and thinking.
At this time, the educator is the student's ideal. Nietzsche's
-~ov^-'relationship to Wagner is a-good example. a
in 1869, Nietzsche, having just discovered his teacher Wagner writes:
I have found a man who reveals to me as no
other the image of what Schopenhauer calls
'the genius' .. .There dwells in him such
^
The Future of Educational Institutionsc The Complete
Works^ p. 59-60
^Ibid.
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uncompromising idealism, such deep and
affecting humanity, such exalted seriousness
of purpose that when I am n^ar him, I feel
as if I am near the divine.
As the student matxires there develops slowly a tension within the
student which is often reflected in the student-teacher relationship:
Youths varyingly show devotion and impudence
towards the same person because at bottom
they only despise or admire themselves in that
other person and between the two feelings but
stagger to and fro in themselves, so long as they
have not found in experience the measure of
their will and ability.
Thus in coming to be himself, the student realizes that negation is
essential. The educator in selecting a part of the knowledge that he
has incorporated into his very way of life is not transmitting facts in
his discussions with the student but knowledge that is intimately related
to himself. Student resistance is to be expected and even affirmed as
the student grows in experience. In Joyful Wisdom Nietzsche describes
his ideal student:
When he said that, his disciple shouted:
'But I believe in your cause and consider it
so strong that I shall say everything, everything
that I can find in my heart to say against it.'
The innovator ^aughed. . . 'This kind of discipleship
is the best.'"
When this type of resistance comes to the surface, it is a sign that te
camel stage is coming to a close. As the tension becomes more rigid,
the role of the educator must change, if the student is to grow. It
^quoted in Hollingdale. Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy.
p. 70.
^Human all too Human. Volume V. The Complete Works, p.
137.
^Joyful Wisdom . The Complete Works. p. 146.
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is now that the teacher must remember his role as liberator rather than
transmitter of certain knowledge and values. Liberation implies an
open future, and letting go. His aim is to help in the creation of
a free person who is constantly self overcoming, a person who lives
intensely and creatively and thus is a law mto himself. Creators do not
live by another's rules, they create their own. That is not to say that
the new model will not bear resemblance to the old, or that the virtues
will be totally new, but it does mean that they have been voluntarily adopted,
made one's own by experimentation, and experience. The educator is not there
to produce imitators but men to whom he can trust that gift of creation.
He realizes that "one repays a teacher badly if one remains nothing but
a pupil." ^ Thus he must eventually say to the student "Now I bid you,
lose me and find yourself."^ To the extent that the student is a carbon
copy of his educator, to that extent the educator has failed.
Imitators, what? You don't want to
have imitators. I don't want people
to do anything after me. I want
everyone to do something before himself
(as a pattern to himself.)
Growing resistance to the educator is a sign of growth. The student
wills to discover as his own truth that which has come to him
from his
educator. Within a sound teacher student relationship there is
a gradual
process of liberation in authority. In the beginning,
authority is
taken on faith, loved and affirmed. However, utlimately
every individual
is unique and if he listens to himself, he will
want to begin anew.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable, p. 190.
^
Ibid .
^Joyful Wisdom .' The Complete Works, p. 206.
1I
I
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Nietzsche made this very clear ij\ his early work, Schopenhauer as Educator :
Everyone carries within himself a productive
uniqueness. . .but this uniqueness carries with
it a whole nexus of duties and obligations. For
the unusual person who burdens himself with this
chain of duties, there is no doxobt that life
loses almost everything which one in his youth
demands from it: security, levity.
It is at this time that the student ventures out into the unknown. If
his need for security is too great, he will not venture. The ideal
educator has gradually led the student to the point where he not only
2had the need to "take the burden of selfhood upon himself" but also
has developed the courage and the strength to give up the dependence of
childhood. His gradual liberation in authority should have prepared him
for this step. His maturity depends on the quality of authority of the
educator during the stage of the camel; the quality dictates the quality
of knowledge that the student has appropriated as his own. As he grows
up within authority and the love relationship of his educakr, he will
begin to realize that the world is appearing more and more full of wonder,
more generating of endless questions. If he is deprived of this authority
at an early age, Nietzsche was convinced that he would end up full of doxabt,
rootless and unable to move towards the unknown. This child begins the
process of negation lame; he is less apt to be confident when crises arise
and he_i5. Less apt ±o endure. Once liberated the stei<='rt can-
his own truth even though it is quite contradictory to the values of his
teacher. Yet his teacher's authority, although overcome, expresses itself forever
3
in the student's selfhood.
Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 29.
"Ibid.
^In "Absolutism to Experimentalism", John Dewey expressed this well when
talking about his former educator, George Morris. "I have never knovm a more
single hearted, whole-souled man, a man of a single piece all the way through;
while
I have long since deviated from his philosophic faith, I should be
happy to be leve
that the influence of the spirit of his teaching has been an enduring
influence
Contemporary American Philosophers. (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1962) p.
18.
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The educator must have the capacity for "raising the student above the
insufficiency of his times and teaching him to be simple and sincere
in his thinking and living."^ He is not a man who is interested in
transmitting mere information but in being the vehicle for an "inward
2
renvovation and inspiration of the purest moral faculties". Indiort
he is a living example.
The example must be given through visible
life and not through books, that is...
through one;s expressions, attitudes,
clothing, food and way of life rather than
through ^peaking and least of all through
writing.
From Nietzsche's point of view, the ^ucators of his day were "more
interested in Eholarship than in humanity." Instead of teaching the
valuing process and the essence of morality, educators had ceased to
even talk about morals. "They simply ignore moral education and make
do with formalities. Virtue is a word that no longer means anything to
the pupil or teacher.""^ Nietzsche condemns this lack because the formalities
result in an acceptance of the current mores and the producing of men
characterized by a "restlessness, a confusion which condemns them to
a sterile and joyless existence."^ As part of one's education, the
student should have the opportunity of reflecting on the essence of morality
and its- essential meaning to hxjman life. Via reflection, experience,
and critical thinking, the educator can bring the student to the point of
engagi
in the act of valuing itself. Since it is life that the schools should
be
concerned with, there is no excuse for its ignoring morality. "Never
were
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 12.
^Ibid .
^
Ibid
.
p. 18.
'^
Ibid
.
p. 11.
^Ibid.
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moral educators more needed and never was there less chance of finding
them,”^
Above all, for Nietzsche educators must be lovers of mankind,
selfless in the healthy, overflowing sense of the term. They should have
attained a certain degree of freedom themselves and once attained, rather
than withdrawing from the world of everyday, "ffeeing from the crowd, the
2
many, the majority where he may forget the men who are the rule"
,
he is
3
willing to "go down and above all go inside." He takes it upon himself
to educate, to liberate the few who in turn might become the redeemers
of mankind. Ultimately, he is a man of faith.
^
Ibid .
^
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Translation, p. 18.
^Ibid.
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Nietzsche’s Conception of the Ideal Teacher - Socratir?
In most of the Nietzschean commentaries since the turn of the
century it was assumed that Nietzsche’s philosophy was the very antithesis
of Socratic philosophy. This view was based on Nietzsche's many negative
remarks about Socrates, himself, as well as his conviction that Western
philosophy went into basic error when Plato appeared with his world of
ideas. However, recently, Walter Kaufmann has advanced the tteis that
the traditional interpretation of the Socrates-Nietzsche relationship is
incorrect. "Nietzsche's admiration for Socrates is a focal point of
his thought and reflects his view of reason and morality as well as the
image of the man he envisaged."^ Kaxifmann contends that Nietzsche
received his conception of the ideal philosopher and ideal educator from
Socrates, the man, rather than socratic philosopohy. "Socrates, while
definitely a decisive turning point in history is the very embodiment
of Nietzsche ' s highest ideal ; the passionate man who can control his
passions. Here, as in Goethe, he found a man who had "given style to
2his character" and disciplined himself to wholeness." Few philosophers
had passed this test for Nietzsche, the achievement of integration of life
—
-and learning.- Socrates for Nietzsche is the ed’a?^:^V' v;ho
achieved an integration of the theoretical and practical. For Nietzsche,
Socrates had avoided the usual bifurcation of man that usually occurs when
Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 391.
^Ibid. p. 399.
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a man becomes immersed in philosophy. The usual distinction between
theory and practice had resulted in a disaster for Western man;
Theory and Practice: Fateful distinction, as if
there were an actual drive for knowledge that,
without regard to questions of usefulness and
harm went blindly for the truth and then, separate
from this, the whole world of practical interests.
I have tried to show
. . .what instincts have
been active behind all these "pure theoreticians
how they all have under the spell of their instincts,
gone fatalistically for something that was 'truth'
for them- for them and only them...The so called drive
for knowledge must be traced back to the drive to
appropriate and conquer.
Like the child in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
,
Socrates was a man who could
say: "the body does not think I but does I," He did not live by a
double standard. He did not separate theory and practice.
Nietzsche's ideal educator possesses the trait of endless
inquiry after tiruth. "One would suspect that Nietzsche must have felt
a special kinship to the ever seeking Socrates. In any case, Nietzsche
identifies Socrates as the first philosopher of life. Thought serves life,
2
while in all previous philosophers, life served thought and knowledge."
It was from Socrates that Nietzsche based his conception of the
ideal educator. For him, as for Plato, the ideal educator is the ideal
philosopher. "Plato seems to have received the decisive thought as to
how a philosopher ought to behave toward men from the apology of Socrates:
3
as their physician, as a gadfly onjthe neck of man."
^
The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation, p. 227.
2
Kaufmann. Nietzsche, p. 396.
O
quoted in Kaufmann. Nietzsche, p. 391.
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Later, Nietzsche will describe the main role of the philosopher as a
physician of cult^lre. "By applying the knife vivesectionally to the
very virtues of the times, he betrays his own secret: to know of a new
greatness of man."^ As an educator and philosopher, Nietzsche conceived
his main task to be making the individual uncomfortable.
To make the individual uncomfortable -
2
that xs my maxn task.
Only in this way can the educator lead the student to true knowledge.
To the extent that the student is self satisfied and happy, to that extent
he is ignorant, blind and prejudiced. As an educator, the teacher is
not concerned with imparting dogma but rather through dialogue helping
the student realize his own ignorance and the necessity for finding his
own answers. Like Socrates, Nietzsche envisioned the educator as a
ft
model who would act as a physician of culture" pointing out the baseness
of the contemporary values as well as a liberator. Via his very being, the
educator can aid the student to begin and stay on the path of endless search-
ing and questioning, endless experimenting.
Neither Socrates nor Nietzsche were interested in disciples. They
realized that in order for the student to become free it was essential that
they negate their teacher eventually.
...and only when you have all denied
— ~
'me will 1 return to you.
Truly, with other eyes, my brothers, I
shall, then seek my lost one^; with another
love I shall then love you.
^quoted in Kaufmann. Nietzsche, p. 404.
^Notes
,
1875. Portable , p. 50.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Hollingdale Translation. p. 105.
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Nietzsche tried to make it clear that the educator was interested in
jjistilling a mode of life rather than a body of truths, a mode of
life characterized by experimentation, reason and creativity. "I
wish no one to imitate me: I wish all to set their own goals.
. .Again,
this is my way, where is yours. Like Socrates, he did not meai
that any goal is all right but rather goals that are arrived at via
rationality, goals that will benefit man in modem society.
Man stands in the midst of the great
whirlpool of forces; and imagines that
this whirlpool is rational and has a
rational aim in view: ERROR! The only
rationality that we know is the small
reason of man: he must exert it to the
utmost, and it invariably leaves him in
the lurch if he tries to place himself
in the hands of Providenc^. Our only
happiness lies in reason.
What could be more Socratic? In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he again
sounds like Socrates. "All my progress has been an attempting and
a questioning and truly one has to learn how to answer such questioning."
The ideal educator is a man who affirms this existence. O^t
of his creative eros, he has developed the capacity to give.
This is the manner of noble souls: that they
do not want to have anything for nothing, least
of all life. -Jfl/hoever is of the jBob wants to
live for nothing; we others, however, ro whom
life gave itself, we always t^ink about what
we might best give in return.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable , p. 307.
^
The Case of Wagner . Kaufmann Translation p. 183.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Hollingdale Translation p. 213
^Ibid. Portable, p. 311.
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The educator who has the capacity for bringing others to liberation, of
necessity, must have tasted this creativity himself, if only for a
moment* He is a man who like Socrates can "constantly experience
,
see, hear, suspect, hope and dream extraordinary things."^ These
dreams give a vision of what could be
,
of how great man potentially
could be, and it is this vision that is somehow caught by the student
and becomes a fotindation of his wanting to become hiiiBelf.
The ideal educator is a man "who is often struck by his own
thoughts as if they came from the outside.
. .who himself is perhaps a storm
2pregnant with new lightnings." Because he is a man of ideas, a man who
can create, he wants nothing more than to have students who can some day
share these thoughts with him. The ideal educator is a "being who
runs away from himself, but whose curiosity always make him 'come to
3himself again." Thus, he is a man who nourishes himself on his own
strength; in his solitude he discovers the richness of his own being and
out of his love for others, he communicates his ideas, his visions and
his deepest hopes.
Like his model Socrates, Nietzsche realized that the ideal
educator must know when to speak, when to communicate openly and when not
to speak. "A good teacher takes things seriously, and even himself, only
4
in relation to his pupils." There is a time for talking and a time for
keeping silent and waiting; "I admire the courage and wisdom of Socrates
in all he did, said and did not say."^
^
Beyond Good and Evil. Zimmem translation, p. 292.
^Ibid .
^
Ibid .
'^
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem translation p. 85.
^Joyful Wisdom. The Complete Works , p. 340.
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Above all, Nietzsche conceived the ideal educator as a seducer, a
magnet who like Socrates could attract young people and lead them to
the life of questioning and seeking truth.
To conceive of a philosopher as a great
educator
,
who, down from his lonely heights,
is powerful enough to attract long series
of generations. It is necessary to grant
him the uncanny privilege of being a great
teacher. A teacher never says what he
thinks himself about a subject but only what
he believes to be of benefit i^ relation to
the liberation of his student.
Nietzsche was convinced that in order to be a good educator , one must
2
be "skilled in the ways of discipline and rearing." He must be able
to assume different roles as the nature of the student dictates. "Some
natiares he will be able to promote only by the whiplash- of scorn, others,
the indolent, indecisive. . .perhaps by exaggerating praise. Such an
education is beyond good and evil." How he communicates, how he
liberates can never be systematized, it depends entirely on the student
and the iraght of the educator. Above all, the ideal educator remains
the model who "measirres the height of what he knows by the depths of
4
his power to do."
Like Socrates, Nietzsche envisioned the educator as initiating
the student in the path of correct and rigorous thinking, opening
him
to experience and to truth. The movement is away from objective knowledge
and toward truth based on the student's own experience.
Nietzsche's
reliance on experience rather than dogma as the source of
truth is also
Socratic.
^
The Will to Power . Kaufnann Translation, p. 512.
^
Ibid .
^Ibid.
"^The Use and Abuse of History, p. 56.
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A kind of intellectual integrity has been alien
to all founders of religions and their kind: they
have never made their experience a matter of
conscience for knowledge. . .We who thirst for
knowledge want to look our experience straight in
^the eye as if theyrepresented a scientific experiment.
Like Socrates, the problem of intellectual integrity seems to have
been dominant in all of Nietzsche's thought. "Who has at all
approached freedom of the intellect cannot help but feel himself
a wanderer on earth, even though not as travelling toward a final
2
goal, for one does not exist." For Nietzsche as for Socrates
there is no notion of divine order. We can find no doctrine of
philosophy. It is true that Socrates considered himself divinely
inspired at times, as did Nietzsche. But the examination of
experience is an on-going process, the enactment of dialogue, not the enactment
3
of who who knows the truth as doctrine. The educators conception of
truth is not something that he give s to the student but rather a process
which arises from questions with occur in the concreteness of their
dialogue. The idea is to view the questions with sufficient ultiiracy
relevant to the situation. Therefore, for Socrates and for Nietzsche
the educator and student are not cencemed with absolute truth but for
a sufficient notion of truth in relation to existential situations.
The man who is open to experience for J^Iietzsche is^ tte
who has the capacity for experiential thinking.
A preference for the questionable and terrifying
things is a symptom of strength, while a taste
^Joyful Wisdom . The Complete Works . #319.
2
Human all too Human. The Complete Works . Vol. V. p. 190.
^Confer Jaspers treatment of Socrates in Vol\jme I of The Great
Philosophers .
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for the pretty and the dainty^belong
to the weak and the delicate.
The educator's approach to knowledge should be such that he can say:
"Give me any kind of skeptical proposal to which I am permitted to say
'lets try it'. But I want tD hear nothing more of anything or any
2
question which does not permit of experimentatxon.
"
For Nietzsche as for Socrates the educator has the obligation
of helping the student move from the world of opinion and prejudice to
one of reason. In Joyful Wisdom Nietzsche speaks directly of Socrates
as the ideal educator.
The genius of the heart, as that great hidden
one has it...The Pied Piper. . .whose voice knows
how to descend into the depths of every soul...
the genius of the heart...who teaches one to
listen. . .who smoothes rough souls and who lets
them taste a new yearning. . .the genius of the
heart...who divines under the hidden and forgotten
^
tbe drop of goodness. . .under the thick
ice...The genius of the heart from whose touch
everyone goes away richer, pressed by the goods
of another, but richer in himself . .
.
opened up
less sure perhaps but full of hopes that as yet
have no name.
For Nietzsche, Socrates' main asset was that he was a lover
who had the
ability to "descend into the depths of every soul." With this
descent
one has the possibility of leading the student from a stage
of dependence
to independence. With the "genius of the heart" of the
ideal educator
the student becomes richer. . .more opened up." He
begins to learn to
^
The Will to Power . Kaufmann translation, p. 480
^Joyful Wisdom . The Complete Works . #51.
^
Ib id . p. 295.
4
Ibid .
^Ibid.
to flow with experience. It becomes a question of letting oneself
go to the extent that you are willing to hold questioning in abeyance
for a while, giving oneself to the experience first and then reflecting
on it. *’For we must be able to lose ourselves at times if we want to
learn something of what we have not in ourselves."^ "As long as one
lives through an experience, one must surrender to the experience and
shut one's eyes instead of becoming an observer immediately. For that
would disturb the good digestion of the experience. Instead of wisdom
2
one would acquxre indigestions."
Because the educator himself is a man of experience who bases
his knowledge on experience, he becomes a model to the student. Over and
over again he learns that he should serve himself "as a source of
3
experience." Like Socrates, Nietzsche thought of the teacher as one who
was "able to be lowly so as to be approachable to many and humiliating
to none... to bear injustice and to have wormed your way through all sorts
of errors so as to be able to approach many hidden souls on their secretive
4
paths. . .always with love and enjoyment of self."
Eros is the basis of the student teacher relationship for Socrates
as for Nietzsche. When Zarathustra comes down off the mountain he says:
"I love mankind...! bring them a gift." For Nietzsche the correlative of
loving is giving out of gratitude for life itself. This eros is that which
gives possibility to the student's continual ascent toward self perfection.
Like Platonic eros, it suffers and dies if it cannot pour itself out.
^
Joyful Wisdom. The Complete Works, p. 239.
^
The Wanderer and His Shadow. Kaufmann Translation, p. 184.
^
Human all too Human . The Complete Works . Volume V. p. 263.
'^Dawn of Day. The Complete Works, p. 19.
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Eros is as important to Nietzsche as to Socrates in the
student teacher relationship. For him, it is eros that sets in
motion the dynamics of self overcoming or liberation. For while
the capacity for creativity and self overcoming cannot themselves be
given to the student, the teacher with the ability to love can
enable creativity and freedom to become possible. As for Socrates,
eros is an intermediary god, half god and half man, who mediates
between god and man helping man to move toward his ideal . The ^ucator
is a man who out of his imer fullness yearns to fertilize the young so
that they may be capable of creating new and beauitiful ideas. The
ideal is never reached but serves as an goal toward which all students
strive. He is constantly aware of his insufficiency, of what he lacks
as he moves closer and closer towards his aim. Zarathustra knows
that the "lover wants to create because he despises. What does
he
know of love, who has not had to despise precisely what he had
loved."
Love as procreation is as essential for Nietzschean educational
thought as Platonic thought. Diotima in The Symposj^ instructs Socrates
Love, Socrates, is not as you imagine,
the love of the beautiful only . What then?
The love of generation and of birth inbeauty.
Yes, I say yes, indeed, she replied. ^t
why of generation? Becavce to-cl
creature, generation is a sort of eternity and
immortality, she replied. . .therefore, love
is of immortality.
' Zarathustra tells his students of the same love:
And this secret spoke life herself to me.
Behold, said she, I am that which must ever
surpass itself. To be sure, you call it
^
The Symposium . The Works of Plato .
Selected and edited by
Irwin Edman. Jowett Translation, p.
373-74.
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’will to procreation' or impulse toward a
goal, towards the higher, remoter more manifold:
but all that is one and the same secret. Rather
would I succumb than disown this one thingj..
that I have to be a struggle and becoming.
In the jstudent teacher relationship the student is as much in need
of the teacher for growth as the teacher is in need of the student to
love and give of himself, to create in the student the ability to carry
his ideas and hopes on to a higher and more meaningful realization.
In a letter to Lou Salome whom Nietzsche regarded as his student, Nietzsche
2
ends "in fond devotion to your destiny-for in you I love also my hopes ."
Like Socrates, Nietzsche was convinced that the educator's
role is not to help the student to adjust to the society but rather to
raise himself above the society so that he can step back and reflect on
its values and mores. In Dawn of Day Nietzsche says: "The sxarest way
to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those
who
think alike than those who think differently."^ Later, he says: "It
seems to me that the genius has always found himself in opposition
to his day
4
the greatness of his task is being the bad conscience of his
time."
The educator's role is truly a gadfly fastened upon the
neck of
man which forces him to think about his actions in relationship
to his
fellow man. By making the student uncomfortable with
his opinions, he
like Socrates, leads the student to the point of
using his reason with
regard to questions concerning human life.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Hollingdale Translation, p.
34.
better to Lou Salome, 1882. Selected Letters of
Friedrich Nietzsche.
Middleton Translation. p. 191.
^
Dawn of Day . Portable , p. 91.
^Portable, p. 444.
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The Role of Eros in the Educational Process.
As indicated previously, for Nietzsche as for Socrates,
the student teacher relationship was based on eros. Nietzsche
envisioned the art of teaching "as the most delicate technique that
ever existed on earth. For Education to take place, it becomes
essential that the student come to the point that, out of love for
his educator, he can sxarrender himself to him and thus begin the
long process towards liberation.
It is impossible to teach love, for
in love alone the soul gains not
only a clear and contemptuous view of
itself, but also desires to look beyond
the self and seek a higher self. Only
he who has given his hea^ to some great
teacher can become free.
Nietzsche was appalled at the conditions in the secondary schools of
Germany, conditions which, of necessity, prevented the one to one
relationships which are essential in the educational process.
Our overcrowded public schools,
our accijmulation of foolishly
manufactured p^lic school masters
are a SCANDAL.
As he studied these educational institutions, he realized that eros
or love, or even sincere communication was lacking between teachers
and students. The teachers were characterized as scholars "more
4
interested in scholarship than in himanity." They were sterile and
lacked faith. The more he became familiar with them, the more justified
5
he felt in saying "never had my eyes beheld anything so motley." They
were lifeless; having lost touch with hmanity they were incapable of Iwing
^
Future of Educational Institutions. The Complete Works, p. 45.
2
Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 61.
^
Twilight of the Idols. Portable , p. 556.
'^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable . p. 231.
^Ibid.
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love relationships with anyone. They were all tied up; "they
were uneasy in trust themselves; hence, they were incapable of
being guides or educators for others."^ Rather than free men, men
of passion who have conquered self mastery, they were "weaklings
„2
who think themselves good because they have no claws. The highest
type of man is the passionate man who is master of his passions and is able
to use them creatively without having ro resort to asceticism for fear
that his passions may conquer him. In order to be an educator, one
must be able to love out of an overflowing richness as well as manifest
a healthy love of self.
The love of the ducator for his student is not a disinterested
love, but is based on egoism. It flows from an affirmation of oneself.
The educator is a man who has "ceased being ashamed of himself." Through
his struggle for self overcoming, he has come to a point where he can
affirm himself, love himself and thus love others not out of need but out
of strength.
one must learn to love oneself, this
I teach, with a wholesome and healthy
love, so that one can bear to b^
with oneself and need not roam.
In The Will to Power , Nietzsche goes further and says:
...
In those men whose ego is v;eak.-aui^ thin —
the power to love has also grov/n weak"; that
the greatest lovers are such owing to the
strength of their ^go, that love is an
expression of ego.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 12.
^Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p. 139.
^
Ibid
. p. 305.
^The Will to Power. The Complete Works . Volume XV. p. 292.
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Ultimately, the educator is a lover, a model to his student. He
is characterized by a certain longing for wholeness. He is an
"xaninhibited man, a natural being that moves around his own pivot.
In his early works, Nietzsche called his ideal educator a genius, a
genius "who is always open to life and to the call of his own being, who
2
is in love with all that is alive and beautxful." This educator, havxng
imposed order on his own passions, is capable of leading others to do
the same. In loving him, the student can accept his hardness and
3
stemess and is "proud that much is demanded of him."
Nothing better can happen to a student than
to come in contact with a teacher who,
because he has thought the deepest thoughts,
must love what is most alive, and like th|
wise men they are, turn to the beautiful.
For the educator, the most beautiful thing in the world is a student who
is earnest about wanting to leaim and who has the potentiality for
creating new and beautiful ideas. The educator's love is such that it
must develop this student; it must make demands; it must guide and sometiir®
it must withdraw. Of its very nature it is not clinging; it knows nothing
of the kind of possessiveness that stifles growth. Without love,
little will happen for the student; with it, education takes place.
This is not to say that the educator has some kind of dis-
interested love for his student. Nietzsche has nothing but scorn for
people
who claim to be 'disinterested' about anything.
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 17.
^Ibid. p. 16.
^
Will to Power. Kaufmann translation, p. 482.
'^Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 16.
-*1
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Now that the priase of the 'disinterested
person' is so popular.
. .and 'disinterested
love?" What!!!! Even an action for love
sake shall be unegoistic?"
Given the necessity of an erotic relationship between teacher and student
for true education to take place, both the teacher and the student love
for their own sake as well as their coinmon ideal. Basically, on the
educator's part it is a selfishness. In an article entitled "Eros
and Education in Plato's Symposium", Robert Wellman points out that
It is for one's own benefit that one takes
upon himself the education of another, from
the immediate point of view of the lover, the
educative process exists not principally for
the student but for himself. It is the teacher
who desires beautiful objecti'^es upon whom he
may beget his pregnant ideas.
Nietzsche says the same thing to his student, Lou, whom he looked upon
as the possible heir to his most secret ideas;
I should like verymuch to be permitted to be
your teacher. To tell the whole truth, I am
now looking for human beings who could become
my heirs; I am carrying around a few ideas that
are not by any means found in my books and am
looking for the most beautiful and fruitful soil
for them...Just look at my selfishness.
It was obvious to Nietzsche that one cannot have this kind of relationship
with many people. Thus, an educator in good conscience "may refuse to
——have -an^~tfling to do with yottng men v/ho are not adequately equipped or
gifted for thetask."*^ Even if the young person has the ability, only a
^
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Translation, p. 164.
^Robert R. Wellman. "Eros and Education in Plato's Symposium".
quoted in Kaijfmann. Nietzsche, p. 52.
"^Case of Wagner. Kaufmann Translation p. 138.
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f6W can ent©n into this lov© irelationship with an ©ducator and th©
t©ach©r must guard against thinking that h© can lov© many. H©
must not b©com©
a victim to any of his specialties, to
his 'hospitality' .. .which is th© danger
for highly developed souls, who deal
prodigally and almost indifferently with
themselves, and push the virtue of liberality
so far that it becomes a vice. One must
know how to CONSERVE ONESELF - the best test
of independence.
At times for the educator this is extremely hard. It is most tempting
to see the possibility of liberating many of the beautiful students with
whom he is surrounded all day, and yet, if he succumbs to the temptation,
he accomplishes nothing. A relationship of the kind Nietzsche envisioned
is draining as well as creative; it demands time and a giving of oneself that
of necessity is possible between an educator and very few students. The
educator is primarily dedicated to the bringing about of the overman,
the creator of future values and laws. Thus, the process must be
superior and imique and of necessity involve only a few students. "All
2
superior education can only concern the exception."
The educator is dedicated to cultivating a man of unity -
wholeness. He must "discover the central strength of the student, and
3
also prevent it from disrupting the other forces." His task is to
"transform the whole student into a living animated system of suns and
4
planets and to discover the laws of this higher mechanism." He must
aid the student in distinguishing "the real from the apprent advancements
5
of human happiness." Above all, he must help the ±udent to take on
^
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Translation, p. 56-57.
2
Portable , p. 56.
3Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 25.
^Ibid.
-170-
the educator's primary goal; "to win power in order to come to the
help of nature and to correct her foolishness and clumsiness a little,
at first for oneself but eventually for everybody."^ Thus, the
goal of transformation of the physis in accordance with hman aspirations
becomes the educators main goal. As a lover he is hoping to bring
the beloved to a point where dedicated to hijmanity, he will use his
power to benefit all. Ultimately, Nietzsche expressed this goal in
terms of the production of overmen - Dionysian man.
The word 'Dionysian' means: an urge to
unity, a reaching out beyond oneself,
the everyday society, across the abyss
of transitoriness; a passionate, painful
overflowing into the darker, fuller and
more floating states: an ecstatic affirmation
of the total character of life.
The Dionysian man is committed to the transformation of nature, the
creation of beauty as well as a love of all.
The eternal will to procreation, to
fruitfulness, to recurrence, the feeling
of the necessary unity of creation and
destruction, , .beauty is not given to man...
it must be^conquered, willed, won by
struggle
.
Eros is that drive, that will to power that pushes us towards unity,
towards “creation. It is the basic life impulse of which education
is only the by product. It is the will to power sxablimated towards
the creation of a more beautiful existence. It is the endless striving
^Schopenhauer as Educator , p. 26.
^
The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation p. 539.
3
Ibid.
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for mity, wholeness and being that characterizes man's "ontological
predicament."
The Lion and the Educator
The question now arises; is the role of the educator over when
the student has learned his skills, appropriated as much of the
factual and cultiiral material that he can master, and now has come
to the point where he has to repudiate, has to reject, has to strike
out on his own even to the point of negating much of wht the educator
has taught him? Nietzsche's answer is an emphatic no. However,
this is not to imply that when tie student does negate he is not alone,
for he is. Once he commences the stage of negation he has taken the
decisive step and begun to tread his own path. No one can do it for
him.
Think not that I will \irge you to
run the same perilous risk! Or that
I will urge you on even to the same
solitude! For whoever proceeds on
his own path meets nobody: that is the
feature of one's "own path". No one
comes to help him in hi| task: he must face
everything quite alone.
Yet some students are much more prepared than others. If they have
had the good fortime of having a loving educator who has prepared him
_Jha^aasess^s-.certain traita_that will stand him in good stead: hardness
courage and self discipline. He knows that his own path involves
more struggling, more self discipline and more hardness but because he has
come in contact with a great man and yearns for that greatness he is willing
to pay the price.
^The Dawn of Day. The Complete Works , p. 2.
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Plato
,
in one of his letters puts it well
:
If the student be truly philosophical,
he believes at this point that he has
been shown a marvelous way and that he
must brace himself at once to follow it,
and that life will not be worth living
if he does otherwise. . .Those who are
not philosophical but tinged superfically
with opinions, when they realize how many
studies are required and how great the
labor, and how disciplined the mode of
daily life is that which benefits^the
subject, they deem it impossible.
And, in actuality, the educator must be prepared for failures. There
will in all probability be those students who out of fear do not
take the step. There will be those students who do begin to find
their own path but give up the high ideal of their educator: to create
for the good of humanity and instead become interested only in selfish
and narrow interests. They deliberately narrow their world to themselves
and the few around them and work only for them. Then there will be
those who get blocked in the stage of negation and remain no-sayers for
the rest of their lives incapable of creation. Also, there will be
those who will not be able to bear the pain of staying on one's own
path, the struggle, the s\iffering, the aloneness and out of weakness
and/or laziness will just give up. It is for these students that
fTietzsche* has a kind of pity. • *-—
‘
This is a feeling for which I find no
name adequate. I sense it when I
see precious capabilities squandered...
or when I see anyone halted, as a result
of some stupid accident, a-^ something less
than he might have become.
^ quoted in Leonard Nelson. Plato. Epistles , in Socratic Method
^ ^
and Critical Philosophy . Translated by Brown. (New Haven Yale.
1
'»4 ' p 27
^The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation. ,p. 198.
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If the educator cannot bear failiare, he will be crushed. Because
he ^as the conscience for the general development of mankind,"^
he is likely to s\jffer deeply when his students fail. Yet,
it is just at this point that he must be strong enough to overcome
the failtire, to have the courage to reflect on the relationship and
try not only to accept it but affirm it and love it. To see it
as part of the whole in the realization that he gave of himself and
his love to the extent that he was capable and that the student’s
liberation was always his primary aim. If he is not strong enough
for this, he should not be an educator.
If, however, the student does commence the stage of negation,
the role of the teacher remains essential. It is exactly at this
stage that the educator is put to the test, the test of his faith in
his student. He realizes that this negation is essential. Thus
he can say; "Now I bid you, lose me and find yourself .. .One repays
2
a teacher badly if one alwys remains a pupil." And even further:
"only when you have denied me will I return to you."^ However, he also
realizes that the dangers are great. The student might perish psycholog-
icallyj he might not be able to bear the suffering and solitude or worse
than that, he might remain a negator. His fear of the student's failure
arises and somehow must be outweighed by his faith. He will have doubts
and maybe even wonder if it would not have been better if the student had
remained an imitator. But he knows better than that.
^
Beyond Good and Evil . Ziiranem Translation, p. 79.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Portable , p. 190.
^Ibid.
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Hls role at this time is one of standing and yet
withdrawing. Nietzsche puts it this way: "My humanity does not
consist in sympathizing with man, but in standing I sympathize with
them,*'^ It is a matter of being there, strong, resolute and acting
with deep conviction, continuing to be oneself - the model. This
standing can reflect one's belief that, yes, the student has set
out on his own but he will be successful. Because the educator has
gone through the same process himself and attained the point where
he could affirm and create, he not only realizes what is happening to
the student, but has faith that he will make it. He realizes that
after his first dizziness with negation, the student will realize that
he has negated all absolutes, all fomdations, all gromd and he will
sense the horror of infinity. Having rejected the past, he will
inevitably, at times feel lost and maybe experience terror. It is as
if knows it will be painful and yet somehow necessary . out of his
love for his student he will be capable of "denying at the right
time."^ Eros will manifest itself in the educator's faith in the
potential creativity of the student - not the creature. Thus, he
will be above pity for pity answers to the creature in man.
In man creator and creature are united... and
.
— your pity is for the creature in him. . .for
that which must be formed, broken, forged, and ^
‘
.
purged...for that which necessarily must suffer.
'
Beyond Good and Evil . Zimmem Traslation. p. 89.
quoted in Kaufmann. Nietzsche , p. 368.
^Beyond Good and Evil. Zimmem Translation. p.l71
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Out of love the educator must be hard. Instead of wish the student
back to the stage of the camel, he wishes him growth and thus suffering:
To those h\jman beings in whom I have a stake
,
I wish suffering, being foresaken, maltreatment,
humiliation. I wish that they should not
remain unfamiliar with profound self contempt,
the torture of self mistrust, and the misery
of the vanquished: I have no pity for them because
I wish them the only thing that can prove today
whether one ^s worth anything or not - That
one endiures.
It made sense to Nietzsche that the more resistance that the student
learns to overcome, the freer he will become. However, the educator
cannot give what he does not have; thus if his life is not marked by
constant struggle and self overcoming, it is inconceivable that his
student will have the strength for this endurance. However, if his
educator is a man who has tasted of freedom and creativity, he knows
that he must have endured "bitter dying in life in order to become
2
a creator. . . " He realizes now that his teacher must have been
"willing to be the mother and endure the mother's pains in order to
3
be a creator." It is at this time of deepest negation that the image
of the strength of his educator can come to the aid of the student.
To the extent that the educator has done his job well, he
will always be a part of his student^ "Now I g<^^lone_^- . You too^go
^ 4 .
alone. Thus I want it... go away and resist Zarathustra . " But it
will take time for the student to realize this. For now he must be
"bold and ready to take risks...No one else can build a bridge on which
5
he must cross the river of life, no one but him alone."
^
The Will to Power. Kaufmann Translation, p. 481.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable, p. 111.
^Ibid.
Ibid , p. 190.
c
Schopenhauer as Educator, p. 4
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Nietzsche was aware that there will be many who will offer to cross the
bridge for you, but at the price of yo\xr personal freedom.
It is true that there are numerous paths,
bridges and demigods that wish to carry you
across the river, but only at the cost of
yourself .. .you would lose yourself ... In this
world there is a \anique way which no one but
you may pass: where does it lead? Do not ask!
Follow it!
Cnee the student has struck out on his own, the educator will keep an
eye on him from afar. Negation is not an end in itself and if it appears
that the student might become blocked in this stage, there is good reason
for the educator to reassert himself as the loving gadfly. He certainly
can step in again and remind the student of the importance of creativity
and affirmation and the fact that negation is only a means to something more.
2
’•To make the individual uncomfortable, that is my task." Thus the educator
can prod and question or create conditions which of themselves prod the
student on to the life of the creator. The student must learn that all
the fighting for "freedom from" will never siiffice for the ability to now
answer the question "freedom for" what? This role of the gadfly was expressed
in his letter to Lou Salome in 1882:
Lou, become the being that you are. First
one has the difficulty of emancipating
oneself from one's chains and ultimately
one has to emancipate oneself from this
emancipation too... In fond devotion to yo^r
destiny, for in you I love also my hopes.
What the student does at this point is up to him. However, the power of
eros, the love of his educator for him and who he is, now at this
^
Ibid.
Notes. Portable , p. 53.
\etter to Lou Salome, 1882. Selected Letters, p. 191.
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point, should not be underestimated. Because it is a powerful drive,
a drive known by the student in relationship to his love for his educator,
it is capable of pushing him on toward more affirmative modes of life.
To create new values: even the lion is
incapable of that...What can the child
do that even the lion cannot? Why
must the preying lion become a child?
The child is innocence and forgetfulness,
a new beginning, a self prope|.ling wheel,
a first motion, a sacred Yes.
The stage of the child is essential for the student to begin to create
new affirmative values for himself and for others. With the realization
that as long as he remains a negator he does not have any values, any
committments, he hopefully will be driven to the creation of a meaning for
his own existence. To the extent that he can accept and love his past,
and come to a point of loving all existence and the fact of eternal recurrence,
he will be successful. Eros or the will to power will urge him on to this
state of being.
The Stage of the Child and the Role of the Educator.
When the student has become a child, the role of the educator
becomes that of a friend. Once having passed the stage of
negation,
the student ±s capable of ent^irig into a mutal relationship
based on love
of each other and their common ideal: the production of
overmen. Zarathustra
tells his students "when you have denied me will I
return to you...You shall
become my friend and the child of a single hope:...
the overman shall live."
'Thid. Portable. o. 190-91,
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There is apparently, here and there on
earth, a kind of continuation of love
where the greedy desire of two persons
for each other has given way to a new
craving and greed, a common higher thirst
for an ideal, that stands above them: but
who knows this love? Who has experienced
it? Its true name is friendship.
Friends for Nietzsche share the highest type of relationship possible
for h\jman beings. '*I teach you the friend in whom the world stands
complete, a vessel of the good, the creating friend who always has
2
a complete world to bestow." By their very freedom, they are
dedicated to the growth and future development of each other and share the
ideal of the transformers of nature. They are dedicated to the
coming of the overman, men who can create meaning for the earth. They
yearn for creators of new values and new ideas that will aid all of
humanity. "May the friend be your festival of the earth and foretaste
3
of the overman."
In effect, at this stage, the student and teacher are each
other's educators. They are finally equals. In each other they "love
the overman as their principle.""^ It follows that they are primarily
interested in helping each other remain true to themselves and develop
their capacity for creativity.
_
They both are meir who.-4’-^ant
become themselves, the unique, the incomparable, those who make laws
5
for themselves, those who can create themselves." Because they are
^Joyful Wisdom . The Complete Works, p. 53.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Hollinqdale Translation, p. 88.
^
Ibid .
4
Ibid .
^Joyful Wisdom . The Complete Works, p. 263.
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committed to helping each other towards self perfection and thus
endlessly engaging in self overcoming, they are strong enough to be
hard with each other. Their love can bear such hardness.
But if you have a sxaffering friend, be
a resting place for his siaffering, but
a hard bed, as it weje...thus will
you profit him best.
They are primarily interested in having each other gain self mastery
and aim toward perfection. They are both characterized by an
affirmation toward all of existence and a lack of revenge; they share
a certain innocence characterized by their acceptance of the constant
flux of all becoming and their love of eternal recurrence. Because
they can control their passions, they are not afraid of them: They
love them and are able to use them in their work as creators of meaning.
Out of fullness and joy they are capable of loving each other and
working toward the creation of new values. They both share a certain
quality of being which sets them apart from others. Their intense
concentration on their own and each other ' s self perfection flows into
their every action as does their gratitude for life itself. They
give because they love and have something to give ; they give because they
are thankful. Somehow they are marked by a certain maturity; "that
means ttiey have reacquired the seriousness that they had as children
2
at play."
quoted in Kaufmann. Nietzsche, p. 367.
Beyond Good and Evil. Zimmem Translation, p. 89.
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Because they are childlike, they have the ability to create; the
ability to be completely consumed by what they are doing. They are outside
of time and themselves. Only by this forgetfulness can they be wholly
aware and free to create. They realize that freedom is the regaining of
that childlike attitude toward life again and again, that it is an
endless process and without it they are unable to create anew. Hard
with themselves, they are capable of destroying all that is old and useless
in themselves and can encourage each other to remain strong for the sake
of creation. Characterized by an amor fati their actions manifest an
acceptance and trust toward life without purpose or calculation. They
live their life with the knowledge that "eternal suffering of giving birth
must exist together with the eternal joy of creation and the eternal
affirmation of the will to live."^ They view their creativity as thdr
common task: the rendering of meaning to the earth and they dedicate
themselves to the creation of superior men who will create more and more
beautiful meaning for human existence. They are bound together in their
hope for the overman.
And there is nobody from whom I want beauty
as much as from you who are powerful : let
your kindness be your final self conquest.
Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I
want the good' from you... You shall strive after
the virtue of the col\amn: it grows more and more
.beautiful and gentle, but internally harder and
more endiaring as it ascends. Indeed, you that
are sublime shall yet become beautiful one day
and hold up a mirror to your own beauty. Then
your soul shall shudder with godlike desires ^
and
there will be adoration even in your vanity.
^
The Twilight of the Idols. Portable
.
p. 172.
^
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Portable . p. 230-31.
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